scholarly journals Not lost in translation: Successfully replicating Prospect Theory in 19 countries

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Ruggeri ◽  
Sonia Alí ◽  
Mari Louise Berge ◽  
Giulia Bertoldo ◽  
Anna Cortijos-Bernabeu ◽  
...  

Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 article on Prospect Theory is one of the most influential papers across all of the behavioural sciences. The study tested a series of binary financial (risky) choices, ultimately concluding that judgments formed under uncertainty deviate significantly from those presumed by expected utility theory, which was the prevailing theoretical construct at the time. In the forty years since publication, this study has had a remarkable impact on science, policy, and other real-world applications. At the same time, a number of critiques have been raised about its conclusions and subsequent constructs that were founded on it, such as loss aversion. In an era where such presumed canonical theories have increasingly drawn scrutiny for inability to replicate, we attempted a multinational study of N = 4,099 participants from 19 countries and 13 languages. The same methods and procedures were used as in the original paper, adjusting only currencies to make them relative to current values, and requiring all participants to respond to all items. Overall, we found that results replicated for 94% of the 17 choice items tested. At most, results from the 1979 study were attenuated in our findings, which is most likely due to a more robust sample. Twelve of the 13 theoretical contrasts presented by Kahneman and Tversky also replicated, with a further 89% replication rate of the total contrasts possible when separating by location, up to 100% replication in some countries. We conclude that the principles of Prospect Theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds, and provide a number of important insights about replications, attenuation, and implications for the study of human decision-making at population-level.

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 395
Author(s):  
Marcelo Cabus Klotzle ◽  
Leonardo Lima Gomes ◽  
Luiz Eduardo Teixeira Brandão ◽  
Antonio Carlos Figueiredo Pinto

Since the fifties, several measures have been developed in order to measure the performance of investments or choices involving uncertain outcomes. Much of these measures are based on Expected Utility Theory, but since the nineties a number of measures have been proposed based on Non-Expected Utility Theory. Among the Theories of Non-Expected Utility highlights Prospect Theory, which is the foundation of Behavioral Finance. Based on this theory this study proposes a new performance measure in which are embedded loss aversion along with the likelihood of distortions in the choice of alternatives. A hypothetical example is presented in which various performance measures, including the new measure are compared. The results showed that the ordering of the assets varied depending on the performance measure adopted. According to what was expected, the new performance measure clearly has captured the distortion of probabilities and loss aversion of the decision maker, ie, those assets with the greatest negative deviations from the target were those who had the worst performance.


Risks ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Oleg Uzhga-Rebrov ◽  
Peter Grabusts

Choosing solutions under risk and uncertainty requires the consideration of several factors. One of the main factors in choosing a solution is modeling the decision maker’s attitude to risk. The expected utility theory was the first approach that allowed to correctly model various nuances of the attitude to risk. Further research in this area has led to the emergence of even more effective approaches to solving this problem. Currently, the most developed theory of choice with respect to decisions under risk conditions is the cumulative prospect theory. This paper presents the development history of various extensions of the original expected utility theory, and the analysis of the main properties of the cumulative prospect theory. The main result of this work is a fuzzy version of the prospect theory, which allows handling fuzzy values of the decisions (prospects). The paper presents the theoretical foundations of the proposed version, an illustrative practical example, and conclusions based on the results obtained.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui-Kuan Chung ◽  
Paul Glimcher ◽  
Agnieszka Tymula

Prospect theory, used descriptively for decisions under both risk and certainty, presumes concave utility over gains and convex utility over losses; a pattern widely seen in lottery tasks. Although such discontinuous gain-loss reference-dependence is also used to model riskless choices, only limited empirical evidence supports this use. In incentive-compatible experiments, we find that gain-loss reflection effects are not observed under riskless choice as predicted by prospect theory, even while in the same subjects gain-loss reflection effects are observed under risk. Our empirical results challenge the application of choice models across both risky and riskless domains. (JEL C91, D12, D81)


1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 719-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Quattrone ◽  
Amos Tversky

We contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory, using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues. The results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory. In particular, our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains, risk seeking in the domain of losses, and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains. This is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times. The results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options, contrary to the assumption of invariance. Finally, we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Stewart ◽  
Benjamin Scheibehenne ◽  
Thorsten Pachur

To fit models like prospect theory or expected utility theory to choice data, a stochastic model is needed to turn differences in values into choice probabilities. In these models, the parameter measuring risk aversion is strongly correlated with the parameter measuring the sensitivity to differences in value. We use dimensional analysis from the physical sciences to show that this is because the sensitivity parameter has units which depend on the risk aversion parameter. This means that comparing sensitivities across individuals with different level of risk aversion is meaningless and forbidden. We suggest a simple bug fix for prospect theory and other decision models which corrects this problem. The bug fix completely removes the correlation between sensitivity and risk aversion parameters in model estimations and allows the parameters to be interpreted as they were originally intended.


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