Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Morse

How to respond justly to the dangers persistent violent offenders present is a vexing moral and legal issue. On the one hand, we wish to reduce predation; on the other, we want to treat predators fairly. The central theme of this paper is that it is difficult to achieve both goals without compromising one of them, and that both are being seriously undermined. I begin by explaining the legal theory, doctrine and practice governing dangerous offenders (DO) and demonstrate that the law leaves a gap in the ability to confine them. Next I explore the means by which the law has overtly or covertly sought to fill the gap. Many of these measures, especially the new form of civil commitment for sexual predators, dangerously conflate moral and medical categories. I conclude that pure preventive detention is more common than we usually assume, but that this practice violates fundamental assumptions concerning liberty under the American constitutional regime.

Author(s):  
Nimer Sultany

This chapter analyzes concrete Egyptian and Tunisian cases that showcase the interplay between continuity and rupture. These cases illustrate the lack of a systemic relation between law and revolution. On the one hand, the judiciary that interprets and applies the law is part of the very social and political conflicts it is supposed to resolve. On the other hand, the law is incoherent and there are often resources within the legal materials to play it both ways. Thus, the different forces at work use both continuity and rupture to advance their positions. Furthermore, legitimacy discourse mediates the contradictions between law and revolution in the experience of different legal and political actors. This mediation serves an ideological role because it presupposes a binary dichotomy between continuity and rupture, papers over law’s incoherence by reducing it to a singular voice, and reduces revolution to an event rather than a process.


1972 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-410
Author(s):  
Aharon Yoran

It is submitted that even if the hapless outsider cannot bring an action for damages because of the existing state of the law regarding fiduciary duties and breach of statutory duties, he still has an equitable remedy of rescission of the contract based on quasi-contractual principles. The crime of fraud, under secs. 13 and 54, respectively, would be made the basis of setting the contract (of sale or purchase) aside. To support this proposition we shall explore the quasi-contractual principles which enable one contracting party, the victim of a crime committed by the other party in entering the contract, to defeat this contract.In Browning v. Morris, in an oft-quoted statement by Lord Mansfield, the following principle was declared: But, where contracts or transactions are prohibited by positive statutes, for protecting one set of men from another set of men; the one, from their situation and condition, being liable to be oppressed or imposed upon by the other; there, the parties are not in pan delicto; and in furtherance of these statutes, the person injured, after the transaction is finished and completed, may bring an action and defeat the contract.


Al-MAJAALIS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Muhammad Arifin Badri

This study aims to examine the laws of dowry money decoration that are common in the community. The innovation and soul of art that is channeled through décor of dowry money is proven to produce beautiful and unique works, so as to attract the attention and interest of the wider community. However, because to produce beautiful and unique works, a high level of creativity is needed, so not everyone can do it. On the one hand, this phenomenon opens up quite good business opportunities, but on the other hand, it should be watched out, because in some conditions it contains the practice of buying and selling currencies with nominal differences. Through this study, I would like to uncover the law of buying and selling practices decorating dowry money and decorating services. As I also intend to present an applicative solution for the community so that they can still channel their artistic talents without violating Shari’ah law.


De Jure ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hristo Banov ◽  

The article reviews the main differences between the monetary obligation of the employer under Art. 232, para. 2 of the Labour Code and other payments that the same party owes by law in the employment relationship. Thus, the hypotheses are differentiated, on the one hand, of the unilateral termination of the employment contract by the employer against monetary payment on the grounds of Art. 232, para. 2 of the Labour Code, and, on the other hand, the emergence of an obligation to pay certain compensations – in the true sense of the term – under Art. 213, Art. 214, Art. 219, para. 2 and Art. 225 of the Labour Code. Thereby, the thesis regarding the impossibility of incurring of an obligation on the employer to simultaneously execute the various mentioned monetary considerations, is reasoned. In addition, the rules set out in the law are discussed, both for contracting and for the final calculation of the amount of the employer’s monetary payment, which this study focuses on.


