Defaming the Dead

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Herzog
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Dead Person ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Dead ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

If you defame the dead, even someone who recently died, tort law does not think that’s an injury: not to the grieving survivors and not to the dead person. This book argues that defamation is an injury to the recently dead. It explores history, including the shaping of the common law, and offers an account of posthumous harm and wrong. Along the way, it offers a sustained exploration of how we and the law think about corpse desecration.

Personalized Legal Areas

2021 ◽  
pp. 61-84
Author(s):  
Omri Ben-Shahar ◽  
Ariel Porat
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Standards Of Care ◽  
Criminal Sanctions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter illustrates personalized law “in action” by examining it in three areas of the law: standards of care under the common law tort doctrine of negligence, mandated consumer protections in contract law, and criminal sanctions. In each area, the chapter examines personalization of commands along several dimensions. In tort law, standards of care could vary according to each injurer’s riskiness and skill, to reduce the costs of accidents. In contract law, mandatory protections could vary according to the value they provide each consumer and differential cost they impose on firms, to allocate protections where, and only where, they are justified. And in criminal law, sanctions would be set based on what it takes to deter criminals, accounting for how perpetrators differ in their motives and likelihood of being apprehended, with the potential to reduce unnecessary harsh penalties.

Legal Dilemmas

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Herzog
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Dead ◽  
The Law ◽  
Star Chamber ◽  
Tort Claims

The chapter launches with Star Chamber proceedings against Lewis Pickering: in the sixteenth century, defaming the dead could be a crime. And that remains true even in today’s United States. But as the common law sharpened the distinction between tort and crime, it rejected the view that such defamation could be a tort. Tort claims extinguished when either plaintiff or defendant died. And when aggrieved survivors sued, the law held they hadn’t been wronged, even if they had been harmed, so they couldn’t recover, either.

Discretion and Security: Excluding Evidence under Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.J.W. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rule Of Thumb ◽  
The Common ◽  
Political Compromise ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Way

Among rules of law Karl Llewellyn noted at one extreme the “rule-of-thumb, in which the flat result is articulated, leaving behind and unexpressed all indication of its reason”. At the other extreme was “the way of principle, in which the reason is clearly and effectively articulated, and that articulation is made part of the very rule”. The vice of principle, he observed, “can be a vaporish vagueness, and the techniques of its effective formulation are not easy to isolate for communication and use”. Partly for this reason, partly perhaps because of its origin in a last-minute political compromise, section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at first confounded attempts to predict the manner of its application. One commentary suggested that it was “of no practical use”; there were dicta in the Court of Appeal to the effect that it did “no more than to re-state the power which judges had at common law before the Act of 1984 was passed”. A leading work on the law of evidence expressed the view that the sub-section was “cast in terms of such vagueness and generality as to furnish little guidance to the court”. There has been some development since those early days. It now seems clear that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be regarded as a codifying Act which has to be looked at on its own wording. Section 78(1), therefore, does not merely re-state the position at common law. It is also clear that in its operation it overlaps section 76 and, through section 82(3), some of the common law. Section 78(1) may be applied in a variety of situations, with or without the presence of some element of impropriety in the way in which the evidence was obtained. Basic questions about its operation nevertheless remain.

Illegal Earnings

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-80
Author(s):  
James Goudkamp ◽  
Lorenz König
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Considerable Promise ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

AbstractThis article addresses the principles of tort law that govern claims in respect of lost illegal earnings. It focuses on common law jurisdictions (and the law in the United Kingdom in particular) where such claims, despite apparently being commonplace, have been largely ignored by academics. It describes the existing law and calls in aid in this regard a four-fold taxonomy of cases. The article then turns attention to how claims in respect of lost illegal earnings ought to be decided. At this juncture, the article looks to ideas emanating from German tort law, which has developed a highly sophisticated jurisprudence on the subject of illegal earnings. The German approach, stated simply, requires tort law to defer to rules in other departments of private law. If, for example, contract law would not protect an interest that a claimant has in a particular transaction by reason of the transaction being tainted with illegality, tort law will not allow a claimant indirectly to obtain the benefits of that transaction via a claim for lost illegal earnings. It is argued that the German solution holds considerable promise and merits consideration as a serious alternative to the significantly more complicated principles that the common law courts have developed, which principles currently lack any thoroughgoing rationalisation.

The Adequacy of the Law of Torts

1961 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecil A. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Accidental Injury ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

Any attempt to evaluate the adequacy or inadequacy of tort law in general is bound to fail unless the scope of inquiry is severely limited. All attempts to find some unifying principle have failed. In light of the diverse interests involved which may be political, domestic or economic, and the purposes to be achieved, which may range from the quasi-criminal to determination of title to property, it would be a miracle of intellectual abstraction if it were otherwise.To confine inquiry to “accidental” injuries, i.e., those arising as a by-product of some lawful activity carried on for reasons other than the invasion of a plaintiff's interest, is helpful but not satis-factory. For example, “accidental” injury to a person's privacy, honour or reputation could fall in this category. While issues of “strict liability” or liability for “fault” permeate this field and have, in England and Canada, been developed by the courts in favour of the former, public interest in freedom to disseminate news and the encouragement of freedom of speech is an important factor here which makes it impossible to compare other branches of the law where there is no counterpart. Here too legislation is playing an important role. By statute in England attempts have been made to mitigate some of the harsher features of strict liability by eliminating damages and substituting an “offer of amends” for accidental and non-negligent defamation. While legislation in Canada has been widespread, particularly with regard to the total or partial abolition of the distinction between libel and slander, such legislation has nowhere changed the strict liability of the common law.

