An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games Without Side Payments

We show that the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.

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Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.97.3.871 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 97 (3) ◽

pp. 871-889 ◽

Cited By ~ 70

Author(s):

Bård Harstad

Keyword(s):

Private Information ◽

Fiscal Federalism ◽

Theoretical Foundation ◽

Bargaining Game ◽

Local Conditions ◽

Side Payments ◽

Political Cooperation ◽

Political Centralization ◽

Decentralized Cooperation

For two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities, I analyze a bargaining game under private information. I derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions—with and without side payments—and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations. While policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions, they create conflicts between the regions and, thus, delay. The results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation, and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial “uniformity assumption” traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature. (JEL C78, D72, D82, H77)

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THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF STRATEGIES

International Game Theory Review ◽

10.1142/s0219198904000344 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 06 (04) ◽

pp. 525-554

Author(s):

GREGORY K. DOW

Keyword(s):

Repeated Game ◽

Standard View ◽

Team Members ◽

Technology Firms ◽

Outside Options ◽

Side Payments ◽

Input Demand ◽

General Production ◽

Production Technologies ◽

Incentive Constraint

This paper replaces the standard view of the firm as a nexus of contracts with a repeated game framework where input contributions and side payments are self-enforced. General production technologies and flexible transfers among team members are allowed. When an incentive constraint binds, input demand and output supply are influenced by the discount factor, the probability of exogenous team dissolution, and the aggregate value of outside options. When this incentive constraint does not bind, the firm maximizes profit in the usual way. I discuss examples involving the Cobb-Douglas technology, firms with a single residual claimant, and partnerships.

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Values of games without side payments

International Journal of Game Theory ◽

10.1007/bf01753436 ◽

1971 ◽

Vol 1 (1) ◽

pp. 95-109 ◽

Cited By ~ 19

Author(s):

G. Owen

Keyword(s):

Side Payments

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Bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus for multi-choice games with coalition structure

2013 25th Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC) ◽

10.1109/ccdc.2013.6561113 ◽

2013 ◽

Author(s):

Tianwen Li ◽

Feng Ma ◽

Weiyi Liu

Keyword(s):

Coalition Structure ◽

Bargaining Set

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THE POSITIVE PREKERNEL OF A COOPERATIVE GAME

International Game Theory Review ◽

10.1142/s0219198900000196 ◽

2000 ◽

Vol 02 (04) ◽

pp. 287-305 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

PETER SUDHÖLTER ◽

BEZALEL PELEG

Keyword(s):

Cooperative Game ◽

Weak Version ◽

Transferable Utility ◽

Bargaining Set ◽

The Core ◽

Reduced Game ◽

Positive Kernel ◽

Game Property ◽

Transferable Utility Games

The positive prekernel, a solution of cooperative transferable utility games, is introduced. We show that this solution inherits many properties of the prekernel and of the core, which are both sub-solutions. It coincides with its individually rational variant, the positive kernel, when applied to any zero-monotonic game. The positive (pre)kernel is a sub-solution of the reactive (pre)bargaining set. We prove that the positive prekernel on the set of games with players belonging to a universe of at least three possible members can be axiomatized by non-emptiness, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and a weak version of unanimity for two-person games.

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