Weltkommunikation und World Brain. Zur Archäologie der Informationsgesellschaft

There are varying medical, legal, social, religious and philosophical perspectives about the distinction between life and death. Death can be declared using cardiopulmonary or neurologic criteria throughout much of the world. After solicitation of brain death/death by neurologic criteria (BD/DNC) protocols from contacts around the world, we found that the percentage of countries with BD/DNC protocols is much lower in Africa than other developing regions. We performed an informal review of the literature to identify barriers to declaration of BD/DNC in Africa. We found that there are numerous medical, legal, social and religious barriers to the creation of BD/DNC protocols in Africa including 1) limited number of healthcare facilities, critical care resources and clinicians with relevant expertise; 2) absence of a political and legal framework codifying death; and 3) cultural and religious perspectives that present ideological conflict with the idea of BD/DNC, in particular, and between traditional and Western medicine, in general. Because there are a number of unique barriers to the creation of BD/DNC protocols in Africa, it remains to be seen how the World Brain Death Project, which is intended to create minimum standards for BD/DNC around the world, will impact BD/DNC determination in Africa.

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World Brain Day 2021: a call to stop multiple sclerosis

The Lancet Neurology ◽

10.1016/s1474-4422(21)00200-3 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Tissa Wijeratne ◽

Wolfgang Grisold ◽

Peer Baneke ◽

Anne Helme ◽

Rachel King ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Multiple Sclerosis ◽

World Brain

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Disrupted small-world brain network in children with Down Syndrome

Clinical Neurophysiology ◽

10.1016/j.clinph.2013.03.004 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 124 (9) ◽

pp. 1755-1764 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Mehran Ahmadlou ◽

Masoud Gharib ◽

Sahel Hemmati ◽

Roshanak Vameghi ◽

Firoozeh Sajedi

Keyword(s):

Down Syndrome ◽

Small World ◽

Brain Network ◽

Children With Down Syndrome ◽

World Brain

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Copernican Revolution in Physics and Cosmology: Vantage Point from beyond Earth

The Spontaneous Brain ◽

10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0012 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 351-376

Author(s):

Georg Northoff

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Body Problem ◽

Vantage Point ◽

Logical Space ◽

Copernican Revolution ◽

The World ◽

Pulling Forces ◽

World Brain ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Mind

Why do we so stubbornly cling to the assumption of mind? Despite the so far presented empirical, ontological, and conceptual-logical evidence against mind, the philosopher may nevertheless reject the world-brain problem as counter-intuitive. She/he will argue that we need to approach the question for the existence and reality of mental features in terms of the mind-body problem as it is more intuitive than the world-brain problem. Our strong adherence to mind is thus, at least in part, based on what philosophers describe as “intuition”, the “intuition of mind” as I say. How can we resist and escape the pulling forces of our “intuition of mind”? The main focus in this chapter and the whole final part is on the “intuition of mind” and how we can avoid and render it impossible. I will argue that we need to exclude the mind as possible epistemic option from our knowledge, i.e., the “logical space of knowledge”, as I say. The concept of “logical space of knowledge” concerns what we can access in our knowledge, i.e., our possible epistemic options that are included in the “logical space of knowledge”, as distinguished from what remains inaccessible to us, i.e., impossible epistemic options, as they are excluded from the “logical space of knowledge”. For instance, the “logical space of knowledge” presupposed in current philosophy of mind and specifically mind-body discussion includes mind as possible epistemic option while world-brain relation is excluded as impossible epistemic option. This, as I argue, provides the basis for our “intuition of mind” and the seemingly counterintuitive nature of world-brain relation. How can we modify and change the possible and impossible epistemic options in our “logical space of knowledge”? I argue that this is possible by shifting our vantage point or viewpoint - that is paradigmatically reflected in the Copernican revolution in cosmology and physics. Copernicus shifted the “vantage point from within earth” to a “vantage point beyond earth”; this enabled him to take into view that the earth (rather than the sun) moves by itself which provided the basis for his shift from a geo- to a helio-centric view of the universe. Hence, the shift in vantage point modified his epistemic options and thus expanded the presupposed “logical space of knowledge”. I conclude that we require an analogous shift in the vantage point we currently presuppose in philosophy of mind. This will expand our “logical space of knowledge” in such way that makes possible to include world-brain relation as possible epistemic option while, at the same time, excluding mind as impossible epistemic option. That, in turn, will render the world-brain problem more intuitive while the mind-body problem will then be rather counter-intuitive. Taken together, this amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy – that shall be the focus in next chapter.