Liability in Bailment in Israeli Law — Rethinking Benefit

1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 744-753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shirley Renner
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Primary Object ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

While “classical” tort law deals with the liability of those unlawfully in possession of goods for their damage or loss, the law of bailment deals with the liability of those lawfully in possession of goods for their damage or loss.The Israeli statute relating to bailment, The Bailees Law, more closely resembles the law of bailment in common law, than its civil law counterpart, the law of deposit. Similar to the law of bailment in common law, Israel's Bailees Law covers both possession where the primary object is the safekeeping of goods, e.g., a warehouseman, and possession where the primary object is other than safekeeping of goods, e.g., chattel hire, hire of work and labour to be performed upon a chattel, and a pledge.In terms of liability for the loss of or damage to the goods, the Israeli statute roughly resembles the “traditional” law of bailment in the common law, which distinguishes different kinds of bailment according to the existence and location of benefit received.

Common Law Codification: Lessons and Warnings from Twenty-First Century Australia

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-206
Author(s):  
Mark Lunney
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
First Century ◽  
Rare Phenomenon ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
Negligence Law

AbstractCodification of tort law is a rare phenomenon in the common law world. However, building on earlier precedents, in the early 2000s, Australian jurisdictions embarked on a project of placing important general principles of negligence law into legislation. This article considers these provisions and argues that they can be considered as an attempt to codify certain parts of the law of tort. Both the process by which this codification took place, and the contents of the ‘codes’, provide interesting comparative material for civilian jurisdictions with codified tort law as well as for common law systems.

• Lord Bridge says that Kerr LJ (in the Court of Appeal) in finding for the seller had in fact misinterpreted what Lord Fraser had said about The Canada Steamship v R [1952] 1 All ER 303 in the Ailsa Craig case! This is an excellent paragraph for demonstrating the way in which judges argue about other cases, following, distinguishing, overruling or stating the precedent or a case erroneously. • Lord Bridge decides the common law point in favour of the sellers in agreement with Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal. • Lord Bridge turns to discuss the ‘statutory’ issue. We now begin to understand the reference to ‘the Act’ in issue (2) as set out by Lord Bridge at Appendix 1, p 310, para 2. • The modified s 55 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is set out. • The Sale of Goods Act 1979 was a statute that was pure consolidation. (This means that it merely collected together the existing law and put it in one place.) • Modified s 55 preserves the law between 18 May 1973 (the date that the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act came into force) and 1 February 1977 (the date that the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 came into force). • Section 55, sub-ss (1), (4), (5) and (9) are set out. Students need to study s 55 carefully to ensure that they understand what it is providing for and that they can follow the discussion of it by Lord Bridge. So, let us stop here for a moment… for a statutory diversion.

2012 ◽  
pp. 105-105
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Way

Torts and Other Wrongs

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
John Gardner
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Common Cause ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter focuses on the law of torts, not in the United States, but in other major common law jurisdictions (England and Wales, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) in which tort cases are normally adjudicated by judges sitting without juries. It considers the so-called classical interpretation of the common law of torts by John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky, and how they tend to equivocate on an important point of law in a way that puts them at odds with some writers with whom they would do better to make common cause. It suggests that this equivocation is where the law of the United States parts company with the law in the rest of the common law world. The problem, an English lawyer might then teasingly say, is with American tort law rather than with the Goldberg and Zipursky rendition of it.

scholarly journals What's Wrong with Restitution

1969 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 221 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Stevens ◽  
Jason W. Neyers
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Simple Formulation ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

The law of restitution has developed out of the law of quasi-contract and the law of constructive trust. Inadequate attention to the logic and coherence of doctrines in the law of restitution, however, renders this new law as opaque and confused as its predecessor. This is largely due to the remedial mentality of the common law. The remedy to the remedial mentality is to concentrate future efforts in stating doctrine on defining rights, not remedies. The precedent for this type of change in method is the transformation that occurred in contract and tort over the past 100 years, inspired, in part, by civilian theories of private law. The right that generates the remedy restitution is the cause of action in unjust enrichment. It arises where there has been a non-consensual receipt and retention of value, that is, a receipt and retention of value that occurs without "juristic reason." "Nonconsensual" means by mistake, by theft or by finding. There are a number of problems in the method of the common law tradition which stand in the way of recognizing this simple formulation: (a) The inherent expansiveness of "restitution " and "unjust enrichment" if these terms are not rigorously defined; (b) The lack of serious competition for the expansive versions of the subject, on a number of fronts; (c) The lack of a clear direction in the efforts to reform the law of quasi-contract and constructive trust; (d) The deeply embedded nature of the quasi-contract thinking; (e) Poor analysis in some areas of the law of contract and (f) Tort; and (g) The lack of an explicit agency of reform in the tradition.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document