scholarly journals Addressing the Tragedy of Common's through Community Innovation in Nepal

1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 92-95
Author(s):  
Shambhu Paudel ◽  
Bharat Bhatt
Keyword(s):  
Community Participation ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Community Forestry ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Conservation Area ◽  
Common Resources ◽  
Annapurna Conservation Area ◽  
The Commons ◽  
The Common ◽  
High Share

Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” speaks about the problems in common resources and this applies highly in the community forestry in Nepal. Annapurna Conservation Area and Community forestry have already shown the proven record of success in community participation. However, the willingness of getting high share in the common property and taking least care has been the major problem. This can be properly addressed through the proper community participation. This article speaks about the ways of addressing the tragedy of commons through community innovation and already being practiced model.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/init.v4i0.5540The Initiation Vol.4 2011 92-95

Vickers Hot Springs

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Bernstein
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Hot Springs ◽  
Public Access ◽  
Common Property Resource ◽  
Resource Conflict ◽  
Social Ecological ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Local Residents ◽  
The Common

Vickers Hot Springs is located near the rural Southern California town of Ojai, and local residents have long enjoyed soaking in the sulfuric pools. But as knowledge of the springs spread, the area saw increases in fights, traffic, burglaries, and drug use. In response, two residents purchased the land and committed to restore the property while allowing limited public access, subsequently generating a great deal of controversy within the community. Privatizing Vickers Hot Springs follows the archetypical lesson of Garrett Hardin's 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Hardin stated that the problem for common-pool resources was that a finite amount of services are demanded by a potentially infinite number of users, who have little to gain by sacrificing for the common good. But Hardin's theory does not always apply. Many communities have come together to manage resources, often without government oversight. Thus, the question is not whether or not Hardin's theory is accurate, but rather “under what conditions it is correct and when it makes the wrong predictions.” Case studies provide nuance to the broad brushstrokes of a theory, and whether Hardin's parable is applicable depends on the particularities of the common property resource conflict. Employing the frameworks established by Hardin, Dietz et al., and Ostrom, this paper examines the management of Vickers Hot Springs within its broader social, ecological, and political context, asking whether the particular circumstances of this resource use conflict made privatization the most predictable outcome.

scholarly journals Shame and honour drive cooperation

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 899-901 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Jacquet ◽  
Christoph Hauert ◽  
Arne Traulsen ◽  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Experimental Paradigm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Common Resources ◽  
Public Goods Experiments ◽  
The Commons

Can the threat of being shamed or the prospect of being honoured lead to greater cooperation? We test this hypothesis with anonymous six-player public goods experiments, an experimental paradigm used to investigate problems related to overusing common resources. We instructed the players that the two individuals who were least generous after 10 rounds would be exposed to the group. As the natural antithesis, we also test the effects of honour by revealing the identities of the two players who were most generous. The non-monetary, reputational effects induced by shame and honour each led to approximately 50 per cent higher donations to the public good when compared with the control, demonstrating that both shame and honour can drive cooperation and can help alleviate the tragedy of the commons.

scholarly journals Effects of commonality in transaction contracts and their provisions – Comparative Jurisprudence Study –: آثار الشيوع في عقود المعاملات وأحكامها – دراسة فقهية مقارنة –

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-35
Author(s):  
Shamsul Alam Mohammed Fayaz Al-Ghazi Shamsul Alam Mohammed Fayaz Al-Ghazi
Keyword(s):  
Common Property ◽  
Public Domain ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Commons ◽  
The Common

This research deals with the rule of benefiting from the common share and its effects on transaction contracts; this research has been presented in five sections. In the first, I explained the commons and its causes with mentioning their types. In the second, I knew the effects of commonality in companies and demonstrated the dispute of jurists regarding the requirement of communality in the profit of the company. The third came indicating the effects of common property in mortgage, including the doctrine of the jurists in that and their evidence and what was mentioned in the discussions, indicating the most correct saying of the scholars. On the fourth, I explained the provisions of common lease between two partners. The fifth section included the doctrines of jurists in the endowment of one of the partners share of the public domain, explaining the evidence of jurists in that and what was mentioned in the discussions and indicated the most correct in it; then it was concluded with a conclusion that included the most important results and recommendations.

scholarly journals Community forestry in Nepal: a model of common property resource management

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 36-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
K.P. Acharya
Keyword(s):  
Resource Management ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Community Forestry ◽  
Forest Land ◽  
Community Forest ◽  
Common Property Resource ◽  
User Groups ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Property Resource Management ◽  
Forest User

The management of common forest land as community forest in Nepal is in practice since 1978. Studies showing the linkages between community forestry and common property resource are scanty in the country. This article discusses characteristics of common property resources and the principles and practices of community forestry in Nepal which is an example of common property resource management between Government agencies and users (co-managers). Forest User Groups (FUGs ) are the institutions responsible to manage the common property.

