Defending Uselessness: Rousseau’s Harmless and Happy Idleness

Political Research Quarterly ◽

10.1177/10659129211035835 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 106591292110358

Author(s):

Jacob T. Snyder

Keyword(s):

Human Nature ◽

Specific Form ◽

Moral Principle ◽

Common Morality

While also valuing useful citizenship, Rousseau offers what is perhaps the most substantive modern account and defense of idleness. According to Rousseau, idleness’ attraction lies in its relation to human nature and its capacity for producing our highest happiness. However, Rousseau is also careful to show that most existing forms of idleness are false, and true idleness is a difficult achievement. The happiness available in idleness can only be attained when free from vanity, obligation, and foresight. This specific form of idleness is also the only form that is morally and politically defensible. Though Rousseau argues, in the First Discourse, that the useless are pernicious, this is only true of the falsely idle that seek to undermine common morality and political attachment. True idleness, while still useless, satisfies Rousseau’s core moral principle to not harm.

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Consequentialist Perfectionism

Dialogue ◽

10.1017/s0012217300008106 ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 35 (1) ◽

pp. 109-116

Author(s):

Ishtiyaque Haji

Keyword(s):

Human Nature ◽

Ethical Theory ◽

Moral Principle ◽

Moral Claims ◽

Normative Ethical Theory

Perfectionism is an ambitious and thoroughly engaging work in which Thomas Hurka sets out to formulate and defend a normative ethical theory that “is of sufficient depth and generality to be … the basis of all moral claims” (p. 32). Beginning with an axiology, Hurka proposes that the development of the properties constitutive of human nature is intrinsically good, and his fundamental moral principle enjoins us to promote the greatest development of the nature of all humans at all times.

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The problem of priority of principles in bioethics. Can the Kantian classification in perfect and imperfect duties help us?

Ηθική. Περιοδικό φιλοσοφίας ◽

10.12681/ethiki.25963 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 13

Author(s):

George Boutlas

Keyword(s):

Moral Dilemma ◽

Moral Principle ◽

Common Morality ◽

Theoretical Justification ◽

Central Idea ◽

Imperfect Duties ◽

The Usa ◽

Seeking Help ◽

The Uk ◽

Moral Objectivism

Principlism has dominated contemporary Anglophone practical ethics often regarded as the most important methodological conception. Young biomedical scientists grow up learning to apply the “four principles”, an approach originally introduced in the USA by Beauchamp & Childress but soon accepted also in the UK with the support of Professor Raanan Gillon. The central idea of the method involves, first identifying the relevant among the four moral principle(s), (beneficence, non maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice) that is (are) connected with a specific moral dilemma. Then, one follows procedures of balancing, specification and deductive application, as a bridge between the moral dilemma and the four principles. Some attention is paid while balancing, to consequentialist considerations, and to other ethically significant concepts as the virtues and the emotions, but only incidentally. What is central in Beauchamp & Childress’s principlism is the adoption of normative insights of common morality, holding the position of a theoretical justification for the methodological reasoning which will determine the solution of a specific moral problem.The main ambition of the four principles approach and its main virtue is the clarity of the method and consequently the ability to become comprehensive and easily applied. There are certain problems though in applying the method. Here, we are going to investigate the problem of relative priority of principles, i.e. which principle overrides the other when two or more of them are in conflict, seeking help by the Kantian division, in perfect and imperfect duties. But we must first answer the question: Is the four principles approach, a method of moral objectivism as Beauchamp & Childress claim, or is it a method of moral relativism, as it is often argued by some of their critics? Only if our answer to the objectivity question is positive, can the main issue of priority be addressed, because an attempt at a determinate ordering wouldn’t mean anything in a relativist frame.

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