scholarly journals Exchange rate policy and inflation in the process of currency integration in Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia with the Eurozone

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-28
Author(s):  
Dorota Żuchowska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Exchange Rate Regimes ◽  
Exchange Rate Policy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Central Eastern Europe ◽  
Rate Policy ◽  
Central Eastern

Among the Central-Eastern Europe countries which joined the European Union in 2004 only three – the smallest (Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia) – joined the Eurozone. Within these economies the process of currency integration was diversified in respect to their previously used systems of exchange rate regimes. Also experiences concerning suppressing inflation and meeting the condition of prices stability varied among them. The aim of this article is to answer the question whether the mode of the applied exchange rate regime has an impact on achieving economical convergence with the Eurozone. I shall compare exchange rate regimes in Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia in the period preceding joining the Eurozone. I shall also examine formation of inflation processes within the conditions of various exchange rate regimes existing in the analyzed countries as well as influence of the employed exchange rate regime policy on satisfying the criteria of convergence by those economies.

State-led violence in Ukraine’s 2004 elections and orange revolution

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taras Kuzio
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Ethnic Conflict ◽  
External Support ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Central Eastern Europe ◽  
Orange Revolution ◽  
Central Eastern ◽  
Second Wave

The Ukrainian opposition faced one of the greatest degrees of state-backed violence in the second wave of democratization of post-communist states with only Serbia experiencing similar cases of assassinations and repression of the youth Otpor NGO. In the 2004 Ukrainian elections the opposition maintained a strategy of non-violence over the longest protest period of 17 days but was prepared to use force if it had been attacked. The regime attempted to suppress the Orange Revolution using security forces. Covert and overt Russian external support was extensive and in the case of Ukraine and Georgia the European Union (EU) did not intervene with a membership offer that had the effect of emboldening the opposition in Central-Eastern Europe. This article surveys five state-backed violent strategies used in Ukraine’s 2004 elections: inciting regional and inter-ethnic conflict, assassinations, violence against the opposition, counter-revolution and use of the security forces. The article does not cover external Russian-backed violence in the 2004 elections unique to Ukraine that the author has covered elsewhere.

scholarly journals Consequences of Employing Different Exchange Rate Regimes in the Situation of Financial Crisis on the Example of Central-Eastern European Countries

Equilibrium ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-49
Author(s):  
Dorota Zbierzchowska
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Exchange Rate Regimes ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Central Eastern Europe ◽  
Central Eastern ◽  
Eastern European Countries

It is characteristic for the countries of Central-Eastern Europe to employ a great variety of exchange rate regimes: by resigning from their own currency and participating in monetary unions through the systems of currency board arrangement; by employing the systems of conventional fixed pegged arrangements; and by the floating systems. In the situation of global financial crisis and liberalization of capital flow in the Central-Eastern Europe countries profits and dangers of using certain solutions in the scope of exchange rate are clearly visible. The aim of this paper is to present theoretical profits and costs of utilizing various kinds of exchange rate regimes and their consequences for the autonomy of monetary policy. The paper also compares contemporary economical situation of the Central-Eastern European countries, what allows the author to indicate those countries, where the limitations stemming from the accepted system of exchange rate had negative consequences for the condition of their economy in general.

Continuity and change in Russia’s policy toward Central and Eastern Europe

2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yury E. Fedorov
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Central Eastern Europe ◽  
Strategic Factor ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Central Eastern ◽  
Sphere Of Influence ◽  
Security Guarantees ◽  
Former Ussr

The accession of the CEE states to NATO and the European Union has put an end to the geopolitical ambiguity and implicit insecurity in the region between Russia and the socalled ‘Old Europe’. Instead of being an area of great powers’ rivalry, elements of ‘buffer belts’ lacking meaningful strategic options, objects of raw Nazi-Soviet deals, or zones under Russian occupation and domination, the three Baltic States and the Visegrad group countries became full-fledged members of the European Union and were given NATO’s security guarantees. By the middle of the 2000s, one would conclude that traditional geopolitics had ended in this region. However, the changes in the strategic situation in CEE have not changed the deep rooted moving forces and long-term strategic goals of the Russian policy toward the region.Moscow seeks to have the position, as its official rhetoric says, of an ‘influential centre of a multipolar world’ that would be nearly equal to the USA, China, or the EU. With this in view Moscow seeks for the establishment of its domination over the new independent states of the former USSR and for the formation of a sphere of influence for itself in Central Eastern Europe. If it achieves these goals, then Europe may return once again to traditional geopolitics fraught with great power rivalries and permanent instabilities radiating far beyond CEE borders. Yet a few questions remain. Has Russia come to the conclusion that attempting to restore its privileged position of influence in Central-Eastern Europe is wrong? Has Russia enough power to threaten the CEE countries? How credible are NATO’s security guarantees? How may Russian behavior in CEE affect a wider European geopolitical context? These questions are appropriate in the light of Russia’s ‘resurgence’ as a revanchist power and because Russia is, and most probably will remain in the next five to ten years, a weighty economic and strategic factor in areas along the Western borders of the former USSR.

