The Effects of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Earnings Management in Egyptian listed firms in the Stock Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1609-1628
Author(s):  
Amr E. Hassan ◽  
Mohamed M. Soliman ◽  
Aiman A. Ragab ◽  
Mohamed A. Rageb
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-225
Author(s):  
Yousra El Mokrani ◽  
◽  
Youssef Alami ◽  

Abstract Purpose: The purpose of the study is to systematically review and examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in restraining earnings management among the listed firms of the Casablanca Stock Exchange. Research methodology: In this study, we used the modified Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals. Our sample comprises 27 firms covering the period from 2016 to 2018, analyzed by the EGLS estimator. Results: Our empirical results show that gender diversity, board size, and audit committee independence reduce the managers' discretion. Simultaneously, we found a significantly positive association between earning management and different corporate governance characteristics such as CEO duality, institutional investor ownership, and family ownership. We do not find any evidence that audit committee size, ownership concentration, and managerial ownership significantly influence discretionary accruals. Limitations: This study's main limitation is that we did not address the direction of discretionary accruals, which does not allow us to detect the motivational aspects behind earnings management. Contribution: The results of this study will help Moroccan authorities in their formulation of an appropriate regulatory framework because very few studies have been conducted in this area in the case of the Moroccan listed companies, especially with a large set of governance variables as our empirical model. Keywords Accruals; Board of directors; Corporate governance; Earnings management; Ownership structure


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-120
Author(s):  
Karina Karina ◽  
Sutarti Sutarti

The purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence of the affect of ownership concetration, firms size, and corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management. Ownership concetration was measure by the biggest stock of individual or organization, firms size was measure by natural logaritma of net assets, and corporate governance mechanisms were measure by three variabels (composition of board of commisioner, audit quality were measure by industry specialize audit firm, and composition of audit committee). Earnings management was measure by discretionary accruals use Modified Jones Method. The population of this research is 41 companies in the banking sector which were listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The research data were collected from banking companies financial statement for the period of 2016 to 2018. Based on purposive sampling method. The reseacrh hypotesis were tested using multiple regression analysis. The results of this research show that firm size, firm of commissioner and proportion of commissioner have significant relationships with earnings management. Next, variables composition of board of commissioner, ownership concetration and specialize audit firm have no significant relationship with earnings management. Keywords: ownership concetration, firms size, corporate governance, earnings management


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-57
Author(s):  
Clarissa Tonay ◽  
Paulina Sutrisno

Objective – This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance and several factors of corporate financial characteristics on earnings management. Corporate governance mechanisms such as an independent board, board size, and audit committee size are expected to be able to limit the ability of management to carry out earnings management. Meanwhile, a company's financial characteristics such as corporate strategy, company age, operating cash flow, company growth, profitability, company size and leverage are predicted to affect earnings management. Methodology/Technique – Many previous studies have involved the examination of corporate governance mechanisms and corporate financial characteristics of earnings management however, the results of those studies give rise to inconsistencies. Hence, this study seeks to re-examine the existence of corporate governance mechanisms and corporate financial characteristics of earnings management. The sample in this research is non-financial companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange between 2016 and 2018. Findings – This data in this study is analysed using statistical methods such as multiple regression linear. The results of this study indicate that one mechanism of corporate governance, the size of the audit committee, has a positive effect on earnings management, while the financial characteristics of companies such as company size and operating cash flow negatively affect earnings management. Novelty – Other corporate financial characteristics such as corporate strategy, company age, operating cash flow, and profitability have a positive effect on earnings management. Meanwhile, the other variables such as board size, leverage, and company growth do not have an influence on earnings management. Type of Paper: Empirical. JEL Classification: G3, G34, G39. Keywords: Earnings Management; Corporate Strategy; Audit Committee Size; Company Age; Operating Cash Flows. Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Tonay, C; Sutrisno, P. 2020. Are Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Financial Characteristics Related to Earnings Management? J. Fin. Bank. Review, 5 (2): 48 – 57 https://doi.org/10.35609/jfbr.2020.5.2(2)


2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (10) ◽  
pp. 2740-2757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atreya Chakraborty ◽  
Lucia Gao ◽  
Shahbaz Sheikh

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a differential effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk in Canadian companies cross-listed on US markets and Canadian companies not cross-listed (Canadian only companies). Design/methodology/approach Using a sample comprised of all Canadian companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index for the period 2009–2014, this study applies OLS and fixed effect regressions to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk. Interaction variables between governance mechanisms and the cross-listing status are used to examine if this effect is different for cross-listed firms. Findings Results indicate that the effect of board characteristics such as size, independence and proportion of female directors remains the same in both cross-listed and not cross-listed firms. CEO duality and insider equity ownership impact firm risk only in cross-listed companies, while institutional shareholdings, environmental, social and governance disclosure and family control affect firm risk in Canadian only firms. Overall, the empirical results indicate that some governance mechanisms impact firm risk only in firms that cross-list, while others are well-suited for Canadian only firms. Practical implications This study suggests that some of the differences between Canadian companies that cross-list and the Canadian companies that do not cross-list in US stock markets may change the impact of governance mechanisms on firm risk. Therefore, these findings have important implications for the design of governance mechanisms in Canadian firms. Since some of these differences are common to other economies, the conclusions can be extended to companies in other countries with similar governance structures. Originality/value Although previous studies have investigated the effect of governance mechanism on firm risk, this is the first paper that studies the differential effect for companies that cross-list in US markets. Specifically, differences in the ownership structure, firm control and in the regulatory and institutional environment, may explain this differential effect. Unlike most of the previous studies that focus on the effect of individual governance mechanisms, this study uses several mechanisms and their interactions at the same time.


Author(s):  
Eman Abdel-Wanis

This paper explores the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the nature of the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees, which helps provide an opportunity to identify whether these mechanisms enable to mitigate agency problems, and thus lower audit fees through a sample of 78 Egyptian listed firms in EGX 100 during the period 2014-2016 using panel data analysis. Results indicated that cash holding increases auditing fees. The board characteristics affect negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. Also, ownership structure affects negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. As well audit committee affects negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. There results support the view that corporate governance mitigate on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agyenim Boateng ◽  
Huifen Cai ◽  
Daniel Borgia ◽  
Xiao Gang Bi ◽  
Franklin Nnaemeka Ngwu

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the capital structure decisions of Chinese-listed firms. Design/methodology/approach Using a large and more recent data set consisting of 2,386 Chinese-listed firms over the period from 1998 to 2012, the authors use different statistical methods (OLS, fixed effects and system GMM) to analyse the effects of firm-specific and corporate governance influences on capital structure. Findings The authors find that the proportion of independent directors and ownership concentration exert significant influence on the level of Chinese long-term debt ratios after controlling for firm-specific determinants and split share reforms. Further analysis separating the sample of this paper into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs) suggests that ownership concentration in the hands of the state leads to decrease in debt ratios. Research limitations/implications The finding implies that concentrated ownership in the hands of the state appears more efficient compared to their private counterparts in their monitoring role. Originality/value This paper extends prior literature, which has concentrated disproportionately on firm-specific influences on capital structure, to the effects of within-firm governance mechanisms on capital structure decisions. The paper contributes to the agency theory–capital structure discourse in an emerging country context where corporate governance system appears weak.


Author(s):  
Xu_Dong Ji ◽  
Kamran Ahmed ◽  
Wei Lu

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005. Design/methodology/approach – This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression. Findings – This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality. Research limitations/implications – Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country. Practical implications – The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China. Originality/value – This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.


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