The Psychological Construction of Emotion – A Non-Essentialist Philosophy of Science

2021 ◽  
pp. 175407392110587
Author(s):  
Peter Zachar

Advocates for the psychological construction of emotion view themselves as articulating a non-essentialist alternative to basic emotion theory's essentialist notion of affect programs. Psychological constructionists have also argued that holding essentialist assumptions about emotions engenders misconceptions about the psychological constructionist viewpoint. If so, it is important to understand what psychological constructionists mean by “essentialism” and “non-essentialism.” To advance the debate, I take a deeper dive into non-essentialism, comparing the non-essentialist views of the early empiricists with those of the psychological constructionists, focusing on the theories of James Russell and Lisa Barrett. Using Lakatos’ notion of scientific research programs, I also describe how Russell's and Barrett's views have evolved into different and potentially competing research programs under the psychological constructionist banner.

2017 ◽  
Vol 69 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 206-226
Author(s):  
Mladen Lisanin

It is the author?s intention to explore the realist theory in International Relations in the context of Imre Lakatos?s Methodology of Scientific Research Programs. To this end, after defining the notion of realism in IR and exposing the foundations of Lakatos?s analytical pattern, relevant findings of several authors who took part in the debate on this issue from the area of philosophy of science (John Vasquez, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth) will be presented and critically analyzed. In that sense, there are two key lines of dispute: about whether Lakatos?s methodology is properly utilized in evaluating realist theory, and whether it represents an adequate tool for such a metatheoretical endeavor in the first place. In the concluding part of the article, author?s findings which point toward tenability of the realist research program, along with a limited scope of applicability of Lakatos?s methodology in the field of International Relations.


This chapter introduces the core thematic ideas of the present volume: that psychiatric research is in crisis, that it has entered a period of extraordinary science, and that a fully adequate response to the crisis should be responsive to the perspectives and interests of persons. We identify various sources of the crisis, drawing special attention to controversies concerning the role of the DSM in psychiatric research. And, we identify different strategies of response to the current crisis, including approaches that emphasize the importance of personal perspectives and the needs of the clinic and those that emphasize the important role of various scientific research programs. Further, we survey various developments (e.g., debates over fundamentals and a role for philosophical analysis, probing of the problems of the DSM framework, relaxation of standard forms of research practice, the introduction of the Research Domain Criteria initiative and other novel research programs) that are jointly suggestive of Thomas Kuhn’s characterization of periods of crisis that can arise in scientific research and of the “extraordinary science” that ensues. We suggest that this Kuhnian framework is useful for understanding the state of psychiatric research and it provides a framework for thinking about responses to the current crisis. We conclude with brief overviews of the contributions to the volume, each of which provides such a response.


1991 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Salanti

As made manifest by Clower's (1975) comments on their “science fiction” nature, general equilibrium theories (GET) present such peculiar and puzzling features that the methodologist must perforce seek some specific methodological accommodation for this part of economic theory. The role played by such theories in contemporary economics is so fundamental (in the sense of Green, 1981) that the impossibility of appraising them by means of any version of falsificationism, and their patent lack of (excess) empirical content if approached with the conceptual devices of the methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP), have prompted several scholars interested in the methodology of economics (although from different points of view and for even more different purposes) to search for a reasonable way out.


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-52
Author(s):  
Matías Bailone

The area of Research at the Research Institute and Foreign Reference of the Supreme Court of Justice has developed two scientific research programs during the past five years which we want to mention and comment on briefly. Both investigations were proposed, directed and supervised by Dr. Eugenio Raul Zaffaroni, one of the Supreme Court Justices on whom the whole structure depends.


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