2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 42-58
Author(s):  
Emilio Dabed

This article sheds new light on the political history of legal-constitutional developments in Palestine in the fourteen years following the Oslo Accord. It examines the relationship between the unfolding social, political, and economic context in which they arose, on the one hand, and PA law-making and legal praxis, on the other. Focusing on the evolution of the Palestinian Basic Law and constitutional regime, the author argues that the “Palestinian constitutional process” was a major “battlefield” for the actors of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Thus, changes in the actors' political strategies at various junctures were mirrored in legal-constitutional forms, specifically in the political structure of the PA. In that sense, the constitutional order can be understood as a sort of “metaphoric representation” of Palestinian politics, reflecting, among other things, the colonial nature of the Palestinian context that the Oslo process only rearticulated. This perspective is also essential for understanding the evolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict after Oslo.


Author(s):  
V. Кroitor

The article studies the issue of scientific and practical validity of applying ethical principles of society as regulatory factors of civil law of Ukraine. Taking into account the lack of validity of ethical principles of society as regulatory factors, the author attempts to make a correlation between the content of such principles of civil law as fairness, integrity and reasonableness, on the one hand, and ethical principles of the society, on the other hand. The author of the paper proves that it is inappropriate to apply the provisions of morality as regulatory factors for the regulation of civil relations. The conclusion on the objection to the civil regularity of ethical principles of society is based on several theses. Firstly, moral rules are not formalized, which creates a threat of arbitrary interpretation of their content. Secondly, ethical principles do not have a definite source of origin. Thirdly, the fundamental ethical rules have already been taken into account in the content of the principles of fairness, integrity and reason, which in turn create competition between the two types of regulatory factors. Unreasonable duplication of regulatory requirements reduces the functionality of the law, complicates the perception of its requirements. The competition between the principles of law and the ethical principles of society must be eliminated by refusing to give the latter the function of regulatory factors. The author of the paper does not deny the possibility of taking into account the ethical principles of society while regulating the relations that have been neglected by the "official law".


Res Publica ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-487
Author(s):  
Els Witte

Tbe struggle for the liberalization of the law on abortion began in Belgium in 1970 when the taboo was breached in an initial bill. However, support by pressure groups failed and this led to a long period of nondecision, which may be explained by the disunity in the camp of the supporters on the one hand and the blocking tactics of the Flemish Christian Democrats on the other. In 1986 a compromise between supporters finally emerged, and via a majority which cut right through the governmental coalition an abortion law was approved at the end of March 1990, which closely corresponds to British, French and Dutch legislation.  The catholic monarch's refusal to ratify the bill caused a political crisis which was solved by the unanimous signing by the assembled ministers.


2021 ◽  
pp. 64-85
Author(s):  
Artur Ghambaryan

The aim of the article is to reveal the collisional relationship between justice and the law in the philosophical dimension. The main objectives of the article are to analyze the contradictions between law from the point of view of broad legal understanding, as well as the answer to the question of how law enforcement agent should act if, in solving a specific case, an outrageous contradiction between law and justice is encountered. The author used a number of scientific methods, in particular, historical-legal-comparative methods. The author concludes that supporters of a broad legal understanding consider the issue of contradiction between law mainly from the point of view of legislative policy, however, they do not discuss the issue of how the law enforcement agent should act when an obvious contradiction between law is encountered in a particular case. In the article the sayings «dura lex sed lex» (The law [is] harsh, but [it is] the law) and «lex iniusta non est lex» (An unjust law is no law at all) are considered in the dimensions of the legalism and natural law. The author concludes that the Radbruch formula is an exception to the saying «dura lex sed lex» (The law [is] harsh, but [it is] the law), which has undergone practical approbation. On the one hand, this resolution values the certainty and stability of the law, and on the other hand, it protects the person (society) from the unjustly shouting unjust laws.


Author(s):  
Michael Naas

This chapter analyzes a large swath of Plato’s Statesman (287b–311c) in order to ask, with “Plato’s Pharmacy” in the background, about the Stranger’s claim that law—and especially written law, since writing is the essence of law—is at once inferior to rule without law and yet, in a world without divine rulers, absolutely necessary for human governance. This chapter returns to many of the insights from Chapter 2 on the myth of the two ages, since what that myth demonstrated was the desirability and yet impossibility of an age in which a truly divine being rules over human beings and the concomitant necessity of trying to imitate that age through laws. Once again, we see that what is at issue in the relationship between the two ages, as well as in the relationship between a regime without law and a regime with it, are two different valences or valuations of life—the values of pure life, fecundity, spontaneity, and memory, on the one hand, and the values of death in life, forgetting in memory, and sterility in fecundity, on the other.


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