scholarly journals Understanding Price Controls and Nonprice Competition with Matching Theory

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
John William Hatfield ◽  
Charles R Plott ◽  
Tomomi Tanaka

We develop a quality competition model to understand how price controls affect market outcomes in buyer-seller markets with discrete goods of varying quality. While competitive equilibria do not necessarily exist in such markets when price controls are imposed, we show that stable outcomes do exist and characterize the set of stable outcomes in the presence of price restrictions. In particular, we show that price controls induce non-price competition: price floors induce the trade of inefficiently high quality goods, while price ceilings induce the trade of inefficiently low quality goods.

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick J. Hurley ◽  
Brian W. Mayhew

SUMMARY We insert an automated high-quality (HQ) auditor into established experimental audit markets to test the impact of high-quality competition on other auditors' supply of and managers' demand for audit quality. Theory predicts that managers will demand high levels of audit quality to avoid investors' price-protecting behavior. This demand should result in the HQ auditor dominating the market and increase other auditors' audit quality provision to compete with the HQ auditor. However, we find that the HQ auditor does not dominate the market—despite holding audit costs constant and investors placing a premium on HQ auditor reports. We also find that adding an HQ auditor results in other auditors lowering audit quality. Additional analyses indicate some managers demand lower audit quality to avoid negative audit reports, consistent with loss aversion as a potential explanation. Our findings indicate a need to develop a more comprehensive theory of the demand for auditing. Data Availability: The laboratory market data used in this study are available from the authors upon request.


ORiON ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Petrus Potgieter ◽  
Bronwyn Howell

The non-rival, non-excludable and infinitely expansible characteristics of digital goods with marginal cost of zero strongly favours the use of bundling strategies. Theoretical tractability requires most models in the current literature to make highly stylized assumptions, rarely observed or anticipated in the real-life situations, motivating inquiry. This paper considers a competition model in which: * the firms, consumers and differentiated products are finite in number; * prices are discrete and not continuous; * consumers may purchase multiple items in a single product category where the degree of complementarity or substitutability of the product categories can also vary across consumers; and * where consumer-specific cost savings are obtained when purchasing multiple items from the same firm. Approximate solutions are obtained through numerical simulation. Firms act in concert to maximise the total firm revenue. Our main finding is that the interplay between maximal firm revenue, consumer surplus and prices is very complex and that high firm revenue and high consumer surplus are not antithetic. It suggests also that consumer surplus and market concentration are not necessarily related. Many market outcomes that are observed may be due to chance rather than design as diverse outcomes can accompany situations that are, to the firms, difficult to distinguish.


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 355
Author(s):  
Randall E. Waldron ◽  
Michael A. Allgrunn

In an earlier article, we reported the results of a classroom experiment simulating price competition in an oligopoly with differentiated goods. That study raised some questions that we were unable to address at that time. For this current study, we have adapted the experiment to further explore the effects of scarcity in the input markets, and to study the effects of price controls in these markets. We find that scarcity in an input market has the expected directional effect on prices in both input and output markets, but not necessarily the magnitude expected; we further find that price controls have only some of the effects expected. In the current experiment, we increased the number of rounds of the game to allow more opportunity for convergence to a stable outcome, and to allow for three distinct phases of the game: initial rounds in which inputs were abundantly available, subsequent rounds in which one inputs supply was dramatically reduced, and final rounds in which a price floor was established on the one input which remained abundant. As expected, firms played Nash/Bertrand strategies in the early rounds. However, the shock caused by reducing the availability of capital took many rounds for full adjustment, with both output prices and the equilibrium rental rate of capital rising consistently and gradually toward their projected equilibria over ten rounds, although even then capital prices did not rise enough to absorb all firm profits. Surprisingly, establishing a minimum wage did not have the anticipated effect of balancing payments between labor and capital; instead, the minimum wage completely disrupted the trend of an increasing rental price of capital and reduced it to zero, while creating volatility in profits without consistently eliminating them. Overall, we find that most of our anticipated results ultimately obtain, but adjustments to variations in market conditions are neither immediate nor perfectly consistent with the predictions of theory.


LISS 2012 ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 1025-1031
Author(s):  
Wenlong Chai ◽  
Huijun Sun ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Jianjun Wu

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 216-249
Author(s):  
Thomas N. Hubbard ◽  
Michael J. Mazzeo

Standard models that guide competition policy imply that demand increases should lead to more, not fewer firms. However, Sutton’s (1991) model shows that demand increases instead can lead to shakeouts if non-price competition takes the form of fixed investments. We investigate this effect in the 1960s–1980s hotel and motel industry, where quality competition arose through investments in swimming pools. We show that demand increases associated with highway openings led to fewer firms, particularly in warm places. We do not find this effect in other industries that serve travelers, gasoline retailing, and restaurants, where quality competition does not involve fixed investments. (JEL G34, K21, L13, L15, L40, L83)


Author(s):  
Toshiya Ueno ◽  
Manabu Yamaji ◽  
Hiroe Tsubaki ◽  
Kakuro Amasaka

The automotive industry is engaging in a global production strategy for simultaneous achievement of QCD (quality, cost and delivery) in an effort to prevail and survive in the worldwide quality competition. In an effort to realize this, the authors have proposed the high quality assurance system for simultaneous achievement of QCD by a change to super short period development designing, the Highly Reliable CAE (Computer-Aided Engineering) Model and demonstrated its effectiveness. To realize this, the rational integration of overall optimality and partial optimality needs to be achieved through the process of problem theory algorithm modeling calculator as a technical requirement to be included in Bolt Tightening Simulation System.


2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall E. Waldron ◽  
Michael A. Allgrunn ◽  
Guoqiang Pei

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-justify: inter-ideograph; text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">We present a classroom experiment which introduces product differentiation and factor markets into the traditional Bertrand framework.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>We find that student behavior converges toward the market outcomes predicted by theory.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>We also find that the experiment enhances student understanding of Bertrand price competition in a market with product differentiation and factor markets, and also appears to increase student satisfaction.</span></span></p>


Omega ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 290-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huihui Liu ◽  
Ming Lei ◽  
Honghui Deng ◽  
G. Keong Leong ◽  
Tao Huang

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