The Neurotic Process As the Focus of Physiological and Psychoanalytic Research

1958 ◽  
Vol 104 (435) ◽  
pp. 518-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence S. Kubie
Keyword(s):  

A series of studies published since 1951 attempted to clarify what is meant by the neurotic in human nature. In returning to this problem today, I must beg your indulgence for repeating myself at some points. Apart from the kindness of your chairman in inviting me to discuss the Neurotic Process as my contribution to this symposium, my further justification is the opportunity which it gives me to add a few considerations which may round out the hypothesis and make it more useful, and also to indicate that the neurotic process is the meeting place for the organic and psychological approaches to problems of human behaviour (4, 5, 7, 10).

Author(s):  
John Dupré

This sketch of an account of human nature begins with the claim that we should see humans as a kind of process, a life cycle, rather than as a kind of substance or thing. A particular advantage of such a process perspective is that it readily accommodates the developmental plasticity that has been an increasingly important concept in recent biological theory. Human behaviour, on this account, should be understood as providing adaptive and flexible responses to an unpredictable environment. It is, therefore, generally misguided to provide a standard account of human nature in terms of behaviour or behavioural dispositions. If there is such a thing as human nature, it is a uniquely refined propensity for novel and unpredictable behaviour.


1974 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 99-120
Author(s):  
Ian Gregory

There is, I gloomily suspect, little which is significantly new that remain to be said about psycho-analysis by philosophers. The almost profligate theorising that goes on within the psycho-analytic journals will, no doubt, continue unabated. It simply strikes me as unlikely that such theorising will generate further issues of the kind that excite the philosophical mind. Though in making such an observation, I recognise that I lay claim upon the future in a manner that many might believe to be unwise. The place of psycho-analysis upon the intellectual map, the implications that psycho-analytic theory and practice have for the various kinds of judgements that we make about human behaviour, have been exhaustively discussed in recent times. Rather more specifically, whether psycho-analysis should be accorded the dignity of being labelled a ‘science’, what the significance is of psycho-analysis for those complex problems bounded by the notions of Reason, Freedom, Motivation, have occasioned much fruitful philosophical debate. It is not any wish of mine to add to the literature on these problems in the forlorn hope that even slightly different answers might be forthcoming.


2005 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
H J Pietersen

Comparison of Western (WH) and African humanism (AH) shows overlapping and complementary approaches to human nature in work organisations. The extant literature is conceptually, empirically and methodologically inadequate, and fails to consider 21st century employment realities. Shortcomings of WH and AH are presented. A dynamic and mutualistic approach to human nature, that includes both self-assertive (individualist) and self transcending (collectivist) tendencies, is briefly outlined. It provides a more comprehensive approach to humanism, for better understanding of human behaviour at work. There is currently too much rhetoric in the field. More research, especially the use of qualitative and narrative interpretive methodologies is required. Opsomming Vergelyking van Westerse (WH) met Afrika (AH) opvattings oor humanisme in werkorganisasies toon, verskille ten spyt, dat oorvleueling en aanvullende benaderingsmoontlikhede bestaan. Die betrokke literatuur is tans konseptueel, empiries en metodologies onvoldoende. Moderne indiensnemingsrealiteite word ook nie verreken nie. Tekortkominge in beide Westerse en Afrika humanisme word aangetoon. Navolging van ’n dinamiese en resiprokale benadering wat beide self-gelding (individualisties) en self-transendering (kollektiwisties) in menslike natuur insluit, word voorgehou as ’n meer omvattende beskouing wat ’n beter begrip van gedrag in werkorganisasies bied. Daar is heelwat retoriek in aansprake betreffende Afrika humanisme. Verdere navorsing, veral begronde en interpreterende studies, is noodsaaklik.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 20160028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hisashi Nakao ◽  
Kohei Tamura ◽  
Yui Arimatsu ◽  
Tomomi Nakagawa ◽  
Naoko Matsumoto ◽  
...  