The Expanses of Sustainability and the Limits of Privatarianism

1997 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Ferguson
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Resource Conservation ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Sustainability Problems

AbstractA review of contributions to the resource conservation literature shows that sustainability problems are seen as caused by “common property.” This “tragedy of the commons” is understood as the result of the failure to assign fully property rights to individuals. The supporting assumptions and premises to these “privatarian” arguments are explicated and examined. After refuting the main premises, it is argued that the application of neoclassical assumptions and premises overlooks other legitimate forms of ownership as effective solutions to the tragedy of the commons. In revisiting other categories of ownership, the limits of privatarianism are identified and the prospects for solutions to sustainability problems are expanded.

scholarly journals Inclusive groups can avoid the tragedy of the commons

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Hintze ◽  
Jochen Staudacher ◽  
Katja Gelhar ◽  
Alexander Pothmann ◽  
Juliana Rasch ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Entire Group ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Cost

AbstractThe public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons (Hardin in Science 162:1243–1248, 1968). In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same rewards as cooperators without having made a contribution before. The question is now, how to incentivize group members to all cooperate as it maximizes the common good. While costly punishment (Helbing et al. in New J Phys 12:083005, 2010) presents one such method, the cost of punishment still reduces the common good. The selfishness of the group members favors defectors. Here we show that including other members of the groups and sharing rewards with them can be another incentive for cooperation, avoiding the cost required for punishment. Further, we show how punishment and this form of inclusiveness interact. This work suggests that a redistribution similar to a basic income that is coupled to the economic success of the entire group could overcome the tragedy of the commons.

scholarly journals Von der Tragedy of the Commons zu deren Benefits

1997 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lilo Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Common Property ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Property Regime

Common Property Regime basieren auf akzeptierten sozialen Normen und Regeln über die gemeinschaftliche Nutzung von natürlichen Ressourcen wie z.B. Wäldern oder Wasserressourcen. Sie haben sich vielerorts nicht nur als gerecht und flexibel, sondern auch als effizient und stabil erwiesen.

Fishermen and ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’

1985 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fikret Berkes
Keyword(s):  
Common Property ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Community Based ◽  
Fish Stocks ◽  
Small Scale Fisheries ◽  
Marine Tenure ◽  
Selfish Users ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Customary Laws

Fish populations are classical examples of commonproperty resources and tend to decline over time. According to the conventional wisdom, they decline through a process popularly known as ‘the tragedy of the commons’, whereby selfish users are locked into a deterministic mechanism in which they are both the villains and the victims. However, the commons paradigm is not the model of reality for all fisheries. There are many sustainable fisheries, and detailed studies of some of them indicate that they do not fit the commons paradigm because there are factors which violate some of the hidden assumptions of the commons paradigm.In many community-based and small-scale fisheries, there are unwritten regulations or customary laws that prevent individuals from maximizing their private gains at the expense of community interests. Far from being owned by no one and freely open to any user, many of the fish stocks of the world are under claims of ownership by communities of fishermen who exercise use-rights and who control access to the resource. As seen in examples from Oceania and North America's west coast, open-access and common property conditions were created, and the ‘tragedy’ started only after the destruction of such traditional marine tenure systems.

Mammalian Bone Marrow Acetylcholinesterase

1982 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 44-45
Author(s):  
Ezzatollah Keyhani
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Bone Marrow ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Extracellular Medium ◽  
The Central Nervous System ◽  
The Common ◽  
Mammalian Bone

Acetylcholinesterase (EC 3.1.1.7) (ACHE) has been localized at cholinergic junctions both in the central nervous system and at the periphery and it functions in neurotransmission. ACHE was also found in other tissues without involvement in neurotransmission, but exhibiting the common property of transporting water and ions. This communication describes intracellular ACHE in mammalian bone marrow and its secretion into the extracellular medium.

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