Expanding the Theoretical Framework in Student Debt Research by Connecting Public Policy Theories to the Student Debt Literature

Current changes in the economic atmosphere have severely impacted the higher education sector worldwide. Policymakers worldwide are facing the challenge of adjusting tuition and financial aid programs in response to these changing economic times. The shift from federal grants to loans has caused student loans to be a popular means of funding higher education for most low and medium-income families. A result of this, is the increase in student loan default as most college students graduate with unmanageable debts, thus, a rising concern for policymakers. The purpose of this paper is to link four public policy theories (Social Contract Theory, Utilitarian Theory, Theory of Neoliberalism, and Three-Policy Stream Theory) to student loan literature. This is to expand the limited database of public policy theories in student loan debt literature. This theoretical linkage points out the role of policymakers in (1) ensuring the security of lives and the preservation of the property of those who voted them into power (Social Contract Theory); (2) establishing educational policies that ensure the ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ (Utilitarian Theory); (3) upholding social welfare or a ‘welfare state’ through fiscal and monetary policies to ensure high employment rates for graduates, low inflation and the provision of public goods (Theory of Neoliberalism), and (4) the risk of undermining the growing power of an informal interest group that is made up of millennials saddled with student loan debt (Three-Policy Stream). These theories reiterate the principal role of policymakers in enhancing human capital through affordable education.

Prosociality without morality: A Humean constructivist approach to prosocial practical reason for moral skeptics

<p>The moral skeptic frequently encounters the view that without a belief in moral facts she has insufficient justification for acting in prosocial ways, such as acting with concern for the interests or welfare of others. This thesis is an argument against that view. The thesis is in two parts, each employing a different type of philosophy. Part one is empirical philosophy, and draws on evidence from psychology and history to show that morality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of prosociality, and may in fact be an obstacle to it. Part two is in the fields of metaethics and practical reason, and addresses the question of how a moral skeptic can employ rationality to develop robust, stable, and coherent practical reasons for prosociality. I argue that this can be done by employing a Humean constructivist view. Finally, I use John Stuart Mill as a case study, arguing that he is a noncognitivist and thus a moral skeptic, and that a Humean constructivist reading of his utilitarian theory accounts for the harmony between his moral skepticism and his prosocial normative theory. Mill thus offers an example of prosociality and moral skepticism within a Humean constructivist framework.</p>

Prosociality without morality: A Humean constructivist approach to prosocial practical reason for moral skeptics

<p>The moral skeptic frequently encounters the view that without a belief in moral facts she has insufficient justification for acting in prosocial ways, such as acting with concern for the interests or welfare of others. This thesis is an argument against that view. The thesis is in two parts, each employing a different type of philosophy. Part one is empirical philosophy, and draws on evidence from psychology and history to show that morality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of prosociality, and may in fact be an obstacle to it. Part two is in the fields of metaethics and practical reason, and addresses the question of how a moral skeptic can employ rationality to develop robust, stable, and coherent practical reasons for prosociality. I argue that this can be done by employing a Humean constructivist view. Finally, I use John Stuart Mill as a case study, arguing that he is a noncognitivist and thus a moral skeptic, and that a Humean constructivist reading of his utilitarian theory accounts for the harmony between his moral skepticism and his prosocial normative theory. Mill thus offers an example of prosociality and moral skepticism within a Humean constructivist framework.</p>

Bentham: Punishment and the Utilitarian Use of Persons as Means

One of the main barriers against a Utilitarian justification of punishment is a widespread criticism that if punishment is evil justified by the good it can achieve, then the state could use persons as a means to an end in pursuing this good. This opens the door, at a theoretical level, for the potential punishment of innocents, disproportionate punishment and failure to respect persons as rational and responsible agents. Further, critics argue that any considerations of security or utility guard against the perceived risks contingently, without intrinsic commitment to respecting persons as ends in themselves. This article addresses the criticism fundamentally by returning to Bentham’s original writings and demonstrating that a principle of equality is embedded in the greatest happiness as an end of government. The principle of equality can theoretically be developed using the tools of Bentham’s political theory, including his commitments to democracy, to the elimination of pain and to the differentiation between real and fictitious entities, to ensure that a Utilitarian theory of punishment, as part of its premise, would be constrained from using persons as mere means. Further, building on the equality of happiness, the article proposes an individualistic justification of punishment that responds to the traditional accusations of innocents’ punishment and excessive punishment, and ensures the respect of persons as rational and responsible agents.

Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions

What is to forgive someone? Is it primarily a change in one’s emotions, in one’s behavior, or something else? What is the connection between forgiveness and blaming attitudes like resentment? What is the relationship between forgiveness and free will? The chapters in this book explore not only these questions about the nature of forgiveness but also questions about the norms of forgiveness. Is forgiveness necessarily gift-like, and thus always discretionary? Is forgiveness ever prohibited or required? What is the relationship between forgiveness and apology? Does love require us to forgive? How does one maintain self-respect when one forgives? Is it morally permissible to forgive people for doing evil? And what would a utilitarian theory of the norms of forgiveness look like? This volume contains entirely new chapters on forgiveness by some of the world’s leading moral philosophers. Some contributors have been writing about forgiveness for decades. Others have taken the opportunity here to develop their thinking about forgiveness they broached in other work. For some contributors, this is their first time stepping into the forgiveness literature. While all the contributions address core questions about the nature and norms of forgiveness, they also collectively break new ground by raising entirely new questions, offering original proposals and arguments, and making connections to what have until now been treated as separate areas within philosophy.

A Comparative Philosophical Analysis of the Kantian Principle of Moral Theory and the Utilitarian Theory: Applications and Critiques

There have been several notions about the Kantian perspective and the utilitarian theory from all walks of life in the academic space. Kant spoke widely on morality, rights and justice for all persons whereas Bentham and Mill spoke of an action being right if they are useful for the benefit of the majority. Kant admonished people to act as they would want all other people to act towards them. This paper, therefore, takes the step to critically compare the Kantian principle of moral theory to the Utilitarian theory as an important aspect in general philosophy and the social science philosophy in particular. This critical paper adopts a systematic review approach whereby scholarly articles from different authors and sources were drawn which served as secondary sources of literature for the discussion. This paper argues that the Categorical Imperative’ is a moral guideline devised to aid an individual in choosing to make the right decision and perform the right duties whereas the Utilitarian approach is an ethical system that proposes that the greatest useful goodness for the greatest number of people should be our guiding principle when making ethical decisions. This paper makes a case by imploring how the categorical imperative of Kantianism and the Utilitarian theory are applied in Social Science Research (SSR). It is therefore recommended that all life matters and persons should not be used as a means for one’s satisfaction and what is right in society must be enforced and what is beneficial to the larger society must also be encouraged.

Sentencing

Gravity is a central concept—often the central concept—that international criminal courts invoke in justifying sentencing decisions. This chapter shows that international sentencing decisions frequently invoke gravity in inconsistent and unexplained ways, thereby detracting from the legitimacy of such decisions. It argues that gravity as a sentencing criterion at international courts ought to be conceptualized in relation to the goals of punishment that are most appropriate for those institutions. It proposes a utilitarian theory of global sentencing that centers crime prevention, especially through deterrence and norm expression, and rejects retribution and harsh punishment. The goal should be to achieve the most deterrence and expressive prevention possible at the lowest cost.

The Judge as Paterfamilias

Following his radical critique of Common Law, both as a system of laws and as a theory of adjudication, Bentham embarked on a career-long attempt to produce an alternative which more adequately meets the criteria of his background utilitarian theory. This chapter focuses on his theory of adjudication. In his view, the proper definition of the judicial role and a proper understanding of the nature, scope, and limits of judicial decision-making could only be achieved by attempting to solve central problems of the design of adjudicative institutions and procedures. The principle on which he based his construction of adjudicative institutions was drawn from his analysis of the defects of Common Law, especially his view that it is self-defeating to attempt to structure judicial decision-making by means of fixed rules in order to constrain arbitrariness and abuse of power.

The Coherence of Bentham’s Theory of Law

This chapter considers again the coherence of Bentham's theory. However, it takes up only two issues: the compatibility of Bentham's utilitarian theory of adjudication with his positivist theory of laws and the plausibility of his theory of adjudication. It argues that Bentham's theories of law and adjudication cannot achieve the aims of the jurisprudential project he set for himself. It suggests briefly why this project itself is fundamentally mistaken. The arguments here can only be sketchy and to an extent they presuppose a conception of the nature and tasks of law which needs to be more fully articulated and defended.