Three Theories of Choice and Their Psychology of Losses

2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162110013
Author(s):  
Tomás Lejarraga ◽  
Ralph Hertwig

Loss aversion has long been regarded as a fundamental psychological regularity, yet evidence has accumulated to challenge this conclusion. We review three theories of how people make decisions under risk and, as a consequence, value potential losses: expected-utility theory, prospect theory, and risk-sensitivity theory. These theories, which stem from different behavioral disciplines, differ in how they conceptualize value and thus differ in their assumptions about the degree to which value is dependent on state and context; ultimately, they differ in the extent to which they see loss aversion as a stable individual trait or as a response to particular circumstances. We highlight points of confusion that have at least partly fueled the debate on the reality of loss aversion and discuss four sources of conflicting views: confusion of loss aversion with risk aversion, conceptualization of loss aversion as a trait or as state dependent, conceptualization of loss aversion as context dependent or independent, and the attention–aversion gap—the observation that people invest more attentional resources when evaluating losses than when evaluating gains, even when their choices do not reveal loss aversion.

Risks ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Oleg Uzhga-Rebrov ◽  
Peter Grabusts

Choosing solutions under risk and uncertainty requires the consideration of several factors. One of the main factors in choosing a solution is modeling the decision maker’s attitude to risk. The expected utility theory was the first approach that allowed to correctly model various nuances of the attitude to risk. Further research in this area has led to the emergence of even more effective approaches to solving this problem. Currently, the most developed theory of choice with respect to decisions under risk conditions is the cumulative prospect theory. This paper presents the development history of various extensions of the original expected utility theory, and the analysis of the main properties of the cumulative prospect theory. The main result of this work is a fuzzy version of the prospect theory, which allows handling fuzzy values of the decisions (prospects). The paper presents the theoretical foundations of the proposed version, an illustrative practical example, and conclusions based on the results obtained.


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 395
Author(s):  
Marcelo Cabus Klotzle ◽  
Leonardo Lima Gomes ◽  
Luiz Eduardo Teixeira Brandão ◽  
Antonio Carlos Figueiredo Pinto

Since the fifties, several measures have been developed in order to measure the performance of investments or choices involving uncertain outcomes. Much of these measures are based on Expected Utility Theory, but since the nineties a number of measures have been proposed based on Non-Expected Utility Theory. Among the Theories of Non-Expected Utility highlights Prospect Theory, which is the foundation of Behavioral Finance. Based on this theory this study proposes a new performance measure in which are embedded loss aversion along with the likelihood of distortions in the choice of alternatives. A hypothetical example is presented in which various performance measures, including the new measure are compared. The results showed that the ordering of the assets varied depending on the performance measure adopted. According to what was expected, the new performance measure clearly has captured the distortion of probabilities and loss aversion of the decision maker, ie, those assets with the greatest negative deviations from the target were those who had the worst performance.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Ruggeri ◽  
Sonia Alí ◽  
Mari Louise Berge ◽  
Giulia Bertoldo ◽  
Anna Cortijos-Bernabeu ◽  
...  

Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 article on Prospect Theory is one of the most influential papers across all of the behavioural sciences. The study tested a series of binary financial (risky) choices, ultimately concluding that judgments formed under uncertainty deviate significantly from those presumed by expected utility theory, which was the prevailing theoretical construct at the time. In the forty years since publication, this study has had a remarkable impact on science, policy, and other real-world applications. At the same time, a number of critiques have been raised about its conclusions and subsequent constructs that were founded on it, such as loss aversion. In an era where such presumed canonical theories have increasingly drawn scrutiny for inability to replicate, we attempted a multinational study of N = 4,099 participants from 19 countries and 13 languages. The same methods and procedures were used as in the original paper, adjusting only currencies to make them relative to current values, and requiring all participants to respond to all items. Overall, we found that results replicated for 94% of the 17 choice items tested. At most, results from the 1979 study were attenuated in our findings, which is most likely due to a more robust sample. Twelve of the 13 theoretical contrasts presented by Kahneman and Tversky also replicated, with a further 89% replication rate of the total contrasts possible when separating by location, up to 100% replication in some countries. We conclude that the principles of Prospect Theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds, and provide a number of important insights about replications, attenuation, and implications for the study of human decision-making at population-level.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Pedroni ◽  
Jörg Rieskamp ◽  
Thorsten Pachur ◽  
Renato Frey ◽  
Jonathan E. Westfall ◽  
...  

The investigation of decisions under risk has mainly followed one of two approaches.One relies on observing choices between lotteries in which economic primitives (outcome magnitudes, probabilities, and domains (i.e., gains and losses)) are varied systematically, and this information is described to participants. The systematic variation of the economic primitives allows to formally describe behavior with expectation-based models such as expected utility theory or cumulative prospect theory (CPT), arguably the most prominent descriptive theories of risky choice. One drawback, however, is that lottery tasks can seem artificial, likely reducing the external or ecological validity. A second more naturalistic approach employs dynamic paradigms that mimic features of real-life risky situations and are assumed to have higher ecological validity. Because key information are often not provided to the decision maker, it is impossible to apply the same models as in the first approach. The goal of the present work is to integrate both approaches, by developing models for the "hot" Columbia Card Task (CCT), a task that combines a dynamic decision situation with systematic trial-to-trial variation in economic primitives. In a model comparison on the basis of the data of 191 participants, we identified a best-performing model that describes behavior as a function of CPT’s main components, outcome sensitivity, probability weighting, and loss aversion. Our work therefore provides a framework that allows the description of risk-taking behavior in a naturalistic dynamic task based on key psychological constructs (e.g., loss aversion, probability weighting) that are rooted in the factorial variation of economic primitives.


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