The effect of corporate governance mechanisms and managerial incentives on corporate tax avoidance in Indonesia

2017 ◽  
pp. 115-120
Author(s):  
R.Y.F. Perdana ◽  
R. Yuniasih
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Earnings Management, Corporate Governance and Tax Avoidance: The Case in Indonesia

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 28-35
Author(s):  
Lulus Kurniasih ◽  
Sulardi Sulardi ◽  
Sri Suranta
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Effective Tax Rate ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Objective - This study aims to determine the effect of earning management and corporate governance mechanisms on corporate tax avoidance. Methodology/Technique - Corporate governance mechanisms use institutional ownership, the size of the board of commissioners, the percentage of independent commissioners, auditing committees, and audit quality as proxies. Meanwhile, earnings management uses the modified Jones model. The sample of this study include non-financial companies that are listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2014 and 2016. Findings - Corporate tax avoidance can be detected by using the effective tax rate (ETR), which is the ratio of income to tax expenses. This sample was chosen using a purposive sampling method, resulting in 871 firms. The results suggest that earnings management has a significant impact on ETR. Novelty - This study identifies that only independent commissioners and audit quality have a significant influence on ETR. Type of Paper - Empirical Keywords: Tax Avoidance; Earnings Management; Corporate Governance; Effective Tax Rate; Audit Quality. JEL Classification: G3, G39, G39.

scholarly journals PENGARUH MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP TAX AVOIDANCE

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-120
Author(s):  
Agustina Mapadang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Negative Effect

This study aims to analyze the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on tax avoidance. Corporate governance mechanisms are measured by Independent Commissioners and Institutional Ownership while tax avoidance is measured by the Avoidance Tax Rate. The research population is all manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-2016 using purposive sampling method. The number of observations of 435 and the type of research is the analysis of causal relationships to see the effect of each variable. The results of the study show that corporate governance mechanisms negatively affect tax avoidance; the board of directors has a positive effect on tax avoidance and institutional ownership has a negative effect on the value of the company.

scholarly journals Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Tax Avoidance in Nigeria: A Quantile Regression Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 20
Author(s):  
Francis Chinedu Egbunike ◽  
Ardi Gunardi ◽  
Udunze Ugochukwu ◽  
Atang Hermawan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Quantile Regression ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

The main objective of the study was to investigate the effect of corporate governance on tax avoidance of quoted manufacturing firms in Nigeria. The study focused on internal corporate governance mechanisms and specifically examined the effect of board size, board independence, board diligence, CEO duality, and audit committee diligence. The ex post facto research design was adopted. The population comprised of all quoted manufacturing companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). The sample was purposively drawn as all companies in the consumer goods sector of the NSE. The study relied on secondary data obtained from annual reports and accounts of the sampled companies. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyze the data. The hypotheses were validated using Quantile Regression technique. Results showed that board size, board independence, and board diligence were significant at the median and 75th quantile. CEO duality and audit committee diligence were not significant at the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile. The study recommended among others moderate board sizes to improve efficiency of decision-making. In addition, the need for more independent directors and meeting frequency should be tailored to suit the needs of the company. Keywords: corporate governance mechanisms, tax avoidance, quantile regression

scholarly journals Dynamic capabilities: The role of board monitoring and managerial incentives

2020 ◽  
pp. 234094442091630
Author(s):  
Aman Asija ◽  
Dimo Ringov
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Dynamic Capabilities ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Simple Rules ◽  
Board Monitoring ◽  
Different Levels

Research on the nature and value of firms’ dynamic capabilities has produced contradictory propositions and findings. Scholars have argued that contingency theorizing has the potential to improve our understanding, as the context in which dynamic capabilities are deployed may affect their value. Drawing on agency theory, we propose that corporate governance mechanisms play a significant role in determining the value of firms’ dynamic capabilities. In particular, we develop theoretical propositions about the differential effect of two corporate governance mechanisms—board monitoring and managerial incentives—on the value of dynamic capabilities in the form of complex codified routines, on one hand, and simple rules, on the other hand, at different levels of environmental dynamism. JEL CLASSIFICATION: L21; L22; D80; G34

scholarly journals The relation between product market competition and corporate tax avoidance: evidence from Korea

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilhang Shin ◽  
Sorah Park
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Product Market Competition ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Internal Governance

This paper examines the effect of industry-wide factors such as product market competition on corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, the focus is on the moderating role of corporate governance in the relationship between product market competition and tax avoidance. To conduct an empirical analysis, a sample of public companies that are listed on the Korea Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2016 is used. The empirical analyses provide the following results. First, product market competition is negatively related to tax avoidance. This suggests that competitive markets act as external corporate governance mechanisms and discipline managers to decrease tax avoidance. Second, the negative association between product market competition and tax avoidance is more pronounced for firms with more independent board of directors and firms with audit committee consisting of outside directors. These findings imply that product market competition acts more effectively when the firm has strong internal governance mechanisms such as board independence and audit committee independence. Therefore, we provide evidence on a complementary relationship between internal governance system and product market competition. The results may be of interest to policy makers and regulators like Korea Fair Trade Commission and Financial Supervisory Service who are involved in promoting market competition, monitoring any abuse of market dominance, and supervising financial reporting quality.

scholarly journals Is corporate governance of private equity targets more effective for risk mitigation?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimiro Marini ◽  
Massimo Caratelli ◽  
Gian Paolo Stella ◽  
Ilaria Barbaraci
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Risk Mitigation ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Active Monitoring ◽  
Industry Expert ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

AbstractPrivate equity is a source of finance and a governance device characterised by active monitoring through sponsors that intervene in targets’ corporate governance. As sponsors are skilled and motivated acquirors, we investigated whether corporate governance mechanisms mitigate leveraged targets’ risk of financial distress differently compared to non-acquired companies through the lenses of agency theory and resource-based theories. We found that targets and non-acquired companies are not significantly different in terms of corporate governance features, but sponsors are skilled enough to choose corporate governance members to mitigate risk more, especially when boards are smaller, have busier industry expert directors, and mandate execution to more managers. These results can be useful to targets, targets’ investors and lenders, and policymakers.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIRTUAL-NETWORK PARADIGM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE ENTERPRISES OF THE FUEL AND ENERGY COMPLEX

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (8) ◽  
pp. 58-62
Author(s):  
Kamila Zagidullina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Functional Approach ◽  
Process Approach ◽  
Virtual Network ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Theoretical Substantiation ◽  
Energy Complex ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Market Transformation

The relevance is increasing due to the need for a theoretical substantiation of the directions and mechanism of further market transformation of the fuel and energy complex, taking into account the dependence of the processes and results of its economic development on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. Key words:economics, fuel and energy complex, corporate governance, functional approach, process approach, virtual-network paradigm, mechanism

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