Optimal Industrial Policies in a Two-Sector-R&D Economy

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilad Sorek

AbstractThis study characterizes welfare-enhancing industrial policies in a two-sector-R&D economy that incorporates both vertical and horizontal innovation. It elaborates on current welfare analyses of two-sector-R&D economies along two lines. First, it explores the welfare properties of non-drastic innovations whereas current analyses are confined to drastic innovations. It is shown that while the endogenously chosen size of drastic innovations is insufficient compared to social optimum, the size of non-drastic innovations may be excessive compared with the welfare maximizing one. Second, it explores welfare-enhancing policies designed to restrict innovators’ market power, whereas current policy analyses focus on R&D and market-entry subsidies. The welfare-maximizing policies presented here combine proper limitations on innovators’ market power along with a corresponding production tax (or subsidy). The limitations over innovators’ market power are aimed to support the optimal innovation size, and the corresponding production tax is set to support the optimal product variety span.

2009 ◽  
pp. 124-135
Author(s):  
S. Migin

Application of technical regulation measures frequently leads to excessive administrative pressure in the conformity assessment sphere. This pressure negatively affects economic agents’ activities and business environment which, in its turn, influences external and internal competitiveness of Russian enterprises. The article treats conformity assessment as one of major parameters that determine market entry barriers and company’s strategic behavior. The market of conformity assessment services itself and its entry barriers are also considered. The article highlights the market power of certification authorities and justifies the necessity to modernize the accreditation system.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 35-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Przemysław Jeziorski

This study examines mergers in two-sided markets using a structural supply-and-demand model that employs data from the 1996–2006 merger wave in the US radio industry. In particular, it identifies the conflicting incentives for merged firms to exercise market power on both listener and advertiser sides of the market, and disaggregates the effects of mergers into changes in product variety and advertising quantity. Specifically, it finds 0.2 percent listener welfare increase (+0.3 percent from increased product variety, and −0.1 percent from decreased ad quantity) and 21 percent advertiser welfare decrease (−17 percent from changes in product variety, and −5 percent from decreased ad quantity). (JEL G34, L13, L82, L88, M37)


2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (11) ◽  
pp. 3459-3499
Author(s):  
Marc Bourreau ◽  
Yutec Sun ◽  
Frank Verboven

We study a major new entry in the French mobile telecommunications market, followed by the introduction of fighting brands by the three incumbents. Using an empirical oligopoly model, we find that the incumbents’ fighting brand strategies are difficult to rationalize as unilateral best responses. Instead, their strategies are consistent with a breakdown of tacit semi-collusion: before entry, the incumbents could successfully coordinate on restricting product variety to avoid cannibalization; after entry, this outcome became harder to sustain because of increased business stealing incentives. Consumers gained considerably from the added variety and, to a lesser extent, from the incumbents’ price responses. (JEL L13, L21, L96, M31)


Asian Survey ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kieran Broadbent
Keyword(s):  

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