scholarly journals Competition with Exclusive Contracts and Market-Share Discounts

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (6) ◽  
pp. 2384-2411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Calzolari ◽  
Vincenzo Denicolò
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Double Marginalization ◽  
Contractual Arrangements ◽  
Exclusive Contracts ◽  
Market Share Discounts

We analyze firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts and market-share discounts (conditional on the seller's share of customers' total purchases). With incomplete information about demand, firms have a unilateral incentive to use these contractual arrangements to better extract buyers' informational rents. However, exclusive contracts intensify competition, thus reducing prices and profits and (in all Pareto undominated equilibria) increasing welfare. Market-share discounts, by contrast, produce a double marginalization effect that leads to higher prices and harms buyers. We discuss the implications of these results for competition policy. (JEL D43, D83, D86, K21, L14, L42)

1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

scholarly journals Exclusive Contracts and Market Dominance

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (11) ◽  
pp. 3321-3351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Calzolari ◽  
Vincenzo Denicolò
Keyword(s):  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Dominant Firm ◽  
Exclusive Contracts ◽  
Market Dominance

We propose a new theory of exclusive dealing. The theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals, and that the buyers' willingness to pay for the product is private information. In this setting, the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them, implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive. We discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases. (JEL D21, D43, D82, D86, K21, L13, L40)

1. Competition policy and economics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.

PROTECTING THE DOMESTIC MARKET: INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND STRATEGIC FIRM BEHAVIOR

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (02) ◽  
pp. 159-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
JENS METGE ◽  
PIA WEISS
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Switching Costs ◽  
Firm Behavior ◽  
Domestic Market ◽  
The Us ◽  
Minimum Price ◽  
Domestic Prices ◽  
Mere Existence

Asian firms frequently have to undercut domestic prices and subsidize switching costs in order to obtain a positive market share when entering European and the US markets. Such practices constitute dumping under Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We demonstrate that the mere existence of an administratively set minimum price, which is frequently used in assessing dumping allegations, protects domestic firms and has the effect of an additional entrance barrier for Asian firms. Consequently, competition policy should reassess GATT's antidumping regulation in order to keep markets open and domestic competition healthy.

IPR Regime and Antitrust Implications of Mergers and Acquisitions: With a Focus on Software and Pharmaceutical Sector

2021 ◽  
pp. 0003603X2199702
Author(s):  
P. L. Beena
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Competitive Dynamics ◽  
Regulatory Mechanisms ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Start Ups ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

This article seeks to analyze the trends and patterns of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) during the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights regime and addresses the antitrust issues related to innovation and competition in the framework of competition policy. Empirical evidence supports the view that enhancing size in terms of corporate control of equity, product market share, and innovation market share could be the motivations for the M&A phenomenon in the sector such as software and pharmaceuticals. These sectors were able to extract relatively more profit margin as compared to the manufacturing sector. This article further observes anticompetitive practices in terms of pricing and abuse of dominance in these two industries. The study argues for introducing regulatory mechanisms in the competition policy which could address the antitrust implications of M&As that are engaged in by knowledge-based firms and start-ups. This is because such acquisitions can reduce the incentives to innovate or change the innovative and competitive dynamics in the relevant market.

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