Il disallineamento tra orientamenti elettorali e posizioni sui temi: una questione giovanile o di famiglia politica?

The transformation of politics in contemporary democracies has led to the emergence of a new ideological conflict, alongside the traditional left-right scheme, described as liberal–authoritarian or cosmopolitan–nationalist cleavage (Norris and Inglehart 2018; Kriesi 2008; 2012; Hooge and Marks 2009; 2018). This brought to a redefinition of the linkages between issue and voting preferences, as many voters decide to support a party independently of their positions or change positions on the issues while voting for the same party. Within such framework, the contribute of the new generations to the growth of the electoral dealignment and volatility has been largely analysed (Franklin 2004; Miller and Shanks 1996; Plutzer 2006). Issue incongruency is part of the process. Young people are often considered to be tolerant and inclusive because they grew up under prosperous and secure conditions and developed post-materialist values of freedom, multiculturalism, progressivism (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Janmaat and Keating 2019). However, the perspective of left-cosmopolitans engaged in electoral politics contrasts with the image of economically-insecure left-behind group of young people who don’t share the same progressive values (Sloam and Henn 2017; Sanders and Twyman 2016) and support right-wing political parties. What is still unknown is the extent to which extreme ideological traits and attitudes (e.g. negative discourses on immigration) combine with positions of openness on individual freedom. Likewise, the same contradiction can be found among left-wing voters who assume liberal position on economy or those economically left and culturally conservative. The article aims at analysing the relationship between issue positions and vote (propensity to vote). We test the hypotheses of a coherent vs incoherent ideological space by looking at the structure of voters’ preferences on economic (State vs. free market) and cultural issues (individual rights, attitudes towards minorities, European integration) and the differences between young people and older component of the electorate. The analysis is focused on the Italian case. Data are taken from the 2020 Itanes survey.

How Compulsory Voting Affects Parties

This second theoretical chapter lays out expectations about the impact of compulsory voting on the ways in which political parties seek votes. It argues that compulsory voting’s influence depends on whether parties are situated inside or outside of the political mainstream. It first proposes that parties’ reduction of get-out-the-vote tactics under mandatory rules will be stronger if they belong to the political mainstream. It then develops expectations about mandatory voting’s influence on the ways in which parties position themselves to attract support. The chapter puts forth the hypothesis that compulsory voting incentivizes mainstream parties to move toward the center of ideological space in an effort to appeal to voting populations that are broadly reflective of society as a whole. For non-mainstream parties, alternatively, mandatory voting incentivizes vote seeking at the extremes in order to appeal to those who are cajoled to the voting booth against their will.

Identifying space for mainstreaming multilingual pedagogies in European initial teacher education policies

This study sought to explore the ideological and implementational spaces for mainstreaming multilingual pedagogies (MPs) in initial teacher education (ITE) policies and curricula across the European Union. The concept of linguistically sensitive teaching (LST) was used as a lens to examine inclusive, equity-centred MPs in ITE. A multi-sited comparative case study was conducted to collect data in nine locations. As a result, a general trend of ideological spaces was observed for MPs in language-in-education policies at the European and (sub)national levels. However, this ideological space was not always implemented in ITE. As a second result, explicit mentions of MPs and LST were identified in the ITE curricula of seven sites, and in each of the nine cases, a potential space for implementation was observed. As a third result we found that the greatest potential for opening implementational spaces for MPs lies in courses that aim to develop general pedagogical and sociolinguistic knowledge as well as professional beliefs in future teachers. In conclusion, we contend that the linguistic ecology and the organisational structure of education systems (decentralisation) are factors that help explain the successful mainstreaming of MPs in ITE institutions.

Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

Strongmen Don’t Pivot

Chapter 5 focuses on the 2016 general election. Having conquered the GOP’s best and brightest in the primary, Donald Trump had no interest in compromises; his version of unity was allowing Republican politicians and party officials a chance to accept his terms. Why compromise with the elites he had vilified before his roaring crowds? No matter what mainstream media thought of his racism, sexism, and bluster, there was a whole online system of nativists and nationalists occupying the ideological space to the right of Fox News who were more than happy to promote Trump, unfiltered. He won support from major evangelical leaders when, without hedging or caution, he became the first presidential candidate to flat-out promise “pro-life” judges. The GOP establishment—horrified by Trump’s campaign but scared of his rabid following—stayed largely silent. When Hillary Clinton let loose about the “deplorables” who liked Trump’s intolerance, it became a defiant note of pride among the whites she attacked, and proof she did not care about their economic woes. Trump doubled down on his nativist populism, aided by timely releases of hacked DNC e-mails by WikiLeaks and the reopening of an FBI investigation into Clinton’s use of a private e-mail server. On Election Day, the unimaginable occurred.

A Spatial Modeling Framework

This chapter proposes a simple spatial modeling framework to analyze how variations in interdependence and ideology shape incentives for cooperation and competition. The goal is to present a framework that is as simple as the prisoner's dilemma, coordination dilemma, battle of the sexes, and other two-by-two games that have served as mental models for rationalist analyses of cooperation. The spatial model easily accommodates multiple actors and distributive conflict and allows for analyses of how institutions structure choices. It starts from the assumption that actors have ideal points in a common low-dimensional ideological space. Yet their utilities are determined not just by their own policies but also by the policies of other actors. This interdependence creates incentives for cooperation. In this context, institutions may help actors achieve mutually beneficial outcomes, but they also have distributive implications. Institutions help shift policy status quos in particular directions.

Introduction

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book's argument that much, though not all, distributive conflict over multilateral institutions takes place in a low-dimensional ideological space. Even if distributive conflict over institutions is not always about ideology, the geopolitical implications often are. The point of this book is not just to argue that ideological contestation matters but also to offer measures, a modeling framework, and empirical illustrations. The theoretical framework helps in better understanding how institutional commitments hang together and may unravel together as challenges to the liberal institutional order mount. If multilateralism is distinct because it advances general principles, then one must understand challenges to the multilateral order in terms of domestic and international challenges to those principles. The chapter then presents a brief illustration of the World Trade Organization.

Ideology and Theories of International Institutions

This chapter explains how the book's theoretical framework contrasts with and complements existing theories of international institutions. It discusses four families of theories: functionalism, rational institutionalism, liberal internationalism, and constructivism. These theoretical frameworks yield meaningful insights about important aspects of the post-World War II multilateral order. Yet they can be enriched by conceptualizing multilateralism in terms of cooperation and competition in a low-dimensional ideological space. Functionalists and their intellectual descendants understand institutionalization as an incremental process driven by interdependencies and the spillover effects from previous institutionalization. Rational institutionalists argue that states delegate authority to international institutions in order to solve strategic problems that prevent states from reaping collective gains. Liberal internationalist theorists argue that the post-World War II multilateral order reflects the values and priorities of the United States. Finally, constructivists have long emphasized the ideational foundations of multilateral institutions. However, they have focused on norms, culture, and identities rather than ideology as the basis for doing so.

Ideology and the Investment Regime

This chapter investigates how ideological contestation has shaped the institutions that protect foreign investment from expropriation. It explains how a focus on competition in a low-dimensional ideological space helps one make sense of the emergence of the investment regime and adjustments to it. From the U.S. perspective, the investment regime is partially about protecting the specific assets of American investors. Yet this could be achieved through other means. The institutional regime is also about advancing principles favored by the United States over alternative principles advocated by the Soviet Union and other states. This chapter first details ideological conflict during the Cold War. It then uses the framework from Chapter 4 to analyze the role of ideology in determining which countries did and did not sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with the United States. Finally, the chapter shows that governments that changed their ideological orientations since originally negotiating BITs are the most likely to renegotiate or end treaties. The rational functional rationales of investment agreements must be understood against the backdrop of fierce ideological competition in a low-dimensional space.