bayesian problems
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2022 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergios Agapiou ◽  
Peter Mathé
Keyword(s):  


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nazia S. Mirza ◽  
Herbert Blumberg

Bayesian vs. frequentist paradigms are here extended to the issue of racial stereotypes. It has been widely argued that human beings do not embody an innate probability of calculus and are not Bayesian thinkers. Bayesian probabilists argue that probability refers to subjective degrees of confidence, while the frequentists believe probability refers to frequencies of events in the real world. A growing body of research has shown that frequentist versions of Bayesian problems elicit Bayesian reasoning. This study (N = 118) replicated Fiedler's finding that a frequency version of the Linda problem elicits Bayesian reasoning in about 75% of participants, compared to 17% for the probability version in Tversky and Kahneman's studies. It also found, however, that the inductive reasoning mechanism that operates on frequency input is not activated when there is a racial stereotype generated.







Cognition ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 98 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liqi Zhu ◽  
Gerd Gigerenzer


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