Time and Ensemble Dynamics in Indeterminacy: John Cage’s Concert for Piano and Orchestra

This chapter examines ensemble dynamics and time consciousness in indeterminate music, using John Cage’s Concert for Piano and Orchestra (1957–8) as a case study. Drawing on interviews and observational studies undertaken with the experimental music ensemble Apartment House, I examine the role of temporal indeterminacy in the socio-musical interactions that characterize performance, and its implications for the musicians’ experiences. In doing so, the chapter makes a broader contribution in its consideration of the ways in which issues of authorship and authority are negotiated in such temporal interactions, and how the dynamics of these negotiations present a sociality based on a ‘separate togetherness’, whereby performers play together (out of time) with one another.

The Contemplative Mind and Life: First-Person Methods and the Challenge of Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal Selfhood for the “Neurophenomenological” Research Program

<p>A new paradigm in cognitive science has emerged called the “enactive approach”, which has given rise to a research program known as “neurophenomenology”. This research program attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to investigate consciousness. In his recent and representative work Mind in Life, Evan Thompson has put forward the thesis that there is a “deep continuity between life and mind”. While I remain sympathetic to the neurophenomenological approach as an exemplar par excellence of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed, I argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: (1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; (2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. My argument begins by laying out the foundations of enactive cognitive science, the continental analysis of time-consciousness and Thompson‟s attempt to close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the neurophenomenological bridging strategy (dynamic systems theory). Next, I discuss the phenomenology of different types of (structured) experiences and the fact that continental and contemplative methods share a common logic. I then argue that first-person methods (i) offer prima facie evidence that there are perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience, and (ii) grant us “cognitive access” to both types of experience. Following this, I consider at least one non-perceptual type of experience (pure consciousness) that breaks down the dynamic and relational structure of time-consciousness. I argue that pure consciousness is phenomenally lived-through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-egological but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially holds true with regards to Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Finally, the nature of pure consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the grounds that phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure. Thus there is a conceptual discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain, being a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) and life. I thus conclude that prima facie: (1) first-person methods give us cognitive access to the objective and subjective domain of consciousness; (2) continental phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. Having completed my argument against the continuity thesis, I will briefly recommend specific avenues for future neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. In this way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point towards the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our understanding of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood.</p>

The Contemplative Mind and Life: First-Person Methods and the Challenge of Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal Selfhood for the “Neurophenomenological” Research Program

<p>A new paradigm in cognitive science has emerged called the “enactive approach”, which has given rise to a research program known as “neurophenomenology”. This research program attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to investigate consciousness. In his recent and representative work Mind in Life, Evan Thompson has put forward the thesis that there is a “deep continuity between life and mind”. While I remain sympathetic to the neurophenomenological approach as an exemplar par excellence of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed, I argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: (1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; (2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. My argument begins by laying out the foundations of enactive cognitive science, the continental analysis of time-consciousness and Thompson‟s attempt to close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the neurophenomenological bridging strategy (dynamic systems theory). Next, I discuss the phenomenology of different types of (structured) experiences and the fact that continental and contemplative methods share a common logic. I then argue that first-person methods (i) offer prima facie evidence that there are perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience, and (ii) grant us “cognitive access” to both types of experience. Following this, I consider at least one non-perceptual type of experience (pure consciousness) that breaks down the dynamic and relational structure of time-consciousness. I argue that pure consciousness is phenomenally lived-through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-egological but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially holds true with regards to Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Finally, the nature of pure consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the grounds that phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure. Thus there is a conceptual discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain, being a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) and life. I thus conclude that prima facie: (1) first-person methods give us cognitive access to the objective and subjective domain of consciousness; (2) continental phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. Having completed my argument against the continuity thesis, I will briefly recommend specific avenues for future neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. In this way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point towards the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our understanding of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood.</p>

On Time and Other Things: Some Cartesian Dichotomies in Antarctica

Antarctica differs from all other regions in the world, not only from its unique geography, but also in the way humans understand it and have incorporated it into global relations. Considering Antarctica's distinctive landscapes and human relations, this paper discusses aspects of how time is humanly perceived in Antarctica. Basing on elements from different human occupations, nineteenth-century sailor-hunters and current incursions, this discussion approximates different historical groups in their experiences of Antarctica, connecting their personal lives, past and present. Meanwhile, also put into issue are the dualities that separate nature and culture, physical and relative time, and past and present, as well as the related notions of time in itself, perceived time speed and internal time consciousness.

