Genetic engineering and gene manipulation: the right (of future generations) to surprise

Genetic engineering is currently at the forefront of biotechnological innovation and aspires to change once and for ever the way we understand and handle human nature. Especially the growth of Eugenics makes us visualise a different world, where humanity will not only dispense itself from the detrimental gene mutations that are accountable for fatal illnesses, but will also ameliorate through prenatal gene manipulation. In the first part of this paper, I will introduce the responsibility-oriented morality of Hans Jonas, who supports vividly all efforts of negative Eugenics but seems sceptical about genetic enhancement, since on the one hand we have no right to decide on behalf of our descendants on what is best for them, and on the other due to his view that the abundance of our genetic stock should not hang on parents’ desires. In the second part, I will correlate these oppositions with Hannah Arendt’s concept of “natality”. Not only do Jonas and Habermas invoke it with applause; “natality” also discloses the very essence of birth, namely that each newborn epitomises total unpredictability and promises to renew human affairs. So, gene manipulation for enhancement purposes seems to encroach on “natality’s” dominion and diminish future autonomy. Finally, I will argue that, if Arendt’s conceptual frame consolidates objections to positive Eugenics, each unborn child holds a right to surprise, the content of which is not limited to an individual level but touches society and humanity.

Bionic man: Principles and limits

The subject of this paper is the ethical considerations raised in the issue of “bionic man”, a man whose many organs have been replaced by artificial, and the principles and ethical limitations that are inherent in this process. Four basic bioethical principles are acknowledged in the international bibliography: a) the principle of beneficence; b) the principle of autonomy and informed consentof patients; c) the principle of justice; d) the principle of equality. Apart from this,some more issues should be taken into consideration in the discussion about theethics of artificial implants: the allocation of health care and economic resources, the patentability of implants, the use of implants in the human consciousness itself and the subsequent changes of implants in one’s personality, as well as the willingness of a patient to accept an implant under the prism of his/her belonging to a specific subculture, due to his/her impairment.

The problem of priority of principles in bioethics. Can the Kantian classification in perfect and imperfect duties help us?

Principlism has dominated contemporary Anglophone practical ethics often regarded as the most important methodological conception. Young biomedical scientists grow up learning to apply the “four principles”, an approach originally introduced in the USA by Beauchamp & Childress but soon accepted also in the UK with the support of Professor Raanan Gillon. The central idea of the method involves, first identifying the relevant among the four moral principle(s), (beneficence, non maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice) that is (are) connected with a specific moral dilemma. Then, one follows procedures of balancing, specification and deductive application, as a bridge between the moral dilemma and the four principles. Some attention is paid while balancing, to consequentialist considerations, and to other ethically significant concepts as the virtues and the emotions, but only incidentally. What is central in Beauchamp & Childress’s principlism is the adoption of normative insights of common morality, holding the position of a theoretical justification for the methodological reasoning which will determine the solution of a specific moral problem.The main ambition of the four principles approach and its main virtue is the clarity of the method and consequently the ability to become comprehensive and easily applied. There are certain problems though in applying the method. Here, we are going to investigate the problem of relative priority of principles, i.e. which principle overrides the other when two or more of them are in conflict, seeking help by the Kantian division, in perfect and imperfect duties. But we must first answer the question: Is the four principles approach, a method of moral objectivism as Beauchamp & Childress claim, or is it a method of moral relativism, as it is often argued by some of their critics? Only if our answer to the objectivity question is positive, can the main issue of priority be addressed, because an attempt at a determinate ordering wouldn’t mean anything in a relativist frame.

The best interests of the child in medically assisted reproduction: A moral-constitutional overview

The infinite and constantly developing options of medically assisted reproduction (MAR) reasonably raise the issue of its permitted range. Proponents of human rights fight for the strengthening of the reproductive right, the access to it by even more people, such as single parents, same-sex couples, elderly women, HIV carriers etc. Still concerning, however, is the fact that the defenders of human rights often forget the rights of the fetus or the child, which cannot be expressed with the same intensity. In the framework of the present study, we investigate the true interests of the child in MAR, in relation to the reproductive right in the light of some borderline cases.

Is dignity a useless concept?

In this paper I undertake to examine Ruth Macklin’s claim that dignity is a useless concept. I explain her contention by the fact that dignity, as a concept, has a long history and has been presented differently at different times. I shed some lighton certain different conceptions of dignity in ancient times and in our contemporaryera. And I end up with the suggestion that the term “dignified”, like “good”, is a primarily evaluative term, unlike what some philosophers have thought.

Η Βιοηθική και ο γενναίος, νέος κόσμος

Οι άνθρωποι επιλέγουμε τις ενασχολήσεις μας είτε παίζοντες είτε σπουδάζοντες – δηλαδή, είτε επειδή μας σαγηνεύουν κάποια αντικείμενα είτε διότι η ανάγκη μας επιβάλλει να εγκύπτουμε σε αυτά. Ενίοτε, όχι πολύ συχνά, η σαγήνη συναντάται με την ανάγκη, και η σύμπτωσή τους γεννά πεδία σπάνιας γονιμότητας – αυτή είναι η περίπτωση της Βιοηθικής. Στο σύντομο αυτό δοκίμιο θα σκιαγραφήσω τους λόγους οι οποίοι επιβάλλουν σήμερα την ενασχόλησή μας με τη Βιοηθική, ενώ, παράλληλα, φιλοδοξώ να μεταφέρω λίγη από τη γοητεία που αυτή ασκεί σε όποιον έρχεται σε επαφή μαζί της.

Benevolens vastator mundi: κριτική αποτίμηση του επιχειρήματος του R. N. Smart και η παράμετρος του οικοφασισμού

Στόχος της εργασίας είναι η εξέταση του επιχειρήματος του R. N. Smart (1958), κατά το οποίο η εκούσια εξάλειψη της ανθρώπινης ζωής στο σύνολό της μπορεί να ταυτιστεί, θεωρητικά, με το μέσο για την εκμηδένιση της δυστυχίας. Το επιχείρημα αρχικά προσεγγίζεται στη βάση του αρνητικού ωφελιμισμού, ενώ στη συνέχεια αποπειράται η σύνδεσή του με σύγχρονες θεωρίες από το πεδίο της περιβαλλοντικής ηθικής και του οικοφασισμού. Σύμφωνα με μία εκδοχή, η μαζική εξάλειψη του ανθρώπινου είδους όχι μόνο θα ήταν μία ηθική πράξη που θα εκμηδένιζε τη δυστυχία αλλά θα επέφερε και μεγαλύτερα ποσοστά ευτυχίας για όλη την οικόσφαιρα, καθώς το συμφέρον αυτής ―εν συνόλω θεωρούμενο― έχει μεγαλύτερη προτεραιότητα ως προς το συμφέρον του ανθρώπινου είδους μεμονωμένα. Μέσα από την κριτική αποτίμηση του αρχικού επιχειρήματος, αξιολογείται η συνοχή του και προκύπτουν τα τελικά συμπεράσματα.