scholarly journals A Dynkin Game on Assets with Incomplete Information on the Return

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiziano De Angelis ◽  
Fabien Gensbittel ◽  
Stephane Villeneuve
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Value Function ◽  
Moving Boundary ◽  
Rate Of Return ◽  
Stopping Sets ◽  
Dynkin Game ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The Value Function

This paper studies a two-player zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques, we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a bidimensional diffusion (X,Y). Then we characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which each player stops at the hitting time of (X,Y) to a set with a moving boundary. A detailed description of the stopping sets for the two players is provided along with global C1 regularity of the value function.

scholarly journals Dynkin game under g-expectation in continuous time

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-470
Author(s):  
Helin Wu ◽  
Yong Ren ◽  
Feng Hu
Keyword(s):  
Differential Equation ◽  
Stochastic Differential Equation ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Value Function ◽  
Backward Stochastic Differential Equation ◽  
Saddle Points ◽  
Value Functions ◽  
Dynkin Game ◽  
The Value Function

Abstract In this paper, we investigate some kind of Dynkin game under g-expectation induced by backward stochastic differential equation (short for BSDE). The lower and upper value functions $$\underline{V}_t=ess\sup \nolimits _{\tau \in {\mathcal {T}_t}} ess\inf \nolimits _{\sigma \in {\mathcal {T}_t}}\mathcal {E}^g_t[R(\tau ,\sigma )]$$ V ̲ t = e s s sup τ ∈ T t e s s inf σ ∈ T t E t g [ R ( τ , σ ) ] and $$\overline{V}_t=ess\inf \nolimits _{\sigma \in {\mathcal {T}_t}} ess\sup \nolimits _{\tau \in {\mathcal {T}_t}}\mathcal {E}^g_t[R(\tau ,\sigma )]$$ V ¯ t = e s s inf σ ∈ T t e s s sup τ ∈ T t E t g [ R ( τ , σ ) ] are defined, respectively. Under some suitable assumptions, a pair of saddle points is obtained and the value function of Dynkin game $$V(t)=\underline{V}_t=\overline{V}_t$$ V ( t ) = V ̲ t = V ¯ t follows. Furthermore, we also consider the constrained case of Dynkin game.

scholarly journals Stochastic Brownian Game of Absolute Dominance

2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 436-452
Author(s):  
Shangzhen Luo
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Value Function ◽  
The Other ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Minimax Criterion ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Suitable Parameter ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Value Function ◽  
Absolute Dominance

In this paper we study a reinsurance game between two insurers whose surplus processes are modeled by arithmetic Brownian motions. We assume a minimax criterion in the game. One insurer tries to maximize the probability of absolute dominance while the other tries to minimize it through reinsurance control. Here absolute dominance is defined as the event that liminf of the difference of the surplus levels tends to -∞. Under suitable parameter conditions, the game is solved with the value function and the Nash equilibrium strategy given in explicit form.

Stochastic Brownian Game of Absolute Dominance

2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (02) ◽  
pp. 436-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shangzhen Luo
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Value Function ◽  
The Other ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Minimax Criterion ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Suitable Parameter ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Value Function ◽  
Absolute Dominance

In this paper we study a reinsurance game between two insurers whose surplus processes are modeled by arithmetic Brownian motions. We assume a minimax criterion in the game. One insurer tries to maximize the probability of absolute dominance while the other tries to minimize it through reinsurance control. Here absolute dominance is defined as the event that liminf of the difference of the surplus levels tends to -∞. Under suitable parameter conditions, the game is solved with the value function and the Nash equilibrium strategy given in explicit form.

COMPACT REPRESENTATIONS OF SEARCH IN COMPLEX DOMAINS

2005 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
YOSI BEN-ASHER ◽  
EITAN FARCHI
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Search Strategy ◽  
Matrix Game ◽  
Set Systems ◽  
Compact Representations ◽  
Mathematical Generalization ◽  
General Search ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Search Domain

We introduce a new zero-sum matrix game for modeling search in structured domains. In this game, one player tries to find a "bug" while the other tries to hide it. Both players exploit the structure of the "search" domain. Intuitively, this search game is a mathematical generalization of the well known binary search. The generalization is from searching over totally ordered sets to searching over more complex search domains such as trees, partial orders and general set systems. As there must be one row for every search strategy, and there are exponentially many ways to search even in very simple search domains, the game's matrix has exponential size ("space"). In this work we present two ways to reduce the space required to compute the Nash value (in pure strategies) of this game: • First we show that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies can be computed by using a backward induction on the matrices of each "part" or sub structure of the search domain. This can significantly reduce the space required to represent the game. • Next, we show when general search domains can be represented as DAGs (Directed Acycliqe Graphs). As a result, the Nash equilibrium can be directly computed using the DAG. Consequently the space needed to compute the desired search strategy is reduced to O(n2) where n is the size of the search domain.

