Minding the Gap in Unlawful and Dangerous Act Manslaughter: A Moral Defence of One-Punch Killers

2008 ◽  
Vol 72 (6) ◽  
pp. 537-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Mitchell

Whilst it is true that the one-punch killer has crossed a moral threshold and acted wrongfully by committing an assault, his victim's death may be both unforeseen and unforeseeable. The gap between what was foreseen/foreseeable and death may thus be considerable. This article suggests it is too great; convicting the killer of manslaughter places too much weight on the element of luck. The task then is to identify an appropriate principle for regulating the gap and in the course of tackling this task the article considers and rejects, inter alia, a recent recommendation by the Law Reform Commission of Ireland.

1960 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 66-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Roberts-Wray

British administration in overseas countries has conferred no greater benefit than English law and justice. That may be a trite observation, but I offer no apology. It has been said so often by so many people—as many laymen as lawyers and perhaps more Africans than Englishmen—that it must be assumed to be true. But what, in this context, are English law and justice, or similar expressions (it is put in many different ways) to be taken to comprehend ? I have heard one or two lawyers who have served overseas speak as if there were a rebuttable presumption that anything suitable for this country should be acceptable for a country in Africa. Even if that were true, and I am sure it is not, it would not that all English legal rules and institutions are appropriate for Africa, for they are not even suitable for England. It is only too true that the law is sometimes “an ass”. Not so often as some laymen like to claim, though laymen may be fair judges of what is good sense in law. I well remember how as a law student I became impatient with principles, especially in the law of torts and the rules of evidence, which to my mind left a large gap between law on the one hand and justice or common sense on the other. I am well aware that in my critical attitude I was at one with the majority, and all lawyers must welcome the labours of the Law Reform Committees, which have borne fruit in a steady stream of important Bills during the last thirty years.


2004 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 601-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Getzler

Michael Lobban shows how dissatisfaction with the law-equity split in English civil justice predated the Judicature Act reforms by two generations at least (one could argue two-and-a half centuries or more—periodization fails quickly). Lobban links the first modern debates over fusion to high legal politics on the one hand and to the more intricate internal problems of evidence, procedure, and jurisdiction on the other. Lawyers of the earlier Victorian age found the Chancery system bequeathed to them by Lord Eldon to be intolerable on two counts: it represented Old Corruption or monopolistic private control of public offices and it exacted heavy costs in procedural inconvenience, cost, and delay. Lobban does not see ideology such as Benthamite philosophy driving the rationalization of Chancery doctrine and institutions though he does not dismiss this factor entirely.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-479
Author(s):  
Sridevi Thambapillay

The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA) which was passed in 1976 and came into force on 1st March 1982, standardized the laws concerning non-Muslim family matters. Many family issues concerning non-Muslim have emerged ever since, the most important being the effects of unilateral conversion to Islam by one of the parties to the marriage. There has been a lot of public hue and cry for amendments to be made to the LRA. After much deliberation, the Malaysian Parliament finally passed the amendments to the LRA in October 2017, which came into force in December 2018. Although the amendments have addressed selected family law issues, the most important amendment on child custody in a unilateral conversion to Islam was dropped from the Bill at the last minute. Howsoever, at the end of the day, the real question that needs to be addressed is whether the amendments have resolved the major issues that have arisen over the past four decades? Hence, the purpose of this article is as follows: first, to examine the brief background to the passing of the LRA, secondly, to analyse the 2017 amendments, thirdly, to identify the weaknesses that still exist in the LRA, and finally, to suggest recommendations to overcome these weaknesses by comparing the Malaysian position with the Singaporean position. In conclusion, it is submitted that despite the recent amendments to the LRA, much needs to be done to overcome all the remaining issues that have still not been addressed.


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-176
Author(s):  
Andrew J Serpell

Payday loans are small-amount, short-term, unsecured, high-cost credit contracts provided by non-mainstream credit providers. Payday loans are usually taken out to help the consumer pay for essential items, such as food, rent, electricity, petrol, broken-down appliances or car registration or repairs. These consumers take out payday loans because they cannot — or believe that they cannot — obtain a loan from a mainstream credit provider such as a bank. In recent years there has been a protracted debate in Australia — and in several overseas jurisdictions — about how to regulate the industry. Recent amendments to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) — referred to in this article as the 2013 reforms — are designed to better protect payday loan consumers. While the 2013 reforms provide substantially improved protection for payday loan consumers, further changes to the law may be warranted. This article raises several law reform issues which should be considered as part of the 2015 review into small amount credit contracts, including whether the caps on the cost of credit are set at the right level, whether the required content and presentation of the consumer warnings needs to be altered, whether more needs to be done to protect consumers who are particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable and whether a general anti-avoidance provision should be included in the credit legislation.


