scholarly journals Czego należy oczekiwać od utylitaryzmu czynów?

Etyka ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 87-109
Author(s):  
R. Bales

In recent years, act-utilitarianism has been distinguished from rule-utilitarianism. We may say (roughly) that act-utilitarianism is the thesis that a particular act (as opposed to a type of act or class of acts) is right if and only if its utility – that is contribution towards intrinsically good states of affairs – is no less than that of some alternative act. Rule-utilitarianism is (roughly) the thesis that an act is right if and only if it conforms to a rule somehow grounded in utility. The present paper concerns one type of argument sometimes used as an attempt to show that act-utilitarianism cannot be an adequate ethical theory. Arguments of this type are characterized by an emphasis on practical difficulties involved in, or paradoxes arising out of, the attempt to apply act-utilitarianism theory to concrete moral situations.

1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 527-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vallentyne

An ethical theory is axiological just in case it makes the permissibility of actions depend solely on considerations of goodness. Act utilitarianism is the paradigm axiological theory. An ethical theory is a pure rights theory just in case it judges an action permissible if and only if it violates no one’s rights. Libertarianism is a paradigm pure rights theory. I shall formulate and defend a type of axiological theory that, unlike act utilitarianism, is sensitive in a new and interesting way to whether rights are violated.Let us start by briefly considering the strengths and weakness of act utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism judges an action permissible just in case it maximizes social (e.g., total or average) welfare. It has many attractive features. It is a clearly formulated theory that draws on the machinery of decision theory. It takes a tough minded approach to morality: always focusing on the outcomes of actions. And it takes human welfare very seriously. The axiological theory I shall defend will have all these features.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Friedman

AbstractThis article addresses the question of whether the relation of moral preference is transitive. I argue, following Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels, that any ethical theory complex enough to be even minimally plausible allows us to generate intransitive sets of preferences. Even act utilitarianism cannot avoid this predicament unless we accept its least plausible version. We must reevaluate the assumption that an ethical theory must be transitive in order to be rational. This problem amounts to a foundational crisis in ethics. However, it has not been taken seriously for two reasons—the belief that the problem has limited scope; and the claim that arguments against transitivity are 'merely' Sorites arguments. This article responds to both of these objections. I also point out some connections between intransitivity and the debate surrounding skepticism about the moral significance of numbers.


1985 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Harsanyi

Utilitarianism and the Concept of Social UtilityIn this paper I propose to discuss the concepts of equality and justice from a rule utilitarian point of view, after some comments on the rule utilitarian point of view itself.Let me start with the standard definitions. Act utilitarianism is the theory that a morally right action is one that in the existing situation will produce the highest expected social utility. (I am using the adjective “expected” in the sense of mathematical expectation.) In contrast, rule utilitarianism is the theory that a morally right action is simply an action conforming to the correct moral rule applicable to the existing situation. The correct moral rule itself is that particular behavioral rule that would yield the highest expected social utility if it were followed by all morally motivated people in all similar situations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-66
Author(s):  
Katarina Majstorovic

In this paper, we have tried to point out the importance of the problem of moral integrity in ethical theory. The best way to make an introduction to ethical weighing when it comes to the problem of moral integrity is to analyze the dispute initiated by Bernard Williams. Namely, this is a critique of the act utilitarianism, whose essential weight is precisely on the topic of moral integrity. Williams conceived his objection as saying that there was no place for the value of moral integrity within the act utilitarianism. The treatment of moral integrity is the point of radical disagreement between utilitarianism and deontological ethics. In this way, deciding between utilitarianism and an alternative ethical position, we are actually deciding in favor or against the affirmation of the values of moral integrity. This is a very significant decision when it comes to ethical position. This paper is part of a broader topic on the place of moral integrity in ethical theory, where we have argued that utilitarianism is not the optimal ethical position, precisely because it does not affirm the value of the moral integrity of the individual. This paper is a preparation of such an attitude and has a more modest ambition - it deals with the re-examination of the perception of moral integrity within a utilitarian ethical position.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Mokriski

