scholarly journals Optimal Taxation with Risky Human Capital

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-309
Author(s):  
Marek Kapička ◽  
Julian Neira

We study optimal tax policies in a life-cycle economy with permanent ability differences and risky human capital investments that have both an unobservable component, learning effort, and an observable component, schooling. The optimal policies balance redistribution across agents, insurance against human capital shocks, and incentives to learn and work. In the optimum, (i ) high-ability agents face risky consumption while low-ability agents are insured; (ii ) the optimal schooling subsidy is substantial but less than 100 percent; (iii) if utility is separable in labor and learning effort, the inverse labor wedge follows a random walk; and (iv ) if the utility is not separable then the “no distortion at the top” result does not apply. The welfare gains from switching to the optimal tax system are about 1 percent in annual consumption equivalents. (JEL D15, H21, H24, I26, J24)

Author(s):  
S. Zhukov ◽  
V. Zelic ◽  
S. Soima

As a result of the conducted research the problems of development of human capital and basic pre-conditions of providing of his competitiveness are certain. Analyzed the loud speaker of charges on development of education and health protection of summary budget of Ukraine and measures on the improvement of economic situation in Ukraine and providing of development of human capital are offered. The basic types of investments are certain in a human capital on levels and subjects of investing. The mechanism of forming of human capital is presented. The mechanism of forming of human capital is presented. It is grounded, that for strategic development of human capital of Ukraine and achievement of equilibrium and balanced of economy in the conditions of globalization modernization of public policy is needed in area of education, namely, creation of the system of education, oriented to forming and development of skills and jurisdictions of man, necessary for innovative activity. Keywords human capital, investments in a human capital, competitiveness, economic state of affairs, payment for work.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucila Berniell

AbstractInformality is pervasive in many developing countries and it can affect occupational and educational decisions. Cross-country data shows that the rate of entrepreneurship as well as the gap between the skill premium for entrepreneurs and for workers increase with the size of the informal economy. Also, in countries with larger informal sectors the fraction of high-skilled individuals that choose to be entrepreneurs is larger. To explain these facts, I develop a model economy with human capital investments, occupational choice and an informal sector, in which the investment in human capital improves the efficiency of labor as well as managerial skills, and the technology to produce goods exhibits capital-skill complementarity. Model predictions can account for cross-country evidence and also shed light on the mechanisms at work when the level of informality in the economy increases. In particular, a higher level of informality discourages human capital investments for workers while it incentivizes these investments for the case of some managers, mostly informal but talented.


1987 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 21-33
Author(s):  
Shelley I. White-Means

Migrant farmworkers are essential to the supply of low-cost agricultural produce. However, employment earnings of this vital labor force are approximately equal to the federal poverty income. This study examines the role of health capital investments in enhancing farmworker productivity and employment earnings. Health capital investments are found to have a larger marginal effect on earnings than other forms of human capital investments, such as education or experience.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Kapička

I characterize optimal taxes in a life-cycle economy where ability and human capital are unobservable. I show that unobservable human capital effectively makes preferences over labor nonseparable across age. I generalize the static optimal tax formulas to account for such nonseparabilities and show how they depend both on own-Frisch labor elasticities and cross-Frisch labor elasticities. I calibrate the economy to US data. I find that the optimal marginal income taxes decrease with age, in contrast to both the US tax code and to a model with observable human capital. I demonstrate that the behavior of cross-Frisch elasticities is essential in explaining the decline. (JEL D91, H21, H24, J24)


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