Voting in Central Banks: Theory versus Stylized Facts

Author(s):  
Roman Horváth ◽  
Kateřina Šmídková ◽  
Jan Zápal

Abstract The paper examines the ability of several alternative group decision-making models to generate proposing, voting and decision patterns matching those observed in the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee and the US Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee. A decision-making procedure, common to all the models, is to vote between adoption of the chairman’s proposal and retention of the status-quo policy, with heterogeneous votes generated by private information of the models’ monetary policy committee members. The members can additionally express reservations regarding the final committee decision. The three alternative models differ in the degree of informational influence between the chairman and the remaining members. We find that a “supermajoritarian” model, in which the chairman proposes a policy she knows would be accepted by a supermajority of the committee members, combined with allowance for reservations, closely replicates real-world decision-making patterns. The model predicts no rejections of chairman’s proposals, low but non-trivial dissent, even during meetings where the chairman proposes no change in policy, and predictive power of the voting record of the whole committee regarding future monetary policy changes.

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Nicole Baerg

This chapter introduces central bankers as “wordsmiths,” skilled users of words, who work together to construct and edit a monetary policy statement with an intention to drive the economy by shaping the public’s beliefs about the future. The chapter starts off showing that central bankers can be both relatively vague and relatively precise with the language that they use. Baerg highlights previous explanations on the benefits of delegating monetary policy to a monetary policy committee rather than to a single individual. Known benefits include better information aggregation and problem-solving. The author introduces the argument that monetary policy committees that have diverse policy preferences are more likely to be precise and illustrates, using examples from Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) transcript data, how policy makers bargain over the policy statement in ways similar to how they negotiate changes in interest rates. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the structure of the manuscript.


2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Jung ◽  
Francesco Paolo Mongelli

This paper explores monetary policy decision-making within an insurance model with expected utility-maximizing policy-makers. The authors consider that policy-makers are different in terms of their backgrounds, experience and skills and they may disagree on the appropriate policy response. In a monetary policy committee, they share information and decide on interest rates by means of an agreed voting rule. The authors show that, in the presence of risk and search costs, it would be optimal for policy-makers to fully insure against the expected loss from a potential policy error. Whether a monetary policy committee sufficiently hedges against this risk will depend on several factors such as the skills of policy-makers, the distribution of members’ beliefs, and the committee’s (statutory) voting rule, but also on other factors not captured by the model


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (5) ◽  
pp. 921-932
Author(s):  
Carlos Madeira ◽  
João Madeira

This paper shows that since votes of members of the Federal Open Market Committee have been included in press statements, stock prices increase after the announcement when votes are unanimous but fall when dissent (which typically is due to preference for higher interest rates) occurs. This pattern started prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The differences in stock market reaction between unanimity and dissent remain, even controlling for the stance of monetary policy and consecutive dissent. Statement semantics also do not seem to explain the documented effect. We find no differences between unanimity and dissent with respect to impact on market risk and Treasury securities.


2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Szilard Erhart ◽  
Harmen Lehment ◽  
Jose L. Vasquez Paz

2017 ◽  
Vol 82 (5) ◽  
pp. 879-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Fligstein ◽  
Jonah Stuart Brundage ◽  
Michael Schultz

One of the puzzles about the financial crisis of 2008 is why regulators, particularly the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), were so slow to recognize the impending collapse of the financial system and its broader consequences for the economy. We use theory from the literature on culture, cognition, and framing to explain this puzzle. Consistent with recent work on “positive asymmetry,” we show how the FOMC generally interpreted discomforting facts in a positive light, marginalizing and normalizing anomalous information. We argue that all frames limit what can be understood, but the content of frames matters for how facts are identified and explained. We provide evidence that the Federal Reserve’s primary frame for making sense of the economy was macroeconomic theory. The content of macroeconomics made it difficult for the FOMC to connect events into a narrative reflecting the links between foreclosures in the housing market, the financial instruments used to package the mortgages into securities, and the threats to the larger economy. We conclude with implications for the sociological literatures on framing and cognition and for decision-making in future crises.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Etienne Farvaque ◽  
Piotr Stanek ◽  
Hakim Hammadou

Abstract This paper starts by describing the composition of monetary policy committees (MPCs) in inflation-targeting and non-targeting countries. The experience of MPC members on their inflation performance is then compared, opposing inflation targeters with non-targeters. Our sample covers the major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, in the period 1999-2008. Our results first show that MPCs are different in inflation-targeting (versus non-targeting) countries. They also reveal that policy-makers’ backgrounds influence inflation, and that the influence of MPCs’ experience is much greater in inflation-targeting countries, while size effects are more important for committees that do not target inflation.


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