Whether man is predisposed to lethal violence, ranging from homicide to warfare, and how that may have impacted human evolution, are among the most controversial topics of debate on human evolution. Although recent studies on the evolution of warfare have been based on various archaeological and ethnographic data, they have reported mixed results: it is unclear whether or not warfare among prehistoric hunter–gatherers was common enough to be a component of human nature and a selective pressure for the evolution of human behaviour. This paper reports the mortality attributable to violence, and the spatio-temporal pattern of violence thus shown among ancient hunter–gatherers using skeletal evidence in prehistoric Japan (the Jomon period: 13 000 cal BC–800 cal BC). Our results suggest that the mortality due to violence was low and spatio-temporally highly restricted in the Jomon period, which implies that violence including warfare in prehistoric Japan was not common.


1995 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Colwell

Causal slippery slope arguments with moral conclusions are sometimes stronger than we think. Their strength may be missed either by overlooking the problems of human nature which support the arguments or, upon seeing the problems, by underestimating their influence upon human behaviour. This article aims to correct the oversight and the misjudgement by looking in some detail at four interrelated problems of human nature which have a direct bearing upon moral causal slope arguments.


Author(s):  
Kate Soper

The nature–convention distinction opposes instinctual or ‘spontaneous’ modes of comportment (those which follow from ‘human nature’) to those which are socially instituted or culturally prescribed. Its philosophic interest resides in its use to justify or contest specific forms of human behaviour and social organization. Since the ‘conventional’ is opposed to the ‘natural’ as that which is in principle transformable, the adherents of a particular order in human affairs have standardly sought to prove its ‘naturality’, while its critics have sought to expose its merely ‘conventional’ status. Relatedly, ‘conventions’ may be associated with what is distinctive to ‘human’, as opposed to ‘bestial’ nature, or denounced for their role in repressing our more ‘natural’ impulses.


2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Riley

AbstractKen Binmore argues that justice consists in a proportional bargaining equilibrium of a ‘game of morals’, which corresponds to a Nash bargaining equilibrium of a ‘game of life’. His argument seems unassailable if rational agents are predominantly self-interested, an assumption that he is apparently willing to make on the grounds that human behaviour is ultimately constrained in accord with the selfish gene paradigm. But there is no compelling scientific evidence for that paradigm. Rather, human nature appears to be highly plastic. If so, rational agents might eventually be moulded by cultural forces into social and moral actors who effectively believe that they are the same person-no different from anyone else−when it comes to certain vital personal interests which ought to be treated as rights. In this context, a utilitarian outcome is an efficient and fair equilibrium of the game of life. Compliance with the rules is enforced by the actor’s own conscience, a powerful internal ‘judicious spectator’ which threatens to inflict harsh punishment in the form of intense feelings of guilt for cheating.


2019 ◽  
pp. 141-156
Author(s):  
Jeroen de Kloet

“The city,” so does Park argue, “shows the good and evil in human nature in excess.” Which inspires him to read the city as a laboratory to study human behaviour. In my chapter I connect the notion of excess to the significance of the ring roads in Beijing. Beijing is an excessive city par excellence, too big, too polluted, too crowded, too ugly, and changing too fast, making one lose his way time and again. The ring roads function as a symbolic device to keep a sense of control over this excess; they help to locate people and places, they function as the highway in the centre, and they create the mental map of the city. How do Beijing citizens relate to the ring roads? And how do art and popular culture help reimagine the ringroads and contain or parody the excessiveness of Beijing?


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Chloe Balla

Abstract Fifth-century authors often invoke the idea that human beings are by nature savage, and that the civilized state of human societies is imposed on them by law and custom. A possible consequence of this idea is a pessimistic anthropological account, according to which pleonexia or greed is a natural characteristic of human beings, and therefore a justified drive of human behaviour. Scholars often attribute this pessimistic account of human nature to the sophists, whose views are considered to be reflected in the speeches of Plato’s characters Glaucon and Callicles. Taking into account the genres and the contexts in which the original sophistic arguments concerning savage humanity appear, as well as the practices for which such arguments were implemented, this paper argues that the pessimistc view of human nature is not a product of sophistic thought, but is rather developed by authors such as Thucydides, who uses it in order to explain the atrocities committed in the course of the Peloponnesian war, and Plato, who uses it as a foil to his arguments concerning the superiority of human nature.


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