Mediation in Ultimatum Bargaining with Inequality Aversion: A Bayesian Persuasion Approach

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuxiang Cao ◽  
Zhuo Chen ◽  
Shaoan Huang
Keyword(s):  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining

The Weakest Link: The Relationship Between Fairness Beliefs and Behavior in Ultimatum Bargaining

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy R. Buchan ◽  
Rachel T. A. Croson ◽  
Eric J. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Bargaining ◽  
Weakest Link ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Relationship

Repeated ultimatum bargaining with a twist: The effect of uncertainty and verifiability of pie size and outside options on honesty and acceptance rates

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry L. Boles ◽  
Michelle Buck ◽  
Rachel Croson ◽  
David Messick ◽  
Keith Murnighan
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Bargaining ◽  
Outside Options ◽  
Acceptance Rates

Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doron Ravid
Keyword(s):  
Rational Inattention ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining

Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study

1996 ◽  
Vol 106 (436) ◽  
pp. 593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Guth ◽  
Steffen Huck ◽  
Peter Ockenfels
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining

Inequality aversion, self-interest and social connectedness

2021 ◽  
Vol 183 ◽  
pp. 744-772
Author(s):  
Matthew Robson
Keyword(s):  
Social Connectedness ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Self Interest

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

scholarly journals Racial differences in inequality aversion: Evidence from real world respondents in the ultimatum game

2012 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 600-617 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Griffin ◽  
David Nickerson ◽  
Abigail Wozniak
Keyword(s):  
Racial Differences ◽  
Real World ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Inequality Aversion

scholarly journals Heartbeat and Economic Decisions: Observing Mental Stress among Proposers and Responders in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game

PLoS ONE ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. e108218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe Dulleck ◽  
Markus Schaffner ◽  
Benno Torgler
Keyword(s):  
Mental Stress ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining ◽  
Economic Decisions ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining Game
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