Pricing and assembly rate decisions for a prefabricated construction supply chain under subsidy policies

Prefabricated construction has attracted worldwide concern and promotion due to its environmental friendliness, high quality, and high efficiency. In China, the application of prefabricated construction still lags due to its high cost. To improve prefabricated construction development, the Chinese government and provinces have launched subsidy policies for different objects that offer subsidies to the assembler, the manufacturer, or consumers. Subsidy policies for different subsidy objects have different impacts on the manufacturer wholesale price and assembler retail price and assembly rate and make their decisions more complicated. Therefore, this study uses game theory and builds three models to analyze the effects of government subsidies on manufacturer pricing, assembler pricing, assembly rate decisions, and profit. We find that government subsidy policies can bring more profit to prefabricated construction enterprises, reduce their costs, and benefit the promotion of prefabricated construction. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we also find that when the government subsidizes enterprises more, it is better to subsidize the assembler, because it is good for all three parties. First, consumers can obtain a lower retail price. Second, enterprises can obtain more profits. Finally, for the government, this approach can increase the demand for prefabricated construction and increase the assembly rate, which is conducive to the promotion of prefabricated construction. When the government subsidizes customers more, it is better for the assembler and the manufacturer to subsidize customers, because they can obtain more profits. It is better for the government and customers to subsidize the assembler or the manufacture, because consumers can get the lower retail price. Although the assembly rate and enterprises’ profits are not optimal, they have also been improved. In addition, when the government directly subsidizes enterprises, the enterprises will actively cooperate with the subsidy policy and are more willing to adopt prefabricated construction. This approach will benefit the promotion of prefabricated construction.

Socioeconomic and Climatic Impacts of Photovoltaic Systems Operating High-Efficiency Irrigation Systems: A Case Study of the Government Subsidy Scheme for Climate-Smart Agriculture in Punjab, Pakistan

This paper presents the results of a field study conducted in the Punjab, Pakistan, to evaluate the socio-economic and climatic impact of Photovoltaic (PV) systems installed under government subsidy scheme for operating high efficiency irrigation systems (HEIS) i.e., drip and sprinkler irrigation systems. Agriculture provides livelihood to almost half of the rural population and recent energy crisis in the country has adversely affected the rural communities. Farmer’s dependence on fossil fuels has significantly increased for operating irrigation systems which has resulted in high costs of agriculture production. Government of Punjab has launched a subsidy scheme to install PV systems for operating efficient drip and sprinkler irrigation systems on cost sharing basis. Photovoltaic systems having a capacity of 17.30 megawatt, were installed to operate high efficiency irrigation systems at around twenty thousand acres under this subsidy project, that has resulted in an annual saving of 0.0066 billion liters of diesel. The average capacity of installed PV systems was 9.0 kilowatt, which matched the 7.50 horse power of installed water pumps. On average, the cost of a PV system per acre was calculated to be 0.000142 billion PKR, while the cost per kWp was calculated to be 0.000149 billion PKR. The research results show that the installation of photovoltaic systems has increased the adoption rate of high-efficiency irrigation systems, reduced carbon dioxide emissions, and reduced the high operating costs associated with diesel powered pump systems. The primary data about on-farm agriculture and irrigation practices used in this study were collected through in-depth farmer surveys, while the secondary data information came from reports, official documents and statistics issued by the government.

Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

In this paper, we study the green credit financing equilibrium in a green supply chain (GSC) with government subsidy and supply uncertainty. The GSC system is composed of one manufacturer, two retailers, one bank, and the government. The manufacturer is subject to both supply uncertainty and limited capital. The manufacturer invests in the R&D of green products and borrows loans from the bank. The government subsidizes banks to encourage banks to provide loans to manufacturers with lower interest rates, which is termed “green credit financing”. The two retailers decide their order quantities with horizontal competition or horizontal cooperation. We first developed a Stackelberg model to investigate the green credit financing equilibriums (i.e., the interest rate of the bank, the manufacturer’s product green degree and wholesale price, and the retailers’ order quantity) under horizontal competition and horizontal cooperation, respectively. Subsequently, we analyzed how the subsidy interest rate, supply uncertainty, and supply correlation affect financing decisions regarding equilibrium green credit. We found that a high subsidy interest rate leads to a low interest rate of bank and the manufacturer can set a high level of green product and high wholesale price, while the retailers can set a high order quantity. Finally, we compared the green credit financing equilibriums under horizontal competition with those under horizontal cooperation using numerical and analytical methods. We found that, in general, the optimal decisions and profits of bank and SC members, consumer surplus, and social welfare under horizontal competition are higher than those under horizontal cooperation. The findings in this research could provide valuable insights for the management of capital-constrained GSCs with government subsidies and supply uncertainty in a competing market.

Research on Government Subsidy Strategies for the Development of Agricultural Products E-Commerce

In many countries, the governments support the development of local agriculture through subsidization. Subsidizing the sales of agricultural products through E-commerce channels is a way to support the development of agriculture in China. This study aims to develop a profit model and apply Stackelberg game theory to determine which type of subsidies and decision-making can provide the maximum benefits for agricultural products E-commerce supply chains. The results indicate that for both centralized decisions and decentralized decisions, the subsidizing to the agricultural cooperative is better than the subsidizing to consumers and no subsidization. The sales volume, preservation level, sales efforts, and overall profit of the agricultural products E-commerce supply chain are significantly higher. It suggests that the government should play a leading role to support the development of agricultural products E-commerce. This study contributes to agricultural research by developing a profit model to examine the effects of different government subsidy strategies on each member of the agricultural online shopping supply chain. Recommendations are provided for agricultural cooperatives, E-commerce platforms, and the government to improve the quality and sales of agricultural products through online shopping channels.