Fullerowski paradygmat (nie)dobrego prawa i jego aktualność „hic et nunc”

The subject of the article is Fuller’s concept of the (not) good law paradigm defined by three notions: “internal morality of law,” “natural law of a formal nature,” and “formal rule of law” — in the perspective of its application in the current legal order of the Republic of Poland. The discourse was conducted in two stages: on a general, theoretical, and axiological levels as well as on a detailed, practical, and praxeological ones. The epistemological level with its retrospective view bears resemblance of two models: bad law and good law. The first, encapsulated in literary legal fiction, describes eight cases (anti-values) of King Rex’s legislative failures. King Rex is monarch with authoritarian and conservative traits who excludes the system of government based on the proportional cohabitation of three powers — legislative, executive, and judicative — in favour of anocracy, which is a hybrid regime “suspended” between democracy and authoritarianism. The second is a remedy in the form of axiological contours, postulates (values) of good law: generality, promulgation, prospectivity, clarity, non-contradiction, reality, stability, and compliance. These principles of the formal rule of law, contained in the concept of “soft” jusnaturalism, are a specific professional and ethical code for the public authority which constitutes, executes, and applies the law. The practical-cognitive level refers to subjectively selected examples of abusing the good lawstandard in the Polish legal and administrative order. It shows the omnipotent and simultaneously dysfunctional executive power in the area of governance and administration, aimed at a radical reconstruction of the social and legal system.

History and the Future of the Hybrid Party Politics in Neoliberal Age: A Case of Pakistan

The causes of rising populism and collapse of the left-right ideological paradigms termed “death of ideology” is important development on election canvas. This trend in recent decades has been described as hybrid party politics. The neo-liberal discourse in hybrid regime shape party politics with free market values, issues of inequality, denial of social justice, and crises of freedom are rampant. Consequently, hybrid party politics perpetuate systemic deprivation and chronic punishment to marginalized sections. The fast penetration of neoliberal and populist elements quickly fused into multi-layered public pedagogy. The common political discourse propounds for quick solutions to seek legitimacy with expanding corporate power constantly. The socioeconomic inequalities consequence of expanding neo-liberal values in all spheres like education and electoral practices have recently started crucially influencing urban socio-political environment that shape populist narratives in electoral arena. Neoliberal-populists leadership promote free market policies that push forward neoliberal populist rhetoric across political parties of different shades. The combination of neo-liberalism and populism thrives on subjects who perceive it solution to their problems. Thus, fast penetrating market-centric subjectivities consider alternative subjectivities outside perimeters of social dignity therefore political inclusiveness becomes subject to connection with power. The educative public pedagogy has been at the base of rising populism unfolding hybrid party politics

The Hobbesian Moment

This chapter reviews how once in power, populist leaders try to assert their political dominance, which is invariably contested by some societal and institutional actors, and shows how this moment of decisive political confrontation determines the ulterior trajectory of the populist government. If populist chief executives succeed during this moment, an aggrandized executive emerges and electoral democracy will transition to a hybrid regime; if they are defeated or constrained, the possibility of regime change is averted. The chapter identifies the permissive and productive conditions that explain the failure or success of populist leaders in emerging victorious from this inflection point. The key permissive condition is voters’ support for radical institutional change. The key productive condition is the ability of populist leaders to use the state’s repressive apparatus to impose their political will. An additional productive condition is sometimes present: the organization and mobilization of low-income voters to support the populist project.

Demokracja w Serbii i Chorwacji w XXI wieku: w koleinach historii?

The author shows the contemporary political regime in Serbia, focusing on the role of the president and the party system. He traces Serbia's evolution in the last decade from non-consolidated democracy to hybrid regime or even non-consolidated authoritarianism from the historical experiences that shaped her political culture. He identifies the sources of autocratism and monism in her state, church and intellectual history. He compares Serbia with Croatia, which for twenty years is a non-consolidated democracy. The article shows that Serbian and Croatian historical pre-1991 cultural and political traditions influenced the perceptions of democracy and “strong leaders” rules of their contemporary inhabitants no less than experience from the transformation period.

Democracy revisited? Prospects of (liberal) democracy (not only) in the East-Central Europe

Scholarly debate about the prospects of democracy have undergone a fundamental change in the last three decades. While the period of the 1990s might be distinguished by extensive optimism, in the 2000s we can observe a distinct change towards a more restrained perception. Furthermore, the last decade might be evaluated as pessimistic in the social sciences on the grounds of economic recession after 2008 as well other crisis in an economic, societal and political senses. The rather distinctive terms used for the expression of doubts about the pro-democratic development and consolidation, such as ‘semi-consolidated’, ‘new’ or ‘young’ democracy, or de-democratisation, were replaced with more dramatic expressions such as illiberal democracy, democratic backsliding, hybrid, regime, soft dictatorship and ‘the light that failed’, as Krastev described the recent image of East-Central Europe in an almost dystopic manner. While in the 1990s the Slovak version of democratura – Mečiarism – was perceived as the exception, in the late 2010s populist neo-illiberal regimes became the dominant shape of regimes in (East)Central Europe. This review essay presents three recent analyses of the democratic backsliding and state capture (not only) in East-Central Europe and frames this presentation into the more extensive literature review.

8. Looking backwards, going forward?

‘Looking backwards, going forward?’ begins with a statement by Imran Khan, prime minister of Pakistan, wherein he mentioned Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the prophet Hazrat Muhammad and Allama Muhammad Iqbal. He tied the three historical figures with the thread of Islam as he sketched plans for his Naya Pakistan. In its seventieth year, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan had settled down to a democratic pattern or ‘hybrid regime’. Pakistan’s three successive elections since 2008 after six decades of military rule are important here. The question is whether Naya Pakistan is something new or is simply old Pakistan dressed up in a new outfit?