Agency and the Successive Structure of Time-Consciousness

I argue for constraining the nomological possibility space of temporal experiences and endorsing the Succession Requirement for agents. The Succession Requirement holds that the basic structure of temporal experience must be successive for agentive subjects, at least in worlds that are law-like in the same way as ours. I aim to establish the Succession Requirement by showing non-successively experiencing agents are not possible for three main reasons, namely that they (1) fail to stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the outcomes of their actions, (2) exhibit the wrong sort of epistemic status for agency, and (3) lack the requisite agentive mental attitude of intentionality. I conclude that agency is incompatible with non-successive experience and therefore we should view the successive temporal structure of experience as a necessary condition for agency. I also suggest that the Succession Requirement may actually extend beyond my main focus on agency, offering preliminary considerations in favor of seeing successive experience as a precondition for selfhood as well. The consequences of the Succession Requirement are wide-ranging, and I discuss various implications for our understanding of agency, the self, time consciousness, and theology, among other things.

“You Are Older, although You Do Not Know That”: Time, Consciousness, and Memory in “A Kind of Alaska” by Harold Pinter (1930–2008)

<i>“A Kind of Alaska”</i> is a one-act play by the British playwright and Nobel Prize winner Harold Pinter (1930–2008), based on the book <i>Awakenings</i> by the neurologist Oliver Sacks (1933–2015). This play, first performed in 1982, is centered around the character of Deborah, a middle-aged woman, struck by <i>encephalitis lethargica</i> (“sleeping sickness”) at the age of 16, who wakes up after 29 years of apparent sleep following the injection of an unnamed drug. This article analyzes how Pinter’s drama investigated the mysterious and fascinating relationship between time, memory, and consciousness. The term “awakenings,” chosen by Sacks himself, clearly refers to the restoration of voluntary motor function in patients with postencephalitic parkinsonism who responded to levodopa. However, it also suggests that these patients had an impairment of awareness. Actually, beyond the acute phase, subjects with postencephalitic parkinsonism were not sleeping but severely akinetic and therefore probably aware of the passage of time. Oliver Sacks probably did not entirely recognize the intrinsic contradiction between prolonged sleep (with consequent impairment of awareness and subjective “time gap”) of the acute lethargic phase and the severe akinesia with preserved awareness of the time-passing characteristic of postencephalitic parkinsonism. This confusion was further compounded by Harold Pinter in his play.

Getting Used To Sins: Looking At the Conditions of Customer Problems in the Context of Habit and Sin

There are experiences and accumulations that people have, consciously or unconsciously, throughout their life. These achievements are generally defined by names such as habit, moderation, temperament, and angel. While behaviors that are liked and praised by other members of the society are accepted, behaviors that are not approved are considered bad. Our habits are indispensable elements of daily life. Since they emerge without thinking and planning rather than being conscious, it makes life easier, practical and fluid. Although it is positive to make moral behavior and virtues a habit, when considered in the context of religious thought and worship life, over time, consciousness / consciousness disappears and can become actions taken without thought. When awareness and consciousness are disabled, religious thought and lifestyle show signs of degeneration. The way of life shaped by habit causes some behaviors that are seen as minor sins in the flow of daily life to be perceived as if there is no religious drawback in practice. Instead of shaping their lives in the light of the Qur'an and circumcision, people develop a unique perception of religion that begins to believe as they live. Verses and hadiths are understood beyond their real meaning with interpretations and compelling interpretations, where weak fatwas are accepted as sources. This situation leads the Muslim community to points that can produce dire consequences in terms of belief. In this study, habits-specific evaluations and determinations will be presented regarding these issues.