Platonic and Aristotelian Teichopolitics

This paper provides a sustained investigation into ancient teichopolitics – the politics of constructing walls – and the question of whether the best city should be surrounded by walls. Plato’s Laws adopts the Spartan view that walls have a negative effect on national character and argues that they should be ‘left lying asleep and undisturbed in the ground’ (Leg. 6.778d). Aristotle’s Politics puts forward a series of objections to Plato and adopts the more pragmatic view that walls are necessary. Although both philosophers debate the status of walls and foreigners within the best city, they fail to draw the thoroughly modern connection between teichopolitics and immigration.

Recognition and Redistribution in Aristotle’s Account of Stasis

In Politics 5.1–3, Aristotle sees different conceptions of proportional equality and justice as the fundamental causes of stasis and metabolē (constitutional change). His account shows what happens to notions of ‘particular’ justice when they become causes of individual and collective action in pursuit of moral and political revolution. The whole discussion of the causes of stasis should be read through the filter of individual/group motivation – as a reflection of what goes on in the heads of those who engage in stasis. Movements towards political change are motivated by ingrained conceptions of proportional equality and fair distribution of honour and wealth. Aristotle’s approach, therefore, may be compared to Axel Honneth’s, that social justice should be seen in terms of the distribution of dignity and respect as well as of material resources.

Cynicism as Immanent Critique: Diogenes and the Philosophy of Transvaluation

I argue that Diogenes and early Cynicism can be understood in an explicitly social and political context, where Cynic praxis, performative public action, can be seen to make visible oppositions inherent to the polity. In doing so, Diogenes’ praxis should be understood as a form of immanent critique, one that demonstrates, for example, that nature and custom (phusis and nomos) are interrelated oppositions in the polis. Cynicism here is understood as a form of immanent critique because Diogenes challenges the social norms of the polis without endorsing external universal standards or predetermined models, but from illuminating dynamics from within the polis and polity.

Eumenides and the Invention of Politics

Recent scholarship has shown that the Eumenides of Aeschylus, far from presenting a complete and coherent picture of the well-ordered polis, in fact offers something quite different, namely, a complex set of questions, concerns and conundrums regarding the very nature of political society. But I suggest that the literature has not yet provided a fully satisfying account of the ways in which those questions are underwritten by the specifically literary practice of Aeschylus as it develops the play’s larger theoretical – especially moral – implications. I argue that the Eumenides can fruitfully be read as a sustained exercise in the subversion of expectations that unsettles its audience and thereby opens up a discursive and aesthetic space for the development of a distinctive political problematic; and further, that this problematic involves a challenging series of meditations on what today would be called political ethics, broadly conceived.

Demagogues and Demagoguery in Hellenistic Greece

This paper introduces scholars of Greek political thought to the continued existence of the phenomenon of demagoguery, or ‘(mis-)leadership of the people’, in the Hellenistic period. After summarizing Classical elite discourse about demagoguery, I explore three areas in which political leaders continued to run afoul of elite norms in Hellenistic democratic poleis: 1) political persecution of the wealthier members of a political community; 2) ‘pandering to’ the people in a way considered infra dignitatem; and 3) stoking bellicosity among the common people. I show that considerable continuities link the Classical and Hellenistic periods and that demagoguery should be approached as a potential window onto ‘popular culture’ in Greek antiquity.

Odd, Idle, and Vicious: Plato’s Use of Public Opinion in His Characterization of the Philosopher in Republic VI

Plato’s characterization of the philosopher often emerges as a way to respond to popular conceptions and representations of the intellectual in Athenian society. In book 6 of the Republic in particular, he articulates his greatest defense of the philosopher against two major charges – that of being vicious and useless. Voicing what appears to be a commonly held view among Athenians, this representation of the philosopher is raised by Adeimantus as an objection to Socrates’ proposal of a philosopher-king. Surprisingly, rather than dismissing the allegations as false, Socrates admits ‘that what they say is true’ (Resp. 6.487d10) and incorporates these criticisms into his argument. This paper proposes that the popular depiction of the philosopher as odd, vicious and idle plays a significant role in Plato’s own characterization of the philosopher, illustrating how Plato diagnoses the philosopher’s alienation from public affairs in a manner that defines and legitimates his own ideas of philosophy.

The Beautiful in Aristotle’s Ethics

This article argues for an aesthetic reading of to kalon, primarily as it appears in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle uses to kalon to indicate that, to the morally serious, virtue is attractive and productive of a kind of pleasure. Read aesthetically, to kalon mitigates the tension between one’s own good and the common good. Aristotle shows how his students’ understanding of to kalon can be refined and thus preserved as an important and salutary feature of moral and political life.

Cyrus’ Beehive: Ruling Eros and with Eros in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia

This paper examines the role of love in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. I argue that an essential aspect of Cyrus’ knowledgeable rule is a specific understanding of eros and a corresponding strategy to cope with the power of love. Specifically, I contend that by exploiting a common Greek distinction between the beloved and the lover, he articulates the view that lovers are subjects or even slaves to their beloved who deceive themselves into thinking that their attraction and the ensuing behaviors are voluntary. Accordingly, Cyrus attempts to avoid falling in love and to rule as a universally beloved leader. Reflecting on the implications of this solution, I finally suggest that Xenophon wishes to show the limits of Cyrus’ solution.