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Spatiotemporal Model of Consciousness II: Spatiotemporal Alignment—Neuro-ecological Continuum and World–Brain Relation

The Spontaneous Brain ◽

10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0008 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 195-236

Author(s):

Georg Northoff

Keyword(s):

Spontaneous Activity ◽

Empirical Evidence ◽

Neural Activity ◽

Necessary Condition ◽

Spatiotemporal Structure ◽

Spatiotemporal Model ◽

Time Consciousness ◽

Spatiotemporal Scales ◽

World Brain ◽

The Brain

Consciousness is neuronal as it is based on the brain and its neural activity. This is what neuroscience tell us citing strong empirical evidence. At the same time, consciousness is ecological in that it extends beyond the brain to body and world – this is what philosophers tell us when they invoke concepts like embodiment, embeddedness, extendedness, and enactment. Is consciousness neuronal or ecological? This amounts to what I describe as “argument of inclusion”: do we need to include body and world in our account of the brain and how is that very same inclusion important for consciousness? I argue that the “spatiotemporal model” of consciousness can well address the “argument of inclusion” by linking and integrating both neuronal and ecological characterizations of consciousness. I demonstrate various data showing how the brain’s spontaneous activity couples and aligns itself to the spatiotemporal structure in the ongoing activities of both body and world. That amounts to a specific spatiotemporal mechanism of the brain that I describe as ‘spatiotemporal alignment’. Conceptually, such ‘spatiotemporal alignment’ corresponds to “body-brain relation” and “world-brain relation”, as I say. World-brain relation and body-brain relation allow for spatiotemporal relation and integration between the different spatiotemporal scales or ranges of world, body, and brain with all three being spatiotemporally aligned and nested within each other. Based on various empirical findings, I argue that such spatiotemporal nestedness between world, body, and brain establishes a “neuro-ecological continuum” and world-brain relation. Both neuro-ecological continuum and world-brain relation are here understood in an empirical sense and can be regarded as necessary condition of possible consciousness, i.e., neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC) (as distinguished from the neural correlates of consciousness/NCC). In sum, the spatiotemporal model determines consciousness by “neuro-ecological continuum” and world-brain relation (with body-brain relation being a subset). Taken in such sense, the spatiotemporal model can well address the “argument of inclusion”. We need to include body and world in our account of the brain in terms of “neuro-ecological continuum” and world-brain relation since otherwise, due to their role as NPC, consciousness remains impossible.

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Is Our Brain an Open or Closed System? Prediction Model of Brain and World–Brain Relation

The Spontaneous Brain ◽

10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0003 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 55-76

Author(s):

Georg Northoff

Keyword(s):

Prediction Model ◽

Closed System ◽

Neural Activity ◽

Resting State ◽

Clinical Symptoms ◽

Predictive Coding ◽

Human Cognition ◽

The World ◽

World Brain ◽

The Brain

Some recent philosophical discussions consider whether the brain is best understood as an open or closed system. This issue has major epistemic consequences akin to the scepticism engendered by the famous Cartesian demon. Specifically, one and the same empirical theory of brain function, predictive coding, entailing a prediction model of brain, have been associated with contradictory views of the brain as either open (Clark, 2012, 2013) or closed (Hohwy, 2013, 2014). Based on recent empirical evidence, the present paper argues that contrary to appearances, these views of the brain are compatible with one another. I suggest that there are two main forms of neural activity in the brain, one of which can be characterized as open, and the other as closed. Stimulus-induced activity, because it relies on predictive coding is indeed closed to the world, which entails that in certain respects, the brain is an inferentially secluded and self-evidencing system. In contrast, the brain’s resting state or spontaneous activity is best taken as open because it is a world-evidencing system that allows for the brain’s neural activity to align with the statistically-based spatiotemporal structure of objects and events in the world. This model requires an important caveat, however. Due to its statistically-based nature, the resting state’s alignment to the world comes in degrees. In extreme cases, the degree of alignment can be extremely low, resulting in a resting state that is barely if at all aligned to the world. This is for instance the case in schizophrenia. Clinical symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations in schizophrenics are indicative of the fundamental delicateness of the alignment between the brain’s resting-state and the world’s phenomena. Nevertheless, I argue that so long as we are dealing with a well-functioning brain, the more dire epistemic implications of predictive coding can be forestalled. That the brain is in part a self-evidencing system does not yield any generalizable reason to worry that human cognition is out of step with the real world. Instead, the brain is aligned to the world accounting for “world-brain relation” that mitigates sceptistic worries.

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