The ROK-U.S. Combined Command and Control System and Crisis Management Procedures

2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-172
Author(s):  
Taeyoung Yoon

This article seeks to examine the development of the ROK-U.S. combined command and control system and crisis management procedures in South Korea. In particular, it explores the four crises which occurred between 1968 and 1999 in order to identify its implications for the ROK-U.S. combined crisis management. During a crisis, command and control over the armed forces are critical issues, in order to co-ordinate military movements and alert operations in the context of overall crisis objectives. Within the ROK-U.S. alliance, the ROK command and control chain of armed forces was highly integrated with the command and control chains of the UNC until 1978 and with the CFC from 1978. This CFC combined command structure has enabled the ROK to participate in the chain of operational control of its own forces and to strengthen its position in the ROK-U.S. combined crisis management procedures. Although both co-operated closely to cope with Korean crises in the past, there were some tensions in the use of military force and in the co-ordination of the detailed operational dimension of military operations. However, it can be argued that as long as the ROK crisis objectives and strategy were achieved through a consensus of alliance crisis options, these arrangements provided an effective crisis management system for ROK to resolve Korean crises. To some extent, the combined crisis management system enabled ROK to use America's massive military and intelligence capabilities to deter North Korea and to manage crises effectively. In the face of an era of transition and transformation in the ROK-U.S. alliance relationships following the September 11 2001, the ROK and U.S. need to minimise potential negative effects on combined crisis management system and maintain coherent deterrence capability and alliance stability on the Korean peninsula.

2019 ◽  
Vol 194 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-809
Author(s):  
Marek Strzoda ◽  
Dariusz Szkoluda

The Command and Control System of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland constitutes an essential element of the State Defense System. Its primary function is to enable decision-makers and commanders at all levels to make decisions and to create systems of actions that, in the course of the operation, achieve strategic, operational and tactical goals. Various external factors and internal conditions influence the structure and then the functioning of this system. This system is subject to continuous evaluation and, consequently, changes that are to lead to its improvement, so that the assumed goals are achieved efficiently and effectively. The article discusses three groups of conditions directly, and with certain factors indirectly, affecting the organization of the command and control system as well as its functioning. The first one concerns the change in the nature of modern security threats. With regard to the short characterization of hybrid activities, subliminal actions, and asymmetric threats, it was indicated how they determine the requirements regarding the organization and functioning of the Armed Forces Command and Command System adequate to such situations. The findings of the 2016 Strategic Defense Review and its result document – the Defense Concept of the Republic of Poland constitute the second group of factors. In the consequence of strategic analysis, the conclusions and recommendations included in the Concept should be taken into account when introducing changes to the command and control system. In the last part, it was pointed out how the decision to establish the Territorial Defense Forces (WOT) and the organizational assumptions resulting from it concerning their structure, tasks, and rules of operation influenced the changes in the Command and control System of the Polish Armed Forces. The conditions presented in particular parts of the study should be considered during the forecasted and partially implemented organizational and functional improvements to the Polish Armed Forces Command and control System.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Hanna RUTKIEWICZ

Z dniem 1 stycznia 2014 r. weszła w życie ustawa z dnia 21 czerwca 2013 r. o zmianie ustawy o urzędzie Ministra Obrony Narodowej oraz niektórych innych ustaw, która wprowadziła dość radykalne zmiany w „pokojowym” (obowiązującym poza czasem wojny) systemie kierowania, a w szczególności dowodzenia Siłami Zbrojnymi Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Od tej daty w Siłach Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na najwyższym szczeblu dowodzenia nie obowiązuje, przynajmniej w czasie pokoju, zasada jednoosobowego dowodzenia, czego nie wyartykułowano w uzasadnieniu projektu wspomnianej ustawy. Wyklucza ją ustawowe usytuowanie na tym szczeblu hierarchii organizacyjnej trzech najwyższych dowódców, właściwych rzeczowo w określonych sferach, niepozostających wobec siebie w hierarchicznej podległości służbowej. Nie pozwala na zmianę tego stanu przyznanie Szefowi Sztabu Generalnego Wojska Polskiego określonych bardzo ogólnikowo i wywiedzionych dopiero w drodze interpretacji zapisu ustawowego kompetencji nadzorczych względem Dowódcy Generalnego Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych i Dowódcy Operacyjnego Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych. Żadnego z tych dowódców regulacje ustawowe nie uprawniają do dowodzenia pozostałymi. Nie można przyjąć, by powszechnie artykułowana i aprobowana zasada cywilnej kontroli nad armią oznaczała przypisanie cywilnemu ministrowi kompetencji dowodzenia, a nie kierowania, armią. Można natomiast stwierdzić, że zasada jednoosobowego dowodzenia została zachowana w obszarach przyporządkowanych odpowiednio: Szefowi Sztabu Generalnego Wojska Polskiego, Dowódcy Generalnemu Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych, Dowódcy Operacyjnemu Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych, gdy chodzi o dowodzenie każdego z nich w swoim obszarze.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-101
Author(s):  
Malwina Ewa Kołodziejczak

Abstract The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the Republic of Poland is one of the main authorities in wartime. But, in Polish legal acts it is not completely clear when the Commander-in-Chief should be appointed. According to Polish law, the Commander-in-Chief shall be appointed in certain situations - for the duration of the war and (sometimes) in the martial law period. In this paper the author will describe these situations and analyse the provisions of his functioning in peace time and in war. Also, it should be noted, that today in Poland decision-makers adopted some very important changes in the Act of 21 November 1967 - Universal duty to defend the Republic of Poland. These changes are to be basis for new rules for the functioning of the Commanderin- Chief and it is a result of the reform of the command and control system. But, the problem is that some parts of legislation were challenged in the Constitutional Court and the case is pending… Every single act of the packet might be not in accordance with the Act of Constitution.


1994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce C. Leibrecht ◽  
Glen A. Meade ◽  
Jeffrey H. Schmidt ◽  
William J. Doherty ◽  
Carl W. Lickteig

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