Author(s):  
Nimer Sultany

This chapter analyzes concrete Egyptian and Tunisian cases that showcase the interplay between continuity and rupture. These cases illustrate the lack of a systemic relation between law and revolution. On the one hand, the judiciary that interprets and applies the law is part of the very social and political conflicts it is supposed to resolve. On the other hand, the law is incoherent and there are often resources within the legal materials to play it both ways. Thus, the different forces at work use both continuity and rupture to advance their positions. Furthermore, legitimacy discourse mediates the contradictions between law and revolution in the experience of different legal and political actors. This mediation serves an ideological role because it presupposes a binary dichotomy between continuity and rupture, papers over law’s incoherence by reducing it to a singular voice, and reduces revolution to an event rather than a process.


Author(s):  
Monica Dapiaggi ◽  
Marco Alloni ◽  
Riccardo Carli ◽  
Nicola Rotiroti ◽  
Giorgia Confalonieri

Abstract The paper presents a quick method for the quantification of nickel species in spent FFC catalysts; the quantification of known quantities NiO and $$\hbox{NiAl}_2\hbox{O}_{4}$$ NiAl 2 O 4 is first done in a matrix of fresh zeolite Y, and then in a complex matrix, similar to the one of a real spent catalyst. The method is carefully checked and the errors in the quantification are critically evaluated. After the validation of the method with known quantities of NiO, well below the law limit for direct re-use, a set of real spent catalysts (representative of a period of 12 months) is analysed. Graphic Abstract


1972 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-410
Author(s):  
Aharon Yoran

It is submitted that even if the hapless outsider cannot bring an action for damages because of the existing state of the law regarding fiduciary duties and breach of statutory duties, he still has an equitable remedy of rescission of the contract based on quasi-contractual principles. The crime of fraud, under secs. 13 and 54, respectively, would be made the basis of setting the contract (of sale or purchase) aside. To support this proposition we shall explore the quasi-contractual principles which enable one contracting party, the victim of a crime committed by the other party in entering the contract, to defeat this contract.In Browning v. Morris, in an oft-quoted statement by Lord Mansfield, the following principle was declared: But, where contracts or transactions are prohibited by positive statutes, for protecting one set of men from another set of men; the one, from their situation and condition, being liable to be oppressed or imposed upon by the other; there, the parties are not in pan delicto; and in furtherance of these statutes, the person injured, after the transaction is finished and completed, may bring an action and defeat the contract.


1994 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 739-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kartik Kalyan Raman

The role of legal tradition in the reformist rhetoric of Benthamite Utilitarianism presents us with a contradiction. On the one hand, there is the common observation that Utilitarian jurisprudence was necessarily ahistorical and rejected the past as a source of concepts for reworking the criminal justice system existing in Britain during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For philosophic reformers such as Bentham, contemporary British criminal justice was to be replaced by a scientific jurisprudence, abstract, universal, and secular in outlook, and antipathetic to the more conservative insistence that the foundations of the penal law continue to be tradition-based. ‘If society was to see any improvement, its law must be reformed; if its law was to be reformed it must be burned to the ground and rebuilt according to a new and rational pattern.’ On the other hand, we find that the very same Utilitarian thinkers, in works describing the state of the law in British India, were concerned with local rather than universal conceptions of criminality. In his 1782 Essay on the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, Bentham, for instance, urged the philosophic reformer to temper change in India by fitting Utilitarian judgments about the law to the frames of local society.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Morse

How to respond justly to the dangers persistent violent offenders present is a vexing moral and legal issue. On the one hand, we wish to reduce predation; on the other, we want to treat predators fairly. The central theme of this paper is that it is difficult to achieve both goals without compromising one of them, and that both are being seriously undermined. I begin by explaining the legal theory, doctrine and practice governing dangerous offenders (DO) and demonstrate that the law leaves a gap in the ability to confine them. Next I explore the means by which the law has overtly or covertly sought to fill the gap. Many of these measures, especially the new form of civil commitment for sexual predators, dangerously conflate moral and medical categories. I conclude that pure preventive detention is more common than we usually assume, but that this practice violates fundamental assumptions concerning liberty under the American constitutional regime.


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