A Dynkin Game on Assets with Incomplete Information on the Return

This paper studies a two-player zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques, we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a bidimensional diffusion (X,Y). Then we characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which each player stops at the hitting time of (X,Y) to a set with a moving boundary. A detailed description of the stopping sets for the two players is provided along with global C1 regularity of the value function.

Dynkin game under g-expectation in continuous time

In this paper, we investigate some kind of Dynkin game under g-expectation induced by backward stochastic differential equation (short for BSDE). The lower and upper value functions $$\underline{V}_t=ess\sup \nolimits _{\tau \in {\mathcal {T}_t}} ess\inf \nolimits _{\sigma \in {\mathcal {T}_t}}\mathcal {E}^g_t[R(\tau ,\sigma )]$$ V ̲ t = e s s sup τ ∈ T t e s s inf σ ∈ T t E t g [ R ( τ , σ ) ] and $$\overline{V}_t=ess\inf \nolimits _{\sigma \in {\mathcal {T}_t}} ess\sup \nolimits _{\tau \in {\mathcal {T}_t}}\mathcal {E}^g_t[R(\tau ,\sigma )]$$ V ¯ t = e s s inf σ ∈ T t e s s sup τ ∈ T t E t g [ R ( τ , σ ) ] are defined, respectively. Under some suitable assumptions, a pair of saddle points is obtained and the value function of Dynkin game $$V(t)=\underline{V}_t=\overline{V}_t$$ V ( t ) = V ̲ t = V ¯ t follows. Furthermore, we also consider the constrained case of Dynkin game.

Reflected BSDEs with general filtration and two completely separated barriers

We consider reflected backward stochastic differential equations, with two barriers, defined on probability spaces equipped with filtration satisfying only the usual assumptions of right-continuity and completeness. As for barriers, we assume that there are càdlàg processes of class D that are completely separated. We prove the existence and uniqueness of solutions for an integrable final condition and an integrable monotone generator. An application to the zero-sum Dynkin game is given.

Solving finite time horizon Dynkin games by optimal switching

This paper uses recent results on continuous-time finite-horizon optimal switching problems with negative switching costs to prove the existence of a saddle point in an optimal stopping (Dynkin) game. Sufficient conditions for the game's value to be continuous with respect to the time horizon are obtained using recent results on norm estimates for doubly reflected backward stochastic differential equations. This theory is then demonstrated numerically for the special cases of cancellable call and put options in a Black‒Scholes market.