Proper characterisation of the parol evidence rule and its applicability in international arbitration

Most arbitral statutes and institutional rules give great latitude to tribunals on the admissibility of evidence, and do not mandate application of domestic rules of evidence. In common law jurisdictions where the parol evidence rule applies, the issue that arises is whether the parol evidence rule is necessarily a procedural rule of evidence which tribunals are not bound to apply, especially in jurisdictions which have codified the rule under domestic evidence legislation. Notwithstanding any codification, this article argues that the parol evidence rule at common law is a substantive rule of contractual interpretation that should be applied as part of the lex contractus in international arbitration proceedings. Faithful application of the parol evidence rule as a substantive rule of contractual interpretation ensures that adjudicators arrive at the same interpretation on the same set of facts, thereby promoting uniformity, predictability, and consistency, regardless of the mode of dispute resolution.

Parliamentary Debates in Canada (1901–2015)

This article analyzes the effect of procedural rule change on the dynamics of parliamentary speeches in the Canadian House of Commons between 1901 and 2015. During this period, several new rules were introduced to reduce the opportunities for private members to speak during the debates so that the government could get its business done within an acceptable amount of time. Our analysis looks at the impact of these rule changes on the content and orientation of all individual speeches made by members of Parliament. The results indicate that parliamentary rules had an important effect on the topic and duration of debates. Our findings also confirm that procedural changes contributed to a heightening of partisan polarization in the Canadian Parliament over time and disproportionately reduced the influence of government backbenchers in the legislative process.

A PLEA OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY BY ACCUSED EMPLOYERS: ARE THERE LIMITS?

The rule against double jeopardy entails that, generally, a person cannot be charged more than once for the same, or substantially the same, offence or misconduct in respect of which he or she has been convicted or acquitted. Under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, this rule is part of an accused’s right to a fair trial. This article shows that every employer prosecuted for allegedly not complying with either employees’ tax obligations in the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, or for an offence at common law, is entitled to raise the procedural defence of double jeopardy. This article argues that the recent judgment in Grayston Technology Investment (Pty) Ltd v S is authority for the proposition that, in any such prosecution, an accused employer may invoke double jeopardy, even if the prior punishment or acquittal stems from non-criminal proceedings under the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 before the Tax Court or the Tax Board. A key hypothesis of this article is the argument that double jeopardy ought not to be applied as an inflexible procedural rule in every instance. This is because such an approach would lead to the undesirable result of undermining the Legislature’s objective in catering for criminal and civil sanctions in respect of certain violations of fiscal legislation. No hard-and-fast rules can be laid down in advance as to when double jeopardy may be successfully invoked. Each case needs to be decided on its own facts. It is contended that when a court decides whether to uphold a double-jeopardy defence, it must strike an equitable balance between, on the one hand, the accused employer’s fundamental right to a fair trial and, on the other, society’s legitimate interest in ensuring that taxpayers comply with their tax obligations on pain of adequate punishment for non-compliance.

Diplomatic Immunity Ratione Materiae and Crimes in International Law

Diplomatic immunity ratione materiae covers not official acts in general but merely acts performed in the exercise of diplomatic functions. Consequently, crimes in international law cannot be protected by this immunity because Article 3(1) of the Vienne Convention on Diplomatic Relations (vcdr) in general should accord with international law, although certain functions under the Article do not contain a ‘legal’ element. Further, diplomatic immunity ratione materiae cannot be upheld for jus cogens violations because Article 3(1) must not contradict a jus cogens prohibition. The dividing line between the procedural rule of immunity and the substantive rule of jus cogens is blurred by the fact that the scope of diplomatic immunity ratione materiae essentially hinges upon the contents a substantive treaty provision setting out diplomatic functions.

Rules are Rules: Reconceiving Monetary Gold as a Rule of Procedure

The Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 is familiar to all international lawyers. Like a catechism, we are taught that the ICJ will not proceed with a case where the legal interests of a State not before the Court “would not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision.” Mollengarden and Zamir's proposal that the Court should dispense with the Monetary Gold principle feels almost heretical. The authors contend that the ICJ Statute sets out a framework for balancing the interests of third parties through the use of the intervention procedure, and that Monetary Gold “disrupts that balance.” Monetary Gold is, they submit, to be treated as only a judicial decision, entitled under Article 36(1)(d) of the Statute to little deference as a source of legal principle. I suggest taking an altogether different approach. The best way to understand the place of the Monetary Gold principle is in the context of the ICJ's rule making powers pursuant to Article 30(1) of the Court's Statute. These rule making powers are not limited to the promulgation of formal Rules of Court but extend to the determination of appropriate procedures during the hearing of a case. These procedural rules (small r), articulated in the context of particular cases, may in time evolve into formal Rules of Court through an iterative process. Monetary Gold is an instance of the Court defining a small r procedural rule in a manner that is consistent with the Court's Statute.

Effect of Positivism in Clinical Legal Education

Clinical Legal Education (CLE) is an education in legal study that aims toprovide knowledge on practical expertise that aims to make lawgraduates capable of providing legal services (legal advocacy).CLEbecome important in recent days because of the tendency to resolvethe matter through legal channels is increasing. But in fact, it showsthat law enforcement is almost interpreted only as rule enforcement.The trend that happens, aspects of compliance procedures takeprecedence over justice. The modern law scientification is stronglyinfluenced by the emergence of positivism paradigm in modernscience. At present, along with the complexity of the problems ofpeople and society, the main character of modern law is a rationalnature. Rationality is characterized by the nature of a procedural rule oflaw. Procedure, thereby becoming an important legal basis to establishwhat is called justice, even the procedure becomes more importantthan talking about justice itself. Legal education, thus more likely toproduce professional practitioners. The resulting legal practitioners arelegal actors who are expected to make a decision which side is wrongand what is right under the provisions of the law. Through this paper isexpected to obtain the understanding that CLE should not result theLaw degree who only give priority to the compliance procedure aspositive law, but also still guided ethics and efforts to achieve justice.The method used for writing this paper is the socio legal research withinductive analysis. Thus, the fact that occurred in the law enforcementpractices will be a major premise and provide input and analysis in thispaper.

Public Deliberation in Russia: Deliberative Quality, Rationality and Interactivity of the Online Media Discussions

Deliberation research is now undergoing two emerging trends: deliberation is shifting from offline to online, as well as from an inherently democratic concept to the one applicable to less competitive regimes (He & Warren, 2011). The goal of this article is to study the peculiarities of deliberative practices in hybrid regimes, taking online discourse on the Russian anti-sanctions policy as a case. We use the Habermasian concept of basic validity claims to assess deliberation quality through the lens of argumentation and interactivity. Our findings suggest that deliberative practices can exist in non-competitive contexts and non-institutionalized digital spaces, in the form of intersubjective solidarities resulting from the everyday political talk among ordinary citizens. Such deliberations can be counted as argumentative discourses, although in a special, casual way—unlike the procedural rule-based debates. Generally, as in established liberal democracies, deliberation in Russia tends to attract like-minded participants. While the argumentative quality does not seem to vary across the discussion threads sample, the level of deliberative interactivity is higher on pro-government media, accompanied with the higher level of incivility. On the other hand, discourses on independent media are distinctively against the government policy of food destruction. The democratic value of such deliberations is unclear and might depend on the political allegiance and ownership of the media. Though some discourses can be considered democratic, their impact on decision-making remains minimal, which is a key constraint of deliberation.