scholarly journals Zwischen Analytischem Pragmatismus und Quietismus

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 69-87
Author(s):  
Matthias Kiesselbach
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Robert Brandom

Dieser Artikel untersucht den meta-philosophischen Graben, der sich durch die  P i t t s b u r g h e r  S c h u l e  der zeitgenössischen Philosophie zieht. Es handelt sich dabei um eine Meinungsverschiedenheit über die Angemessenheit und Erfolgsaussichten philosophischer Erläuterungsversuche, in denen begriffliche Praktiken, welche wir nur implizit beherrschen, durch die Kombination einfacher und einfach zu überblickender praktischer Regeln nachkonstruiert werden. Während solche philosophischen Rekonstruktionen für Robert Brandom zu einem besseren Verständnis der relevanten Begriffe bzw. Vokabulare führen und damit ein taugliches Mittel für die analytische Philosophie sein können, hält John McDowell sie für Symptome eines fehlerhaften Verständnisses diskursiver Praxis und ihr Scheitern für unvermeidbar. Nach McDowell liegt die Aussichtslosigkeit („linearer“) philosophischer Rekonstruktionen im Holismus der Sprachkompetenz und der Intentionalität begründet: Zwischen konkreten begrifflichen Fähigkeiten gibt es holistische (und damit letztlich zirkuläre) Voraussetzungsverhältnisse. Dieser Artikel verteidigt Brandoms These der Kompatibilität zwischen dem von McDowell zitierten Holismus und der Möglichkeit philosophischer Rekonstruktionen mit einem konkreten Beispiel einer glückenden Rekonstruktion, welche in einer zentralen Hinsicht als „linear“ bezeichnet werden könnte. Schließlich werden zwei mögliche Antworten McDowells skizziert, aus denen sich Raum für eine Fortführung der Debatte ergeben könnte.

scholarly journals Beyond Realism and Antirealism ---At Last?

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Joseph Rouse
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Scientific Understanding ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
The World ◽  
John Haugeland ◽  
Michael Williams ◽  
Realism Question

This paper recapitulates my four primary lines of argument that what is wrong with scientific realism is not realist answers to questions to which various anti-realists give different answers, but instead assumptions shared by realists and anti-realists in framing the question. Each strategy incorporates its predecessors as a consequence. A first, minimalist challenge, taken over from Arthur Fine and Michael Williams, rejects the assumption that the sciences have a general aim or goal. A second consideration is that realists and antirealists undertake a mistaken, substantive commitment to a separation between mind and world, which allows them to frame the issue in terms of how epistemic “access” to the world is mediated. A third strategy for dissolving the realism question challenges its underlying commitment to the independence of meaning and truth, a strategy pursued in different ways by Donald Davidson, Robert Brandom, John McDowell, John Haugeland, and myself. The fourth and most encompassing strategy shows that realists and antirealists are thereby committed to an objectionably antinaturalist conception of scientific understanding, in conflict with what the sciences themselves have to say about our own conceptual capacities.

scholarly journals Hermenéutica, autonomía y experiencia en la estética alemana contemporánea. A propósito de El arte como praxis humana. Una estética de Georg Bertram.

2018 ◽  
pp. 223-234
Author(s):  
Naím Garnica
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Pittsburgh School

A dos años de su publicación original (Kunst als menschliche Praxis. Eine Asthetik, 2014) ingresa por primera vez, en manos de la excelente traducción de José Francisco Zuñiga García, un libro completo de Georg Bertram. Este profesor alemán de filosofía de la Freien Universitat Berlin cuenta con una productividad destacada como sorprendente, pues atraviesa diversos campos y tradiciones de discusión filosófica con cierta comodidad. Bertram puede discutir tanto con la tradición analítica como con los herederos de la tradición crítica de la estética alemana (Albrecht Wellmer, Martin Seel, Christoph Menke) y las fuentes de la hermenéutica contemporánea. Probablemente, este hecho tenga que ver con su trayectoria intelectual y formativa que, como bien indica la edición de esta colección de estética de la editorial española Comares, el autor ha investigado al lado de pensadores provenientes de muy diversas corrientes de pensamiento, desde Martin Seel u Odo Marquard hasta los circuitos académicos de Pittsburgh orientados por John McDowell. Esto último es evidente en la reconstrucción de Kant y Hegel que Bertram realiza en los capítulos dos y tres de este texto. Los trabajos de los llamados “neohegelianos de Pittsburgh” o Pittsburgh School (John McDowell, Robert Brandom, Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard) se vuelven visibles en el análisis de los idealistas alemanes.

