scholarly journals Questionnaire Survey Concerning Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement among Undergraduates

2020 ◽  
Vol 140 (11) ◽  
pp. 1397-1403
Author(s):  
Midori Yamamoto ◽  
Yuji Ishii
2021 ◽  
pp. 147821032110619
Author(s):  
Fanny Monnet ◽  
Christina Ergler ◽  
Eva Pilot ◽  
Preeti Sushama ◽  
James Green

Qualitative work with students who use prescription medicines for academic purposes is limited. Thus, a more nuanced understanding of tertiary students’ experiences is urgently needed. Our study – which draws on five semi-structured interviews with New Zealand university students, complemented with information from local newspapers, blog entries and discussion forums – reveals students’ motivations and perceived effects, their risk perceptions and provides insights into the circumstances enabling the engagement with prescription medicines for academic purposes. Students were influenced by peers and social norms; and ideas about identity, morality and fairness also played a role for engaging with cognitive enhancers. Students used high levels of stress and workload to justify their use but took individual responsibility for their practices. By taking responsibility in this way, rather than considering it as a product of their environment, they buy into the neoliberal university discourse. Unexpectedly, some participants were already receiving medically justified psychopharmacological treatment but extended and supplemented this with nonmedical use. Others considered their use as being for academic emergencies, and that their low level of use helped manage risks. Overall, students viewed pharmacological cognitive enhancement for improving academic performance as cautious, safe, and morally acceptable. We argue in this paper that a local understanding of students’ motivations, justifications and perceptions of pharmacological cognitive enhancement is required, to tailor policies and support systems better to their needs and behaviours.


Author(s):  
Nils-Frederic Wagner ◽  
Jeffrey Robinson ◽  
Christine Wiebking

Using cognitive enhancement technology is becoming increasingly popular. In another paper, the authors argued that using pharmacological cognitive enhancers is detrimental to society, through promoting competitiveness over cooperation, by usurping personal and social identifies and thus changing our narrative and moral character. In this chapter, the authors seek to expand that argument by looking at an emerging technology that is rapidly gaining popularity, that of transcranial stimulation (TS). Here the authors explore TS via two major methods, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial electrical stimulation (TES). In this, the authors seek to demonstrate that artificial cognitive enhancement is detrimental to society. Furthermore, that the argument can be applied beyond the moral dubiousness of using pharmacological cognitive enhancement, but applied to new, emergent technologies as well. In other words, artificial cognitive enhancement regardless of the technology/medium is detrimental to society.


Neuroethics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-278
Author(s):  
Niloofar Bavarian ◽  
Stephanie Sumstine ◽  
Jocelyne Mendez ◽  
Kyle Yomogida ◽  
Wilma Figueroa ◽  
...  

Neuroethics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma C. Gordon ◽  
Lucy Dunn

Abstract Recent discussions of cognitive enhancement often note that drugs and technologies that improve cognitive performance may do so at the risk of “cheapening” our resulting cognitive achievements (e.g., Kass, Life, liberty and the defense of dignity: the challenge for bioethics, Encounter Books, San Francisco, 2004; Agar, Humanity’s end: why we should reject radical enhancement, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010; Sandel, The case against perfection. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2007; Sandel, The case against perfection: what’s wrong with designer children, bionic athletes, and genetic engineering?”. In: Holland (ed) Arguing about bioethics, Routledge, London, 2012; Harris in Bioethics 25:102–111, 2011). While there are several possible responses to this worry, we will highlight what we take to be one of the most promising—one which draws on a recent strand of thinking in social and virtue epistemology to construct an integrationist defence of cognitive enhancement. (e.g., Pritchard in Synthese 175:133–151, 2010; Palermos in Synthese 192:2955–2286, 2015; Clark in Synthese 192:3757–3375, 2015). According to such a line, there is—despite initial appearances to the contrary—no genuine tension between using enhancements to attain our goals and achieving these goals in a valuable way provided the relevant enhancement is appropriately integrated into the agent’s cognitive architecture (in some suitably specified way). In this paper, however, we show that the kind of integration recommended by such views will likely come at a high cost. More specifically, we highlight a dilemma for users of pharmacological cognitive enhancement: they can (1) meet the conditions for cognitive integration (and on this basis attain valuable achievements) at the significant risk of dangerous dependency, or (2) remain free of such dependency while foregoing integration and the valuable achievements that such integration enables. After motivating and clarifying the import of this dilemma, we offer recommendations for how future cognitive enhancement research may offer potential routes for navigating past it.


Neuroethics ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meghana Kasturi Vagwala ◽  
Aude Bicquelet ◽  
Gabija Didziokaite ◽  
Ross Coomber ◽  
Oonagh Corrigan ◽  
...  

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larissa J. Maier ◽  
Evangelia Liakoni ◽  
Jan Schildmann ◽  
Michael P. Schaub ◽  
Matthias E. Liechti

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