scholarly journals Von der Tragedy of the Commons zu deren Benefits

1997 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lilo Fischer

Common Property Regime basieren auf akzeptierten sozialen Normen und Regeln über die gemeinschaftliche Nutzung von natürlichen Ressourcen wie z.B. Wäldern oder Wasserressourcen. Sie haben sich vielerorts nicht nur als gerecht und flexibel, sondern auch als effizient und stabil erwiesen.

1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 92-95
Author(s):  
Shambhu Paudel ◽  
Bharat Bhatt

Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” speaks about the problems in common resources and this applies highly in the community forestry in Nepal. Annapurna Conservation Area and Community forestry have already shown the proven record of success in community participation. However, the willingness of getting high share in the common property and taking least care has been the major problem. This can be properly addressed through the proper community participation. This article speaks about the ways of addressing the tragedy of commons through community innovation and already being practiced model.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/init.v4i0.5540The Initiation Vol.4 2011 92-95


1997 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Ferguson

AbstractA review of contributions to the resource conservation literature shows that sustainability problems are seen as caused by “common property.” This “tragedy of the commons” is understood as the result of the failure to assign fully property rights to individuals. The supporting assumptions and premises to these “privatarian” arguments are explicated and examined. After refuting the main premises, it is argued that the application of neoclassical assumptions and premises overlooks other legitimate forms of ownership as effective solutions to the tragedy of the commons. In revisiting other categories of ownership, the limits of privatarianism are identified and the prospects for solutions to sustainability problems are expanded.


1985 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fikret Berkes

Fish populations are classical examples of commonproperty resources and tend to decline over time. According to the conventional wisdom, they decline through a process popularly known as ‘the tragedy of the commons’, whereby selfish users are locked into a deterministic mechanism in which they are both the villains and the victims. However, the commons paradigm is not the model of reality for all fisheries. There are many sustainable fisheries, and detailed studies of some of them indicate that they do not fit the commons paradigm because there are factors which violate some of the hidden assumptions of the commons paradigm.In many community-based and small-scale fisheries, there are unwritten regulations or customary laws that prevent individuals from maximizing their private gains at the expense of community interests. Far from being owned by no one and freely open to any user, many of the fish stocks of the world are under claims of ownership by communities of fishermen who exercise use-rights and who control access to the resource. As seen in examples from Oceania and North America's west coast, open-access and common property conditions were created, and the ‘tragedy’ started only after the destruction of such traditional marine tenure systems.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Hardisty ◽  
Howard Kunreuther ◽  
David H. Krantz ◽  
Poonam Arora

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Bernstein

Vickers Hot Springs is located near the rural Southern California town of Ojai, and local residents have long enjoyed soaking in the sulfuric pools. But as knowledge of the springs spread, the area saw increases in fights, traffic, burglaries, and drug use. In response, two residents purchased the land and committed to restore the property while allowing limited public access, subsequently generating a great deal of controversy within the community. Privatizing Vickers Hot Springs follows the archetypical lesson of Garrett Hardin's 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Hardin stated that the problem for common-pool resources was that a finite amount of services are demanded by a potentially infinite number of users, who have little to gain by sacrificing for the common good. But Hardin's theory does not always apply. Many communities have come together to manage resources, often without government oversight. Thus, the question is not whether or not Hardin's theory is accurate, but rather “under what conditions it is correct and when it makes the wrong predictions.” Case studies provide nuance to the broad brushstrokes of a theory, and whether Hardin's parable is applicable depends on the particularities of the common property resource conflict. Employing the frameworks established by Hardin, Dietz et al., and Ostrom, this paper examines the management of Vickers Hot Springs within its broader social, ecological, and political context, asking whether the particular circumstances of this resource use conflict made privatization the most predictable outcome.


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