Chapter VI. The “Principle of Insufficient Reason” and the Right to Nonsense

1942 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Homer H. Dubs

Author(s):  
Sujit Choudhry

In Johar, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which criminalized same-sex relations. The idea of transformative constitutionalism figured centrally, as did a piece of the global template of rights-protection—proportionality. In Johar, the Indian Constitution was envisioned as a transformative document, in two senses: anti-colonial and cosmopolitan. It gave birth to a radically new constitutional order that conferred citizenship and political power on the previously disenfranchised living under the yoke of British imperial rule. The Indian Constitution was also a cosmopolitan constitution in its fidelity to the universal principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. These two conceptions of transformative constitutionalism define the scope of admissible reasons for proportionality analysis. Section 377 of the Indian Penal was unconstitutional on the cosmopolitan ground that mere social morality was an insufficient reason to limit the right to engage in harmless, constitutionally protected activity, the basis on which courts around the world have struck down parallel provisions. I argue that Section 377 was also unconstitutional for the anti-colonial reason that it was an element of the Imperial constitutional order in British India in the period after the Indian Mutiny in 1857 of indirect colonial rule.


KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gábor Szabó

Pierre Simon Laplace defines classic probability in his “Essai philosophique sur les probabilités” in 1814. According to Laplace, probability is the correlate of partial human knowledge. Laplace’s notion of probability rests on the idea that if there is no reason to believe one event is more likely to happen than the other, then the two events should be considered equally probable. This idea is the principle of insufficient reason defined by Jacob Bernoulli, most probably a counterpoint to Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason. The principle of insufficient reason is called the principle of indifference by Keynes and it is known under this name in criticism. Laplace defines probability as the number of useful happenings for creating an event divided by the number of events equally probable. The paper traces three presuppositions of Laplace’s definition and fasifies them one by one to show that his definition of classic probability cannot be defended. The paper claims that because i. in a determinist world there are not only epistemic probabilities, ii. epistemic probabilities are not necessarily subjective and iii. the principle of indifference does not provide sufficient basis for analysing probability, the classic definition of probability cannot be argued for.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
Henning Rosenau

The right to reproduction, including the use of modern methods of fertility medicine, is well founded on constitutional grounds and is protected by the Constitution Germany and of Estonia as well. This right is protected also at the level of European human rights, by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which addresses the right to a private and family life. In light of Article 8(2) of that convention, restrictions to these are deemed legitimate only when they are based on scientifically valid evidence and to protect the wellbeing of the child. The author concludes that the current state of scientific knowledge gives insufficient reason to justify prohibition of ovum donation and surrogate motherhood. Said prohibition discriminates against people who rely on such methods (thereby infringing on Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 3(1) of the German Basic Law). Therefore, ovum donation and surrogacy should be allowed by law, as is proposed under sections 6 and 8 of the proposal for a modern law on reproductive medicine (AME-FMedG) issued by the Augsburg and Munich Working Group of medical ethics lawyers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-301
Author(s):  
Dominik Janzing

Abstract The principle of insufficient reason (PIR) assigns equal probabilities to each alternative of a random experiment whenever there is no reason to prefer one over the other. The maximum entropy principle (MaxEnt) generalizes PIR to the case where statistical information like expectations are given. It is known that both principles result in paradoxical probability updates for joint distributions of cause and effect. This is because constraints on the conditional P ( effect ∣ cause ) P\left({\rm{effect}}| {\rm{cause}}) result in changes of P ( cause ) P\left({\rm{cause}}) that assign higher probability to those values of the cause that offer more options for the effect, suggesting “intentional behavior.” Earlier work therefore suggested sequentially maximizing (conditional) entropy according to the causal order, but without further justification apart from plausibility on toy examples. We justify causal modifications of PIR and MaxEnt by separating constraints into restrictions for the cause and restrictions for the mechanism that generates the effect from the cause. We further sketch why causal PIR also entails “Information Geometric Causal Inference.” We briefly discuss problems of generalizing the causal version of MaxEnt to arbitrary causal DAGs.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 320-320
Author(s):  
L. Barness

Given the Babel of information and misinformation, the question emerges: Is there a rational method to decide what to eat? To seek an answer, we must go back to a two-hundred-year-old idea that is usually referred to as "La Place's Principle of Insufficient Reason" and states that events are to be assigned equal probabilities if there is no reason to think otherwise. E. T. Jaynes has recently extended the principle to state use that "in making inferences on the basis of partial information, we must use that probability distribution that has the maximum (informational) entropy . . . maximally noncommital with regard to missing information subject to what is known." Without going into a detailed computer program, we can infer that the most rational aliment will be obtained by fulfilling known nutrient requirements, minimizing intake of proven toxic substances, and randomizing everything else. In other words, the most variable diet that fulfills known constraints is the diet of choice. The clue is variation: use different foods, change brands frequently, and never use the same recipe twice. Bring on the escargot, candied grasshoppers, roast guinea pig, alfalfa sprouts, macadamia nuts, falafel, turnip greens, squid, mare's milk, and seaweed salad. Minimize the intake of packaged foods, since they contain additives of unknown toxicity, and where they are unavoidable, keep varying the suppliers according to additives.


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