IPR Regime and Antitrust Implications of Mergers and Acquisitions: With a Focus on Software and Pharmaceutical Sector

2021 ◽  
pp. 0003603X2199702
Author(s):  
P. L. Beena

This article seeks to analyze the trends and patterns of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) during the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights regime and addresses the antitrust issues related to innovation and competition in the framework of competition policy. Empirical evidence supports the view that enhancing size in terms of corporate control of equity, product market share, and innovation market share could be the motivations for the M&A phenomenon in the sector such as software and pharmaceuticals. These sectors were able to extract relatively more profit margin as compared to the manufacturing sector. This article further observes anticompetitive practices in terms of pricing and abuse of dominance in these two industries. The study argues for introducing regulatory mechanisms in the competition policy which could address the antitrust implications of M&As that are engaged in by knowledge-based firms and start-ups. This is because such acquisitions can reduce the incentives to innovate or change the innovative and competitive dynamics in the relevant market.

Author(s):  
Vasylyna Kolosha

The article examines an impact of digitalization on modern competition policy. Author proves that a necessity to modify traditional instruments of competition policy is caused by such special features of economic rivalry at the digital markets as significant return on scale, network effects and growing importance of data. Author argues that competition authorities face challenges caused by digitalization at the almost all stages of determining of firm’s dominant position, especially in the case of determining of relevant market, its participants and estimation of their market share. Special issues of the activity of digital platforms as a key competition subjects at modern markets are analyzed. Author proves that in the most cases it is appropriate to consider each side of the platform as a separate market when the relevant market is determined. Determination of a single market of intermediation services is justified only if the single price is set for all platform clients and if there is the same degree of substitution of the services for each consumer group. The article shows that it is necessary to consider positive cross-group effect when SSNІP-test is used for economic analysis of digital platforms activity. The problems of evaluation of business platforms market share are exposed. Author argues that usage of revenues as a basis for market share calculation is not appropriate if platform sets zero-price. In this case market share should be calculated based on the number of user or intensity of usage. It is proven that the main criterion of competition policy efficiency – consumer welfare – should include not only the price but also such parameters as privacy, consumer choice, protection of personal data, switching costs. A necessity of modification of Ukrainian competition policy in response to challenges of digital era is proven.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 480-500
Author(s):  
Patrick Chege Nderitu ◽  
Simon Wagura Ndiritu

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to determine the effects of the mergers and acquisitions on market prices, consumer welfare and aggregate profit of the merging firms and those of the non-merging firms and, therefore, answer the question on the overall effect of mergers and acquisitions on different performance measures on milk market using data from all the 34 licensed and active milk processors in Kenya. Design/methodology/approach A new model of analysis as developed from the Canadian Competition Policy maker, i.e. The Canadian Competition Policy merger simulation model, was used. Findings The study found that mergers and acquisitions lead to increase in market shares of the merging firms. The study also found that mergers and acquisitions have a significant effect on product price in the processed milk market. From the findings, the study concludes that mergers and acquisition not only lead to an increase in market shares of both merging and non-merging processed milk firms but also create market dominance due to reduction in the number of market players in the industry. Research limitations/implications The study uses the data for the licensed and active milk processors in the industry. The dormant and the non-licensed processors are excluded. Future studies can use the farm-gate prices as opposed to final consumer prices for the processed milk market. Originality/value The study contributes toward providing information on the effect of buyouts on social welfares, prices, market share, profitability and other relevant market equilibrium performance measures in the processed milk market in Kenya.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 271-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Al Kassiri ◽  
Tatiana Čorejová

This articles discusses the importance of converting knowledge into realizable output, which can subsequently be patented. Patenting, in itself, is already the result of a completed and difficult process. The importance of patenting is not only advantageous for the author patent, but also for the whole society and knowledge-based economy. In this article, we explain not only the effect of patenting on the economy as a whole, along with its advantages, but also possible acceleration in process of patenting. Universities rely on the important aspect of innovation and patenting, whereas innovation and patenting alone support the economic growth. Lack of projects covering patenting process may cause less outputs of innovation. Projects which support the development of innovation and start-ups have big potential in reducing unemployment and increasing the motivation of new foreign investors.


2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (6) ◽  
pp. 2384-2411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Calzolari ◽  
Vincenzo Denicolò

We analyze firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts and market-share discounts (conditional on the seller's share of customers' total purchases). With incomplete information about demand, firms have a unilateral incentive to use these contractual arrangements to better extract buyers' informational rents. However, exclusive contracts intensify competition, thus reducing prices and profits and (in all Pareto undominated equilibria) increasing welfare. Market-share discounts, by contrast, produce a double marginalization effect that leads to higher prices and harms buyers. We discuss the implications of these results for competition policy. (JEL D43, D83, D86, K21, L14, L42)


Author(s):  
David B. Audretsch ◽  
Iris A. M. Beckmann ◽  
Werner Bönte

Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip

This chapter discusses the market share limits that determine the applicability of Regulation 330/2010. Each of the supplier and the buyer must in principle remain below an individual limit of 30 per cent. In order to assess the market share limits, the chapter addresses the following steps of the analysis: (i) ninth step: definition of the relevant market; and (ii) tenth step: calculation of the market shares. It concludes by addressing the concrete and practical application of the market share limits in accordance with Regulation 330/2010 and offers easy-to-read overview tables illustrating the effect of changes in the market share levels over time.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 88-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianpaolo Iazzolino ◽  
Monica De Carolis ◽  
Paola Clemeno

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