4 Nationalist and Labor Protest, 1913 –1919

2020 ◽  
pp. 76-91
Keyword(s):  
1976 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Handelman

In years past, Mexico's political system was often cited as a model for political development in the “third world” (Scott, 1974, 1965). While most Latin American governments allowed associational interest groups little opportunity to articulate their needs and demands, Mexico's ruling party (the PRI) provided institutionalized representation for three major segments of the nation's population: the agrarian sector (peasants and agricultural workers); the middle class (the “popular sector”); and organized labor unions. Anderson and Cockcroft (1966: 16) indicated that “the Mexican national leadership seem … to be committed to tolerating a substantial amount of political pluralism. It is taken for granted … that occupational groups attempt to promote their interests and demands through organizations.”More recently, however, a “revisionist” group of political scientists has disputed the contention that Mexico is moving toward democratic pluralism; instead they characterize its political system as essentially authoritarian (Purcell, 1973; Johnson, 1971; Stevens, 1970; Davis and Coleman, 1974). In this article I shall examine the degree of latitude which the Mexican political system allows independent labor movements I in articulating the demands of their members and in pressing I those demands on the ruling party.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 781-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
GRAEME B. ROBERTSON

Existing theories of labor protest depend on independent organizations representing workers. However, in many countries most workers are either not organized at all or are in labor unions intended for control, not representation. This is particularly the case in partially liberalized or hybrid regimes where, despite the introduction of electoral competition, autonomous, democratic organizations representing labor are not well developed. Yet such workers do protest. Drawing on an original new dataset from one hybrid regime, post-Communist Russia, I develop a theory of labor protest and of the institutional mechanisms used by elites to influence it. Instead of being a function of union membership or characteristics of the information environment, as the existing literature would have it, protest occurs when it is in the interest of powerful elements of the elite, or when economic conditions are truly desperate.


2013 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Su ◽  
Shizheng Feng

We study the propensity for protest in the context of individuals’ alternative choices in urban China. Depending on the number and quality of social ties (orguanxiin Chinese), individuals may resort to one of two alternatives: to engineer life-changing events through personal connections or to join others in labor protest. We call one “adaptation” and the other “voice.” As our working hypothesis, we first expect them to be mutually exclusive. That is, adaptation throughguanxinetworks may help diffuse the will to protest, as those who enjoy betterguanxinetworks would advance their class status through such networks. With data from a national survey, our analysis rejects this working hypothesis. Those who are better connected are not only more likely to adapt but also more inclined to voice, and the effect of social ties on protest is significantly smaller for those who are connected to people with power. The implications are twofold. First, our data not only confirm the well-known effect of social connections on protest, but also specify the effects caused by high-class versus low-class connections. Second, in a comparative vein, the individual decision making on adaptation and/or voice offers a glimpse into the intertwining domains of social space in contemporary China.


1960 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaston V. Rimlinger

An autocratic regime undergoing industrialization either develops effective techniques to “manage” inevitable labor protest or sows the seeds of its own destruction. Its highly concentrated authority is incompatible with the accumulation of power within the mass movements which industrialization engenders or stirs into action. It must destroy or control them. This problem faced Tsarist Russia as it later faced Soviet Russia. In neither case were the rulers inclined to treat industrial disputes as a private affair between employers and workers and leave the solution in their hands. Yet, the two cases are radically different in methods and consequences. The modern totalitarian state directs and controls labor through worker mass organizations, by channelling the energy of the leaders and the enthusiasm of the followers into predetermined patterns. This method of control, which is essentially indirect and “from within”, contrasts sharply with the old-fashioned method of direct control “from the top down”, which aimed mainly at repressing rather than using labor organizations and at resolving industrial unrest partly through punishment and partly through more positive preventive measures.


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