Geographies of media and power

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inka Salovaara-Moring ◽  
Kirsi Maunula

•This article explores the representation of the United States in Finnish daily newspapers, 1984—2009. Empirically, it builds on an analysis of editorials and commentaries that focus on US foreign policy. The examples deal with the deployment of US nuclear missiles to Europe in 1984, the Balkans war in 1994, the continuation of the war in Iraq in 2004, and the Cairo speech of newly elected President Barack Obama in 2009. Theoretically, the article reflects on discourses through the geographies of power politics and identity organized by the media of the small borderland country, Finland, at the ideological, economic and cultural-interactional levels. The focal questions are how the frontiers and contours of the evolving geopolitical positions of the United States were articulated, and how territorial units were defined in the spatial and symbolic practices of the commentators. In these discourses, ‘USA’ is constructed through three successive narratives: (a) as a ‘superpower’ in relation to the Soviet Union/Europe, in which new identities are depicted as part of differing positions in power geographies; (b) ‘America’ as an ideological space where the main organizing principles are ‘American’ values and moralities in relation to changing economic and political geographies; and (c) a territorial order of geo-economy in which the USA is represented as the engine of capitalism with its economic superiority highlighted. •

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 197-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lykourgos Kourkouvelas

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union and its East European allies sought to prevent the installation of U.S. nuclear missiles in Western Europe by embarking on a diplomatic “peace offensive” that included proposals for the creation of denuclearized zones in various geographical areas of Europe. This article considers how the NATO countries responded to these proposals. In the end, the Western allies rejected proposals for the denuclearization of the Balkans and other areas in Europe, but discussions within NATO's councils often proved complicated, especially regarding southern Europe. In the case of the 1957 Stoica proposal for the denuclearization of the Balkans, the leading NATO countries stepped back and let Turkey and Greece reject the proposal, but by 1963, in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States and other key allied countries as well as the NATO bureaucracy assumed a more active role in evaluating and ultimately rejecting the notion of denuclearization in the Mediterranean.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina Spohr Readman

On the basis of recently released archival sources from several member-states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), this article revisits the making of NATO's landmark 1979 dual-track decision. The article examines the intersecting processes of personal, bureaucratic, national, and alliance high politics in the broader Cold War context of increasingly adversarial East-West relations. The discussion sheds new light on how NATO tried to augment its deterrent capability via the deployment of long-range theater nuclear missiles and why ultimately an arms control proposal to the Soviet Union was included as an equal strand. The 1979 decision owed most to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's political thought and initiative. Intra-alliance decision-making, marked by transatlantic conflict and cooperation, benefitted from the creativity and agency of West German, British, and Norwegian officials. Contrary to popular impressions, the United States did not truly lead the process.


1986 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Kubalkova ◽  
A. A. Cruickshank

In the historiography of the Cold War a small but active group of American historians influenced by New Left radicalism rejected the view prevailing in the USA at the time in regard to the assignation of responsibility for the beginning and continuation of the Cold War.1 Although their reasoning took them along different routes and via different perceptions as to key dates and events, there were certain features all US revisionists had in common (some more generally recognized than others). Heavily involved as they were in the analysis of the US socio-economic system, the Soviet Union was largely left out of their concerns and it was the United States who had been found the ‘guilty’ party. The revisionists, of course inadvertently, corroborated Soviet conclusions, a fact gratefully acknowledged by Soviet writers.2


Author(s):  
Maryna Bessonova

The most widespread plots interpreted as the beginning of the Cold War are the events that took place in 1946: February 9 – J. Stalin’s speech to the electorate in Moscow; February 22 – the American charge d’Affaires in the Soviet Union G. Kennan’s “long telegram”; March 5 – W. Churchill’s speech in Fulton (the USA); September 27 – the Soviet Ambassador in the United States N. Novikov’s “long telegram”. But there was an earlier event, so called “Gouzenko affair”, which is almost unknown for the Ukrainian historiography. On September 5, 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk of the Soviet embassy to Canada, defected to the Canadian side with more than a hundred secret documents that proved the USSR’s espionage activities in the countries of North America. Information about the network of Soviet agents caused a real panic in the West and was perceived as a real start of the Cold War. In the article, there is made an attempt to review the main events related to the Gouzenko affair and to identify the dominant interpretations of this case in contemporary historical writings. One can find different interpretations of the reasons and the consequences of Gouzenko’s defection which dramatically affected the history of the world. One of the main vivid results was an anti-communist hysteria in the West which was caused by the investigation that Canadian, American and British public officials and eminent scientists were recruited by the Soviet Union as agents for the atomic espionage. For Canada, the Gouzenko affair had an unprecedented affect because on the one hand it led to the closer relations with the United States in the sphere of security and defense, and on the other hand Canada was involved into the international scandal and used this case as a moment to start more activities on the international arena. It has been also found that the Canadian and American studies about Gouzenko affair are focused on the fact that the Allies on the anti-Hitler coalition need to take a fresh look at security and further cooperation with the USSR, while the overwhelming majority of Russian publications is focused on the very fact of betrayal of Igor Gouzenko.