scholarly journals Hegel normativista La prioridad de la práctica, la autoconciencia como logro social y como sujeto de estados normativos, en el cap. IV de la Fenomenología del espíritu

2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (158) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Assalone
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Robert Brandom

<p>Se desarrolla la concepción normativista de la autoconciencia hegeliana, de acuerdo con los aportes de los denominados “neohegelianos de Pittsburgh” (Robert Brandom, John McDowell), así como de otros autores anglosajones como Robert Pippin, Terry <br />Pinkard y Paul Redding. Se presenta el recorrido de la autoconciencia en el capítulo IVde la Fenomenología del Espíritu, y se desarrollan algunos rasgos que pueden extraerse de dicha presentación, de acuerdo con la lectura normativista de los autores mencionados</p>

Analytic Philosophy and the Need for Pragmatist Metaphysics

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Lisa Landoe Hedrick
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Richard Rorty ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Alfred North Whitehead ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Ethical Critique

This article addresses the problem of intentionality in Analytic philosophy. It begins with an assessment of post-Sellarsian scholarship, with primary attention to the work of Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, Robert Brandom, and John McDowell. I argue that contemporary Analytic discourse on intentionality not only needs, but internally warrants, a pragmatist metaphysics in order to adequately and accurately communicate its public relevance—particularly in ethics. I suggest the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead as consonant with the sort of metaphysics needed in order to correct tacit presuppositions currently limiting Analytic treatments of intentionality and, in turn, the possibility of ethical critique without ethnocentrism. The resultant proposal is for a “modest” metaphysics, not unlike that for which Jeffrey Stout has called.

Reply to Guy Longworth

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Representational Content ◽  
Main Issue ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Half Century ◽  
The Law

Starting in about 2004 John McDowell and I have engaged in a debate. There have been a number of public exchanges, and quite a few more private ones. In my view, some progress has been made (though the debate continues). Others may disagree (the ‘law of diminishing fleas’). I, at any rate, think I have learned from him. Guy Longworth does us both the honour of comparing our debate to one a half century earlier between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. Honours apart, I think he has pointed to an illuminating connection between what I have long thought the main issue and another. If I had been asked what question McDowell and I had been (most centrally) debating, I would have said: it is the question how enjoying an experience of perceiving (e.g., of seeing) can make judging one thing or another intelligibly rational (that last term lifted from McDowell). I have a story to tell which is, in one key respect, sparser than his. To telegraph, he thinks such experience must have (representational) content. I think, not just that it needn’t, but that if it did, we would be cut off from ...

Reply to Nat Hansen

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell

Hansen is certainly right that the aim of my ‘Travis examples’ is, not to explain anything, but rather to point to a phenomenon. Or perhaps I would not now say so much as that. Over the course of my career I have been very deeply influenced by John McDowell. The main lesson I have taken from him is that the most important ‘result’ in philosophy—one of its most important tasks—is showing (to borrow a bit of McDowellian terminology) how it is ...

Are the Colours of Things Secondary Qualities?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
General Notion ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Independent Reality ◽  
Metaphysical Status

This chapter challenges the notion that the colours we believe to belong to the objects we see are ‘secondary’ qualities of those objects. Such a notion is endorsed by John McDowell, who has explained why he thinks the author is wrong to resist it. McDowell recognizes that the author’s focus on the conditions of successfully unmasking the metaphysical status of the colours of things is a way of trying to make sense of whatever notion of reality is involved in it. However, the author argues that the notion of reality he is concerned with is ‘independent reality’, not simply the general notion of reality. He also contends that an exclusively dispositional conception of an object’s being a certain colour cannot account for the perceptions we have of the colours of things.

A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge

Dialogue ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 565-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byeong D. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Practice Model ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
The Gettier Problem

ABSTRACTRobert Brandom argues for a “pragmatic phenomenalist account” of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to develop and defend a pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge by resolving those problems. I argue, in particular, that this account can accommodate both the lesson of the Gettier problem and the lesson of reliabilism simultaneously.

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