History of Operations Research

Author(s):  
Saul I. Gass ◽  
Arjang A. Assad
Author(s):  
Frederic Adam ◽  
Ciara Heavin

In such a complex and well-researched domain as decision support systems (DSS), with a long history of authors making insightful contributions since the 1960’s, it is critical for researchers, especially those less experienced, to have a broad knowledge of the seminal work that has been carried out by prior generations of researchers. This can serve to avoid proposing research questions which have been considered many times before, without having consideration for the answers which have been put forward by previous scholars, thereby reinventing the wheel or “rediscovering” findings about the life of organizations that have been presented long before. The study of human and managerial decision-making is also characterized by considerable depth and seminal research going back to the beginning of the 20th century, across a variety of fields of research including psychology, social psychology, sociology or indeed operations research. Inasmuch as decision-making and decision support are inextricably linked, it is essential for researchers in DSS to be very familiar with both stream of research in their full diversity so they are able to understand both what activity is being supported and how to analyze requirements for developing decision support artefacts. In addition, whilst the area of decision support has sometimes been characterized by technology-based hype, it is critical to recognize that only a clear focus on the thinking and actions of managers can provide decisive directions for research on their decision support needs. In this article, we consider first the characteristics of human cognition, before concentrating on the decision-making needs of managers and the lessons that can be derived for the development of DSS.


2020 ◽  
pp. 167-185
Author(s):  
Phillip S. Meilinger

This chapter recounts the history of Operations Research, intelligence, and their effects on the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II and beyond. Airmen use different weapons employed against different targets to achieve different results than do soldiers or sailors. These necessary differences—the result of the mediums in which they operate—are characterized by airmen’s attempts to most effectively and efficiently injure Nazi Germany and Japan. Few situations better illustrate how the services employ different prisms through which to view war, which in turn shapes their strategic thought. Airmen confronted questions on what targets should be struck and how this could be done most effectively. Operations Research was established as a scientific discipline to address these types of questions. Unfortunately, neither the intelligence apparatus nor the technology necessary to measure the effects of air attacks were available, nor was the analytical framework then in place to allow proper measurement. These breakthroughs did not occur until the 1990s.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 846-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Dayé

Delphi is a procedure that produces forecasts on technological and social developments. This article traces the history of Delphi’s development to the early 1950s, where a group of logicians and mathematicians working at the RAND Corporation carried out experiments to assess the predictive capacities of groups of experts. While Delphi now has a rather stable methodological shape, this was not so in its early years. The vision that Delphi’s creators had for their brainchild changed considerably. While they had initially seen it as a technique, a few years later they reconfigured it as a scientific method. After some more years, however, they conceived of Delphi as a tool. This turbulent youth of Delphi can be explained by parallel changes in the fields that were deemed relevant audiences for the technique, operations research and the policy sciences. While changing the shape of Delphi led to some success, it had severe, yet unrecognized methodological consequences. The core assumption of Delphi that the convergence of expert opinions observed over the iterative stages of the procedure can be interpreted as consensus, appears not to be justified for the third shape of Delphi as a tool that continues to be the most prominent one.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer DiCarlo ◽  
Alfred Eustes ◽  
Gregory Steeger

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