Vickers Hot Springs

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Bernstein

Vickers Hot Springs is located near the rural Southern California town of Ojai, and local residents have long enjoyed soaking in the sulfuric pools. But as knowledge of the springs spread, the area saw increases in fights, traffic, burglaries, and drug use. In response, two residents purchased the land and committed to restore the property while allowing limited public access, subsequently generating a great deal of controversy within the community. Privatizing Vickers Hot Springs follows the archetypical lesson of Garrett Hardin's 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Hardin stated that the problem for common-pool resources was that a finite amount of services are demanded by a potentially infinite number of users, who have little to gain by sacrificing for the common good. But Hardin's theory does not always apply. Many communities have come together to manage resources, often without government oversight. Thus, the question is not whether or not Hardin's theory is accurate, but rather “under what conditions it is correct and when it makes the wrong predictions.” Case studies provide nuance to the broad brushstrokes of a theory, and whether Hardin's parable is applicable depends on the particularities of the common property resource conflict. Employing the frameworks established by Hardin, Dietz et al., and Ostrom, this paper examines the management of Vickers Hot Springs within its broader social, ecological, and political context, asking whether the particular circumstances of this resource use conflict made privatization the most predictable outcome.

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-27
Author(s):  
Fernando Suárez Müller ◽  
Christian Felber

This paper explores the possibility of an economic system different from both capitalism and communism, that is based on the major ethical values that constitute the principles of human dialogue, the so-called Idealism of Dialogue. This implies an economic model based on cooperativism. An economy modelled in this way envisions the Common Good of society. This is more than the sum of the interests of individuals and it can be measured by looking at the intended impact on society of actions taken by organizations. If the impact of these organizations is oriented towards cooperative action they can be characterized as developing the Common Good. If they block cooperative action they can be seen to be serving private interests. This paper shows how a group of Austrian entrepreneurs has started a network of enterprises that functions both as a kind of cooperative and as a non-governmental organization (Gemeinwohl-Ökonomie). They promote the ideals of Greek oỉkonomía and at the same time consider their own efforts to be the accomplishment of the main principles of Enlightenment which are liberty, equality and fraternity. 


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 92-95
Author(s):  
Shambhu Paudel ◽  
Bharat Bhatt

Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” speaks about the problems in common resources and this applies highly in the community forestry in Nepal. Annapurna Conservation Area and Community forestry have already shown the proven record of success in community participation. However, the willingness of getting high share in the common property and taking least care has been the major problem. This can be properly addressed through the proper community participation. This article speaks about the ways of addressing the tragedy of commons through community innovation and already being practiced model.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/init.v4i0.5540The Initiation Vol.4 2011 92-95


Focaal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (79) ◽  
pp. 54-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Morgen ◽  
Jennifer Erickson

This article examines the development of competing forms of fiscal citizenship in Oregon tax-related ballot initiative campaigns between 1970 and 2010. Antitax advocates constructed a “taxpayer identity politics” that positioned a privatized “taxpayer” against representatives of the state, recipients of public services, and public sector unions. In response, a progressive coalition produced an alternative citizen—the “Oregonian,” a socially responsible taxpayer/citizen who supports and defends public services and values a “common good.” “Incipient commoning” emerges as support for “the common good” through discourse about community and belonging that is more and other than, though in relation to, the state. Attention to how “publics” conceive of themselves suggests that concepts like the “the commons” already circulate in the imaginaries and vocabularies of advocates resisting neoliberal policies.


Author(s):  
Shamsul Alam Mohammed Fayaz Al-Ghazi Shamsul Alam Mohammed Fayaz Al-Ghazi

This research deals with the rule of benefiting from the common share and its effects on transaction contracts; this research has been presented in five sections. In the first, I explained the commons and its causes with mentioning their types. In the second, I knew the effects of commonality in companies and demonstrated the dispute of jurists regarding the requirement of communality in the profit of the company. The third came indicating the effects of common property in mortgage, including the doctrine of the jurists in that and their evidence and what was mentioned in the discussions, indicating the most correct saying of the scholars. On the fourth, I explained the provisions of common lease between two partners. The fifth section included the doctrines of jurists in the endowment of one of the partners share of the public domain, explaining the evidence of jurists in that and what was mentioned in the discussions and indicated the most correct in it; then it was concluded with a conclusion that included the most important results and recommendations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 36-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
K.P. Acharya

The management of common forest land as community forest in Nepal is in practice since 1978. Studies showing the linkages between community forestry and common property resource are scanty in the country. This article discusses characteristics of common property resources and the principles and practices of community forestry in Nepal which is an example of common property resource management between Government agencies and users (co-managers). Forest User Groups (FUGs ) are the institutions responsible to manage the common property.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELENA GISSI ◽  
Portman Michelle ◽  
Anna-Katharina Hornidge

This viewpoint emphasizes gendered perspectives and reflects on gender roles for sustainability-focused governance. It argues that when considering gender in this context, not only equity, or power-plays between genders are at stake; in addition, for effective ocean governance, an irreducible contribution of female voices is necessary. Some key contributions of women in the field of ocean governance-related research are described as examples. If women, for instance, are not included in fisheries management, we miss the complete picture of social-ecological linkages of marine ecosystems. Overall, women are often regarded as major actors driving sustainable development because of their inclusiveness and collaborative roles. Similarly, women have advocated for the common good in marine conservation, raising important (and often neglected) concerns. In maritime industries, women enlarge the talent pool for innovation and smart growth. Besides the manifold possibilities for promoting the involvement of women in ocean governance and policy-making, this viewpoint highlights how gendered biases still influence our interactions with the ocean. It is necessary to reduce the structural, and systemically-embedded hurdles that continue to lead to gendered decision-taking with regard to the ocean.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Hintze ◽  
Jochen Staudacher ◽  
Katja Gelhar ◽  
Alexander Pothmann ◽  
Juliana Rasch ◽  
...  

AbstractThe public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons (Hardin in Science 162:1243–1248, 1968). In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same rewards as cooperators without having made a contribution before. The question is now, how to incentivize group members to all cooperate as it maximizes the common good. While costly punishment (Helbing et al. in New J Phys 12:083005, 2010) presents one such method, the cost of punishment still reduces the common good. The selfishness of the group members favors defectors. Here we show that including other members of the groups and sharing rewards with them can be another incentive for cooperation, avoiding the cost required for punishment. Further, we show how punishment and this form of inclusiveness interact. This work suggests that a redistribution similar to a basic income that is coupled to the economic success of the entire group could overcome the tragedy of the commons.


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