Judicial ideology in economic cases: Evidence from the General Court of the European Union

2020 ◽  
pp. 146511652097134
Author(s):  
Wessel Wijtvliet ◽  
Arthur Dyevre
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
Measurement Methods ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Private Business ◽  
Promising Alternative ◽  
Expert Ratings

We contribute new empirical evidence on the influence of ideology on the behaviour of European Union judges. As votes and other common proxies for judicial preferences are unavailable, we ask 46 competition law experts to rate the ideology of 51 judges who have served on the General Court of the European Union. The average ratings are then used to explain the outcome of competition and state aid cases (N = 655). We find that, consistent with research on United States courts, the pro-business score of the panel median is a significant predictor of General Court decisions in competition and state aid cases. We find less conclusive evidence for the influence of Europhilia. While showing that attitudes towards private business may matter more than Europhilia in economic cases, our analysis also suggests that expert ratings constitute a viable and promising alternative in settings where other measurement methods are unavailable.

III. Social Policy

2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 475-482
Author(s):  
Erika Szyszczak
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Holistic Approach ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Lisbon Agenda

Social policy is undergoing review, the aim being to consolidate the fragmented nature of social policy law, and to provide for the integration of all Community policies. This is part of a larger where the EU is attempting to provide a holistic approach towards all policies, ensuring that they meet the demands placed upon governments, as well as private undertakings, in the enlarged single market. Of particular significance is the interaction between social policy law and competition law, especially in relation to state aid and merger policy. The Lisbon Process, now at mid-term, has not been successful in delivering the projected results. Thus throughout 2005 the European Union focused upon revitalizing the Lisbon agenda with the focus upon improving the quality of work as well as combating unemployment.1

European Union Law

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional History ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
Part Structure ◽  
Free Movement Of Goods ◽  
Substantive Law

European Union Law uses a distinctive three-part structure to examine the constitutional foundations, legal powers, and substantive law of the European Union. This third edition includes an updated dedicated chapter on the past, present, and future of Brexit. Part I looks at the constitutional foundations including a constitutional history and an examination of the governmental structure of the European Union. Part II looks at governmental powers. It covers legislative, external, executive, judicial, and limiting powers. The final part considers substantive law. It starts off by examining the free movement of goods, services, and persons. It then turns to competition law and finally ends with an analysis of internal and external policies.

General Overview of Private Damages Claims

De Jure ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora Mateina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
General Overview

This article aims to provide a general overview of the regime of claims for private damages caused by breaches of competition law. The possibility for private damages claims existed even prior the adoption of the Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. Nevertheless, these claims were not popular among the business, even when the Commission for Protection of competition established breaches and imposed sanctions for breach of competition. With the transposition of the directive in the Bulgarian Competition Protection Act, an increased interest towards private damages claims is expected.

scholarly journals Competition Law and State Aid for Failing Banks in the EU and its Specific Implications for CEE Member States

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Virág Blazsek
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Common Market ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Bank Bailouts ◽  
The Eu

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the longrun however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.

scholarly journals The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of Consequential Judicial Self-Restraint

2021 ◽  
pp. 155-181
Author(s):  
Pál Sonnevend
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Law

AbstractModern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inherently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitutional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means already available.

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