Author(s):  
Vladimir K. Кantor ◽  

The author examines a geopolitical line in the development of Russian philoso­phy in emigration. Not only the Russian revolution of 1917, not only the Nazi revolution of 1933–1935, but the Second World War changed the balance of power on the intellectual map of the world. Hitler was defeated by the Soviet Union with the help of the Anglo-American allies. As a result, two blocks emerged. They got a taste for the disposal of Europe and other countries of the United States, the USSR also strengthened, expanding the area of its influence (“Eastern bloc”). Should emigrants return to Russia? Bunin tried, but at the bor­der he turned back after reading articles about Akhmatova and Zoshchenko in the Pravda newspaper. Remain in a devastated and half-starved Europe, which has no time for emigrants? Or choose the third path where the track has al­ready been paved. Russian intellectuals from Germany have already settled in the United States, many have taken root there, some have returned. This, in essence, was the second emigration, the continuation of the first. There was already an experience of flight, but there was also a craving for German culture, which, despite the German Nazism sweeping through the world, Russian thinkers highly valued. They – as it should be in trouble – held on to each other. An example of this intellectual collaboration is Karpovich and Stepun.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 607-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck

Thirty-three years ago I published an article in this Journal entitled Who Killed Article 2 (4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, which examined the phenomenon of increasingly frequent resort to unlawful force by Britain, France, India, North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The essay concluded with this sad observation:The failure of the U.N. Charter's normative system is tantamount to the inability of any rule, such as that set out in Article 2(4), in itself to have much control over the behavior of states. National self-interest, particularly the national self-interest of the super- Powers, has usually won out over treaty obligations. This is particularly characteristic of this age of pragmatic power politics. It is as if international law, always something of a cultural myth, has been demythologized. It seems this is not an age when men act by principles simply because that is what gentlemen ought to do. But living by power alone ... is a nerve-wracking and costly business.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 123-144
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Czornik

The U.S. accession to the Second World War and indisputable victory initiated a new stage in the history of the United States. The country took a superpower position next to the USSR. The USA became the leading force of the democratic and capitalist world. During the Cold War, competing with the Soviet Union for influence in the global scale, the United States effectively spread its ideology, political system model, and value system. A number of determinants of an internal nature, both objective and subjective, influenced the shape of the foreign policy of the USA during the Cold War.


Author(s):  
Sebastian Rosato

Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. This book offers a theory—intentions pessimism—that says great powers can rarely if ever be confident that their peers have benign intentions, because it is extraordinarily difficult for them to obtain the kind of information that would allow them to reach such a conclusion. Any optimistic assertions to the contrary—and there are many—are wrong. Indeed, even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust—Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era (1871-90); Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement (1895-1906); France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period (1919-30); and the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the Cold War (1985-90)—the protagonists were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions. As a result, they competed for security. The ramifications for the future of U.S.-China relations are profound. Uncertain about the other side’s intentions, but aware of its formidable capabilities, Washington and Beijing will go to great lengths to strengthen their military and diplomatic positions, triggering a competitive action-reaction spiral with the potential for war.


Author(s):  
Erik Voeten

This chapter investigates how ideological contestation has shaped the institutions that protect foreign investment from expropriation. It explains how a focus on competition in a low-dimensional ideological space helps one make sense of the emergence of the investment regime and adjustments to it. From the U.S. perspective, the investment regime is partially about protecting the specific assets of American investors. Yet this could be achieved through other means. The institutional regime is also about advancing principles favored by the United States over alternative principles advocated by the Soviet Union and other states. This chapter first details ideological conflict during the Cold War. It then uses the framework from Chapter 4 to analyze the role of ideology in determining which countries did and did not sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with the United States. Finally, the chapter shows that governments that changed their ideological orientations since originally negotiating BITs are the most likely to renegotiate or end treaties. The rational functional rationales of investment agreements must be understood against the backdrop of fierce ideological competition in a low-dimensional space.


Author(s):  
D. S. Foglesong

Histories of the end of the Cold War that have focused on the roles of the top leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have neglected an important dimension of the ending of the antagonism between the West and the East. Before Ronald Reagan and M.S. Gorbachev met at Geneva in November 1985, citizens of the USA, the USSR, and European nations who were alarmed by the danger of nuclear war formed new organizations dedicated to overcoming the hostility between their nations. British members of European Nuclear Disarmament and American activists in groups such as Beyond War and Peace Links established connections to independent groups in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as the Committee of Soviet Women and the Committee for the Defense of Peace in the USSR. These relationships made it possible to organize very ambitious citizen diplomacy projects. Hundreds of Soviet citizens made extensive speaking tours in the United States while numerous British and American activists visited the Soviet Union. These exchanges dispelled negative stereotypes and helped to end the mutual demonization that had been central to the Cold War since the late 1940s. Analysis of the experiences of the citizen diplomats in the 1980s yields lessons for contemporary international relations about the importance of avoiding one-sided blame for conflicts and the need to move beyond recriminations about the past in order to develop cooperation in the present and future.


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