Debates and arguments surrounding the questions of tanzīh (transcendence) and tashbīh (anthropomorphism) were a dominant feature of the discourses of early and classical theological thought. Within these discourses, the former term, tanzīh, was intricately entwined with the conception of God’s absolute transcendence and pre-eminence; while, the term tashbīh retained a rather pejorative connotation as it was associated with the conceptualization and description of God and his divine attributes using human characteristics and qualities as analogues; indeed, the verb from which the verbal noun tashbīh is derived signifies the act of likening or equating. Theological movements and schools of thought were defined by their respective standpoints on the notions of tanzīh and tashbīh, although scholars who were accused of adopting anthropomorphic positions repudiated such allegations, claiming that they were essentially advocating tanzīh. While the Qurʾan includes imposing statements which describe God as being “without peer or equal” (Q. 42:11; and Q. 112:4), and refer to him as “omniscient, omnipotent and sublime” (Q. 2:255; Q. 6:101–6; Q. 42:19), it also makes ample use of metaphors, forms of comparison, and imagery to exemplify and describe the personal and close nature of his relationship with mankind. The Qurʾan even describes God as being “closer to man than his jugular vein” (Q. 50:16) in ways which underscore his divine immanence. The conceptual significance of such Qurʾanic dicta was soon pored over within rational theological discourses in which arguments about transcendence and anthropomorphism loomed large. The associated terminology which features in the discussions includes taʿṭīl (negation), which was a label used to deride those who “stripped or divested God of his attributes”; tajsīm, which in contrast was a term used to besmirch those who associated God with physical presence and form; also connected to this was the term ḥashwiyya which has negative connotations in the history of classical Islamic thought as it was used to impute and vilify those religious movements who were accused of anthropomorphism. Separately, taʾwīl, whose original meaning denotes interpretation or explanation, was used in a theological context to indicate the “obviation” of the literal meanings of language when conceptualizing God and his attributes. Within the tradition, there were also scholars who refrained from proffering opinions on the meaning of such sensitive Qurʾanic passages and dicta discussing the divine attributes, and they adopted a strategy referred to as tafwīḍ or “delegation.” Mapping the precise historical trajectory of the gestation of these concepts together with their sundry terminology and the reasons why they became such contentious topics in Islamic theology remains a tentative exercise: the earliest theological sources tend to be fragmentary, while later literary sources are separated in time from the periods to which they refer; and in such sources adversaries sometimes misrepresent the perspectives of opponents. Still, the significance of the discussions on tanzīh and tashbīh ensured that they remained at the forefront of developing classical theological discourses, even resurfacing in the context of debates about Islamic reform and modernity. Significantly, safeguarding a conception of God whose transcendence is unique lay at the heart of Islamic philosophical discussions.
Eternal sunshine of the spotless mind: Light and luminous being in Islamic theology