According to the eligibility theory of meaning, often attributed to David Lewis, the referent of a predicate is the property that best balances the twin constraints of charity (i.e. fit with our usage of the term) and eligibility, where eligibility is a function of metaphysical naturalness (i.e. how much of a natural kind the property is). This sort of metasemantics, which is motivated by its ability to resolve problems of indeterminacy and secure shared reference between disputing parties, can be somewhat friendly towards revisionary (i.e. counterintuitive) theories, since highly natural properties can act as “reference magnets,” securing our reference despite some mismatch with usage. In this paper, I apply these considerations to normative ethics and argue that the theory of rule utilitarianism achieves a high balance of charity and eligibility. I proceed by comparing rule utilitarianism to two of its well-known rivals, act utilitarianism and Rossian pluralism (a.k.a. “Commonsense Morality”). I show how the former achieves a high degree of eligibility but only at a significant cost of charity, while the latter does the opposite, fitting very nicely with our considered judgments but at the price of very low eligibility. Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, strikes a good balance between these extremes; it assigns to our core moral term (‘moral permissibility’) a relatively natural property without doing too much damage to our moral convictions. Thus, rule utilitarianism should be regarded as a promising moral theory by any philosopher who takes seriously considerations of eligibility and naturalness.


Author(s):  
Peter Vallentyne

Puzzles can arise in ethical theory (as well as decision theory) when infinity is involved. The puzzles arise primarily in theories – such as consequentialist theories – that appeal to the value of actions or states of affairs. One important question is whether one source of value (such as major aesthetic pleasures) can be infinitely more valuable than another (such as minor gustatory pleasures). Another question concerns what morality requires when there is an infinite number of feasible options and no option is maximally valuable. In such cases, morality can demand no more than that we ‘almost maximize’ or (more weakly) that we do enough, or ‘satisfice’. An ethical puzzle can arise when time is infinitely long. Is a state of affairs with two units of value at each time more valuable than a state of affairs with one unit at each time (even though both produce infinite amounts of value)? Other related puzzles can arise when time is finite but infinitely divisible. It should be noted that related puzzles can also arise when probabilities are involved.


2021 ◽  
pp. 15-20
Author(s):  
Anna Smajdor ◽  
Jonathan Herring ◽  
Robert Wheeler

This chapter explains the consequentialist approach to ethical analysis. It distinguishes act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. It also considers different possibilities as to which outcomes should be considered relevant for consequentialists. It considers a number of challenges and objections to consequentialist ethics.


Author(s):  
David Copp

The interpretation of the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill has been a matter of controversy at least since J.O. Urmson published his well known paper over twenty-five years ago. Urmson attributed to Mill a form of “rule-utilitarianism”, contrasting his reading with the “received view” on which Mill held a form of “act-utilitarianism”. Since then, the interpretive problem has typically been seen to be that of determining which of these two types of theory should be attributed to Mill, or, at least of determining whether Mill was a “rule-utilitarian”. However, as the distinction is typically made, it is possible to have a utilitarian theory which is neither an act- nor a rule-utilitarian theory (nor a form of “utilitarian generalization“). 1n particular, as I will attemptto show, Mill's theory is of neither type but is an example of a sophisticated type of utilitarianism which we might call “iterated-utilitarianism”, for reasons which will become clear in what follows.


2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-130
Author(s):  
Nenad Cekic

The debate whether ethical thought of John Stuart Mill should be interpreted as a sort of rule-utilitarianism or in a manner of ?classical? act-utilitarianism was launched in early 1950?s. One of the ?proofs? that Mill, in fact, was a rule-utilitarian is based on the presence of the ?generalization test? in his work. This test in the form of asking and answering the question ?What if everybody does the same?? is the essence of socalled ?utilitarian generalization? - one of two main forms of rule-utilitarianism. The author discusses what the purpose of this test in Mill?s work has. It is usually assumed that ?generalization test? is normative in its nature, but there is strong evidence in Mill?s text that it has a fact-tracking role. The fact-tracking sense of the ?generalization test? cannot prove that Mill was rule-utilitarian.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document