scholarly journals Nuclear Energy Projects Financing Option with Contracts for Difference: The Perspective from European Union State Aid Modernisation

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Rimšaitė
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 305
Author(s):  
Dóra Lovas

<p>The aim of the article is to present the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the case of the Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant. This investment can also be related to the Paks II nuclear power plant investment, therefore the two investments are compared too. Both projects were examined by the European Commission, which take an important part when the national aid was awarded to Hinkley Point C and Paks II projects, and the decision of the CJEU also had influence on it. The author considers the European Commission’s aid conception positive, because the less developed countries are not forced to use only the renewables, but the environmental and security aspects of nuclear energy are also allowed (e.g. Hinkley Point C and Paks II nuclear power plants). The subsidy was allowed in both cases, but the reasons are different. In these cases, the limits of the EU energy politics can be seen, i.e. the right to select the package and the priority of the energy security and sustainable development. To mention an example for the difference, in Great Britain the energy sector was divided among the participants on the market but in Hungary the nuclear energy remained under state control. In the first option the state wanted to prove that it grants offset for the help to the general market services and in the second option the market investor principle was highlighted in order to show no other market participant act in other way. These points were not accepted, the state aid was provided both cases with permissible reasons because the projects condescend the goals of environmental policy and energy security. The decisions show that as a result of the efforts to protect the environment the dependency on energy increased and it cannot be solved only be encouraging the usage of the renewables. The permissive attitude of the European Commission can be found here and it is influenced by the increased state regulative roles. According to the author, it also appears in the environmentally friendly decisions which refers to the Paris Agreement’s fulfilment and the involvement of environmental requirements into politics. Moreover, the European Union tries to maintain its leader role in economics, which can be reached by the decrease of energy dependency and the exclusive usage of renewable energies is not the appropriate solution. The CJEU judgement is relevant in several respects. The article focuses primarily on the issue of environmental protection, state aid and the relation between the Euratom Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 140 ◽  
pp. 103924
Author(s):  
Yue Meng ◽  
Hasan Diner ◽  
Serhat Yüksel

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Contu ◽  
Elgilani Eltahir Elshareif

Purpose This paper aims to estimate willingness to accept (WTA) hypothetical nuclear energy projects and the impact of net perceived benefits across three countries: Italy, a country without nuclear plants in operation; the UK, a country with nuclear plants in operation and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has more recently opted for the inclusion of nuclear energy in its energy mix. These valuations can support cost-benefit analyses by allowing policymakers to account for additional benefits and costs which would be otherwise neglected. Design/methodology/approach Data collection was conducted through online nationwide surveys, for a total of over 4,000 individuals sampled from Italy, the UK and the UAE. The surveys included choice experiments designed to elicit preferences towards nuclear energy in the form of WTA, indicating estimated compensations for welfare worsening changes and questions to measure perceived risks and benefits. Findings The average WTA/Km is the lowest for the case of the UAE. What is more, perceived net positive benefits tend to decrease the WTA required by the UAE respondents? Moreover, across the cases, albeit to a lesser extent with regard to Italy’s case, there is evidence that a more positive benefit perception seems to increase the valuation of environmental and public benefits offered as part of the experiment. Originality/value The contribution of this study is primarily twofold: first, it provides a comparison of WTA values in a context where the availability of choice experiment data is scant; second, it assesses whether and to what extent perceived net positive benefits of nuclear energy impact WTA of nuclear energy projects.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Virág Blazsek

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the longrun however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.


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