Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Reply

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (5) ◽  
pp. 1918-1923 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Engelmann ◽  
Martin Strobel
Keyword(s):  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Maximin Preferences

Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (5) ◽  
pp. 1912-1917 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Fehr ◽  
Michael Naef ◽  
Klaus M Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Maximin Preferences

scholarly journals Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. 857-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Engelmann ◽  
Martin Strobel
Keyword(s):  
Relative Performance ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Maximin Preferences

We present simple one-shot distribution experiments comparing the relative importance of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion, as well as the relative performance of the fairness theories by Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels and by Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt. While the Fehr-Schmidt theory performs better in a direct comparison, this appears to be due to being in line with maximin preferences. More importantly, we find that a combination of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and selfishness can rationalize most of the data while the Bolton-Ockenfels and Fehr-Schmidt theories are unable to explain important patterns.

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

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