scholarly journals Market Entry, Fighting Brands, and Tacit Collusion: Evidence from the French Mobile Telecommunications Market

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (11) ◽  
pp. 3459-3499
Author(s):  
Marc Bourreau ◽  
Yutec Sun ◽  
Frank Verboven
Keyword(s):  
Market Entry ◽  
Product Variety ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Mobile Telecommunications ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Brand Strategies ◽  
Telecommunications Market ◽  
Best Responses ◽  
New Entry

We study a major new entry in the French mobile telecommunications market, followed by the introduction of fighting brands by the three incumbents. Using an empirical oligopoly model, we find that the incumbents’ fighting brand strategies are difficult to rationalize as unilateral best responses. Instead, their strategies are consistent with a breakdown of tacit semi-collusion: before entry, the incumbents could successfully coordinate on restricting product variety to avoid cannibalization; after entry, this outcome became harder to sustain because of increased business stealing incentives. Consumers gained considerably from the added variety and, to a lesser extent, from the incumbents’ price responses. (JEL L13, L21, L96, M31)

scholarly journals Scanner Data: New Opportunities for Demand and Competitive Strategy Analysis

1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald W. Cotterill
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Scanner Data ◽  
Strategy Analysis ◽  
Price Response ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Sufficient Detail ◽  
Bertrand Price Competition ◽  
Reaction Equations

This paper reviews prior research by agricultural economists on the demand for food products using scanner data. Thereafter, a differentiated product's oligopoly model with Bertrand price competition is developed and used to specify brand level demand and oligopoly price reaction equations. The model has sufficient detail to estimate brand level price elasticities and price response elasticities which in turn can be used to estimate three indices of market power. The first index estimated is the familiar Rothschild Index. The paper develops estimates two new indexes, the observed index and the Chamberlin quotient for tacit collusion. It concludes with comments on how the proposed method for the measurement of market power in a differentiated oligopoly can be improved.

An empirical model of customer loyalty in the Jordanian Mobile Telecommunications Market

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mamoun N. Akroush ◽  
Samer M. Al Mohammad ◽  
Majdy I. Zuriekat ◽  
Bayan N. Abu Lail
Keyword(s):  
Customer Loyalty ◽  
Empirical Model ◽  
Mobile Telecommunications ◽  
Telecommunications Market

Investigating Switching Cost Roles in Determining Loyalty in the Mobile Telecommunications Market

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdul Qayyum ◽  
Do Ba Khang
Keyword(s):  
Service Quality ◽  
Customer Loyalty ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Switching Costs ◽  
Field Survey ◽  
Mobile Telecommunications ◽  
Perceived Service Quality ◽  
Equation Modelling ◽  
Quality Value ◽  
Telecommunications Market

The paper evaluates various roles (direct antecedent, mediator or moderator) of perceived switching costs in determining customer loyalty in the mobile telecommunications market. Data were collected through a field survey of mobile phone users in Pakistan. Structural equation modelling was used to evaluate hypothesized relationships. Perceived switching costs were found to play all three roles. Findings suggest that perceived switching costs directly influence customer loyalty, mediate the impacts of perceived service quality, value, and trust on customer loyalty and negatively moderate the relationships of satisfaction and perceived service quality with customer loyalty. Implications of these findings are discussed.

China's Practice of Implementing a 3G Mobile Telecommunications Standard

2009 ◽  
pp. 140-151
Author(s):  
Mingzhi Li ◽  
Kai Reimers
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Demand Side ◽  
Economic Aspects ◽  
Mobile Telecommunications ◽  
Economic Market ◽  
Political Market ◽  
Standardization Process ◽  
The Government ◽  
Telecommunications Market

This chapter analyses and evaluates the Chinese government’s 3G policy of supporting the creation and implementation of the country’s indigenous TD-SCDMA standard. On the supply side, the addition of a new standard has enriched choices available on the 3G mobile telecommunications market; however, on the demand side, the government had to force operators to adopt this standard due to their lack of interest in the new standard. Building on insights gained from North’s theory on the transaction costs of politics, the authors explain this standardization process as a result of interaction between the political market and the economic market which has ultimately been driven by ideology shifts that took place on multiple levels of China’s society in recent years. They contribute to the standardization literature by demonstrating how North’s theory can be used for integrating political and economic aspects in the analysis of standardization processes.

scholarly journals The tangled web of mobile telecommunication mergers: Hutchison Whampoa, Telefónica and BT

Info ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Curwen ◽  
Jason Whalley
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Data ◽  
Mobile Telecommunication ◽  
Mobile Telecommunications ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Corporate Strategies ◽  
Telecommunication Companies ◽  
Telecommunications Market ◽  
The Uk

Purpose – This paper aims to demonstrate how consolidation within Europe’s mobile telecommunication markets requires willing buyers and sellers. Design/methodology/approach – After highlighting the resurgence in merger and acquisition (M & A) activity in mobile telecommunications, the paper draws on a variety of secondary sources to analyse the strategies of three companies. Findings – The paper highlights the interwoven nature of the strategies of three companies: BT, Hutchison Whampoa and Telefónica. BT has returned to the mobile telecommunications market in the UK, with the company it did not acquire being purchased by Hutchison. As Hutchison implements a “double or quits” strategy in Europe, it has acquired operations from Telefónica, which, in turn, has exited most of its non-Spanish European operations to focus on Latin America. Research limitations/implications – The paper relies on secondary data and thus highlights the challenges of doing so and the need for more information regarding M & As to be in the public domain. Practical implications – There is a need to adopt a sector-wide or regional approach for analysing the strategies of telecommunication companies. Originality/value – The paper uniquely provides an overview of three corporate strategies to show how they interact with one another.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document