scholarly journals USE OF (HARD AND SOFT) PEGGED EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ON THE PATH TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATIONS IN TERMS OF CRISIS

2018 ◽  
pp. 250-266
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Exchange Rate Regimes ◽  
Exchange Rate Policy ◽  
External Shocks ◽  
Exchange Rate Fluctuations ◽  
Accession Countries ◽  
Rate Policy ◽  
Pros And Cons

Important aspect of ongoing discussions on the choice of exchange rate regime is its reaction to crisis as a strong and unexpected external shock; such was the case of Great Recession from 2008.-onwards. It is generally accepted that pegged exchange rate regimes are more sensitive to external shocks that might cause their long-term destabilization. Still, the soft pegged regimes (also entitled intermediate regimes) have fewer limits, with rules that allow more maneuver space for national strategy. The group of soft pegged regimes is wider, both in structure and scope, then those of hard pegged regimes. While countries with more flexible regimes might use exchange rate fluctuations as automatic stabilisator, (hard and/or soft) pegs impose some limitations. In the first place, there is stability goal that, in combination with strict regulatory rules, limits the monetary and exchange rate policy, demanding the use of other strategies, such is the internal devaluation. Secondly, these countries do not use wide scope of instruments and their crisis strategy is more rigid than those of other regimes. Finally, there are dilemmas on the optimality of exchange rate strategy during the pre-eurozone membership period, including the euro introduction strategy. These dilemmas deepen in terms of crisis. This paper focuses on comparison of hard and soft pegged regimes (the latter also entitled intermediate regimes) in selected European union accession countries, using „de facto“classification scale developed by International Monetary Fund. Despite the crisis, there have not been dramatic turbulences in terms of exchange rate policy in observed countries, but the general economic indicators clearly show the real depth of crisis and slow recovery. The question open for further discussion is whether such regimes should be obtained or abandoned during the crisis and what is their contribution to national economy. Furthermore, there are pros and cons of possible strategies, considering the European integration process.

scholarly journals Central-Eastern Europe in Post-COVID-19 International Politics

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
I. Kobrinskaya ◽  
◽  
B. Frumkin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Political Development ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
World Politics ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Central Eastern Europe ◽  
Central Eastern ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

The article is based on the hypothesis about the transition of the development of international processes from the stage of uncertainty to the stage of the negative certainty – the increase and synergy of the impact of negative factors in the environmental, climatic, epidemiological, socio-economic, technological, and security spheres against the background of worsening geopolitical contradictions and confirmed by the crisis caused by the COVID19 pandemic. The article examines the dynamics of socio-economic and political development and the changing role of the Central-Eastern European region. Having strengthened their positions in the European Union through adaptation to EU policies and norms, by the mid-2010s the CEE countries began to pursue an increasingly independent course. By 2020 their policy became one of the factors hindering the further deepening of the EU integration, primarily in the foreign policy sphere, and the process of federalization of the Union. The analysis of the state of public opinion conducted in the article testifies to the dualism of the perception of citizens of the CEE countries of the EU membership. High support for the EU is combined with frustration at the partial loss of national sovereignty, which is actively used by nationalist political forces in the region. During the early months of COVID-19 pandemics the countries of the region performed better than the EU as a whole, which created prerequisites for reformatting the position of the CEE countries in the EU. The enormous resources provided by the EU to Central-Eastern Europe to overcome the crisis and move towards sustainable development serve as a tool for even deeper economic and political integration of the CEE into the EU. Conditionality of support for the implementation of the EU strategies could have an impact on the CEE countries that is very similar to the period of their accession to the integration grouping and lead to the next stage of desovereignization. Meanwhile, for the European Union closer binding of the CEE countries allows not only to take another step towards federalization, but also to strengthen its actorness in world politics and the global economy.

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