scholarly journals Designing truncated priors for direct and inverse Bayesian problems

2022 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergios Agapiou ◽  
Peter Mathé
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Problems

Specific features of regions of acceptance of hypotheses in conditional Bayesian problems of statistical hypotheses testing

Sankhya A ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. K. Kachiashvili ◽  
K. J. Kachiashvili ◽  
A. Mueed
Keyword(s):  
Hypotheses Testing ◽  
Statistical Hypotheses ◽  
Statistical Hypotheses Testing ◽  
Bayesian Problems

scholarly journals Children can solve Bayesian problems: the role of representation in mental computation

Cognition ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 98 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liqi Zhu ◽  
Gerd Gigerenzer
Keyword(s):  
Mental Computation ◽  
Bayesian Problems

Sensitivity Analysis of Classical and Conditional Bayesian Problems of Many Hypotheses Testing

2012 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-605 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. J. Kachiashvili ◽  
M. A. Hashmi ◽  
A. Mueed
Keyword(s):  
Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
Hypotheses Testing ◽  
Bayesian Problems

Introducing the Leroy Problem: Extending the Frequency vs. Probability Debate to Racial Stereotypes via an Evolutionary Perspective [slightly revised]

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nazia S. Mirza ◽  
Herbert Blumberg
Keyword(s):  
Inductive Reasoning ◽  
Racial Stereotypes ◽  
Bayesian Reasoning ◽  
Evolutionary Perspective ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Racial Stereotype ◽  
Growing Body ◽  
Reasoning Mechanism ◽  
Linda Problem ◽  
Bayesian Problems

Bayesian vs. frequentist paradigms are here extended to the issue of racial stereotypes. It has been widely argued that human beings do not embody an innate probability of calculus and are not Bayesian thinkers. Bayesian probabilists argue that probability refers to subjective degrees of confidence, while the frequentists believe probability refers to frequencies of events in the real world. A growing body of research has shown that frequentist versions of Bayesian problems elicit Bayesian reasoning. This study (N = 118) replicated Fiedler's finding that a frequency version of the Linda problem elicits Bayesian reasoning in about 75% of participants, compared to 17% for the probability version in Tversky and Kahneman's studies. It also found, however, that the inductive reasoning mechanism that operates on frequency input is not activated when there is a racial stereotype generated.

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