Chapter Two. Private Nonmarket Rule-Making in Context A Typology of Global Regulation

2011 ◽  
pp. 18-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattli Walter

This chapter discusses the key drivers and risks of private transnational governance. It shows that private governance rarely seems to stay purely private. When it fails to consider wider societal interests and concerns, private governance will draw unwanted attention from governments, potentially leading to oversight and regulation or public-private partnerships — what is referred to as ‘joint or hybrid’ governance. A trend towards hybrid governance appears to be detectable both in the cases of privatization of global regulation and the rise of transnational private justice. In the former case, states have taken steps to improve procedural transparency and broaden the range of partners involved in transnational rule-making. In the latter case, the constitutionalization of international arbitration governance promises to integrate and safeguard fundamental public policy norms in private judicial processes. Future research on global governance will have to carefully examine the significance and effectiveness of ‘joint or hybrid’ governance.


Author(s):  
Tim Büthe ◽  
Walter Mattli

This chapter presents a typology of global regulation, which differentiates the institutional setting for rule-making, which is either public or private, from the global selection process, which is either market based or nonmarket based. Four types of global regulatory governance are discussed. The first type, termed “public (governmental) nonmarket standard-setting,” involves collaboration through traditional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) or transgovernmental cooperation among domestic regulators. The second type is market-based private regulation, which entails rule-making by firms or other bodies competing, individually or in groups, to establish their preferred technologies or practices as the de facto standard through market dominance or other strategies. The third type of global regulation—private yet nonmarket-based—is regulation by focal rule-making institutions, such as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The fourth type of regulation results from market-like international competition between public regulatory agencies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Oliver Westerwinter

Abstract Friedrich Kratochwil engages critically with the emergence of a global administrative law and its consequences for the democratic legitimacy of global governance. While he makes important contributions to our understanding of global governance, he does not sufficiently discuss the differences in the institutional design of new forms of global law-making and their consequences for the effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance. I elaborate on these limitations and outline a comparative research agenda on the emergence, design, and effectiveness of the diverse arrangements that constitute the complex institutional architecture of contemporary global governance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-18
Author(s):  
Sherzod Khayitov ◽  
Keyword(s):  

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