scholarly journals Callable Russian Options and Their Optimal Boundaries

2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsuo Suzuki ◽  
Katsushige Sawaki
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Stopping ◽  
Value Function ◽  
Optimal Stopping Problem ◽  
Dynkin Game ◽  
Russian Option ◽  
The Value Function

We deal with the pricing of callable Russian options. A callable Russian option is a contract in which both of the seller and the buyer have the rights to cancel and to exercise at any time, respectively. The pricing of such an option can be formulated as an optimal stopping problem between the seller and the buyer, and is analyzed as Dynkin game. We derive the value function of callable Russian options and their optimal boundaries.

Double stopping by two decision-makers

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 438-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Szajowski
Keyword(s):  
Markov Process ◽  
Optimal Stopping ◽  
Value Function ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Secretary Problem ◽  
Gain Function ◽  
Competitive Situation ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The Value Function

A problem of optimal stopping of the discrete-time Markov process by two decision-makers (Player 1 and Player 2) in a competitive situation is considered. The zero-sum game structure is adopted. The gain function depends on states chosen by both decision-makers. When both players want to accept the realization of the Markov process at the same moment, the priority is given to Player 1. The construction of the value function and the optimal strategies for the players are given. The Markov chain case is considered in detail. An example related to the generalized secretary problem is solved.

scholarly journals ON LEVEL SETS WITH "NARROW THROATS" IN LINEAR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

2005 ◽  
Vol 07 (03) ◽  
pp. 285-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
SERGEY S. KUMKOV ◽  
VALERY S. PATSKO ◽  
JOSEF SHINAR
Keyword(s):  
Differential Games ◽  
Level Sets ◽  
Value Function ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Terminal Time ◽  
Linear Differential Games ◽  
Neighboring Level ◽  
Linear Differential ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The Value Function

Examples with zero-sum linear differential games of fixed terminal time and a convex terminal payoff function depending on two components of the phase vector are considered. Such games can have an indifferent zone with constant value function. The level set of the value function associated with the indifferent zone is called the "critical" tube. In the selected examples, the critical tube and the neighboring level sets exhibit "narrow throats". Presence of such throats requires extremely precise computations for constructing the level sets. The paper presents different forms of critical tubes with narrow throats and indicates the combinations of problem parameters that can produce them.

scholarly journals Approximation of value function of differential game with minimal cost

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-561
Author(s):  
Yu.V. Averboukh
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Bellman Equation ◽  
Value Function ◽  
Stochastic Game ◽  
Inequality Constraints ◽  
Minimal Cost ◽  
Parabolic Pde ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The Value Function

The paper is concerned with the approximation of the value function of the zero-sum differential game with the minimal cost, i.e., the differential game with the payoff functional determined by the minimization of some quantity along the trajectory by the solutions of continuous-time stochastic games with the stopping governed by one player. Notice that the value function of the auxiliary continuous-time stochastic game is described by the Isaacs–Bellman equation with additional inequality constraints. The Isaacs–Bellman equation is a parabolic PDE for the case of stochastic differential game and it takes a form of system of ODEs for the case of continuous-time Markov game. The approximation developed in the paper is based on the concept of the stochastic guide first proposed by Krasovskii and Kotelnikova.

scholarly journals Stochastic Brownian Game of Absolute Dominance

2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (02) ◽  
pp. 436-452
Author(s):  
Shangzhen Luo
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Value Function ◽  
The Other ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Minimax Criterion ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Suitable Parameter ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Value Function ◽  
Absolute Dominance

In this paper we study a reinsurance game between two insurers whose surplus processes are modeled by arithmetic Brownian motions. We assume a minimax criterion in the game. One insurer tries to maximize the probability of absolute dominance while the other tries to minimize it through reinsurance control. Here absolute dominance is defined as the event that liminf of the difference of the surplus levels tends to -∞. Under suitable parameter conditions, the game is solved with the value function and the Nash equilibrium strategy given in explicit form.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document