Historical Responsibility, Harm Prohibition, and Preservation Requirement: Core Practical Convergence on Climate Change

ENERGYO ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Shue
2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Shue

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to map the relationships of various moral arguments for action on climate change to each other in a particular case rather than to explore any single argument in depth or to make any abstract claims about the priorities among the arguments themselves. Specifically, it tries to show that “historical responsibility”, that is, responsibility (moral or legal) for past emissions, is very important, although not quite in the way usually argued, but that it is not by itself determinative. Other, independent considerations also greatly matter, although it happens that as a matter of fact all considerations strongly tend to converge towards the same conclusions about which states are responsible to act in order to slow climate change. “Historical responsibility” is shown to involve both contribution to, or causation of, climate change and benefit from climate change. Other factors that play roles in this case are ability to pay, the no-harm principle, and the duty to preserve the physical pre-conditions of human life.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Armin Rosencranz ◽  
Kanika Jamwal

This article argues that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s conception of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC) was never effectively implemented through the Kyoto Protocol. The investments under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism suggest that CBDRRC has been used by developed countries to buy a “right to pollute”, i.e., maintaining or even increasing their greenhouse gas emissions, while investing in clean energy in developing nations, thus defeating the essence of CBDRRC as intended under the UNFCCC. Second, it points out that the Paris Agreement reflects a significant shift in the CBDRRC, both in terms of its textual understanding as well as its implementation. A qualifier, “in the light of national circumstances”, was added to the principle of CBDRRC in the Paris Agreement, allowing a form of voluntary self-differentiation. This qualifier diluted a top-down, objective analysis of States’ commitments. For several scholars, this shift has meant a softening of the principle, making the “differentiation” more dynamic and flexible. In the authors’ opinion, the qualifier is a fundamental modification of the principle to make it politically more palatable. It completely disregards the notion of historical responsibility for climate change, which was the cornerstone of CBDRRC as conceived under the UNFCCC. Therefore, rather than presenting a more flexible understanding of UNFCCC’s conception of CBDRRC, the Paris Agreement marks a total departure from it. Lacking an explicit redefinition of the principle of CBDRRC, it is misleading to contend that the Paris Agreement is still anchored in it.


2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Goldemberg ◽  
Patricia Maria Guardabassi

The historical responsibility of countries listed in the Annex I of the Convention on Climate Change has been used extensively as a justification for the lack of action of countries not included in Annex I to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed the contribution of non-Annex I countries to the CO2 emissions in the period 1850 - 2006 to assess their relative contribution to total CO2 emissions. In the period 1980 - 2006 non-Annex I countries represented 44% of the total but this contribution increased in the period 1990 - 2006 to 48%. If we extrapolate present trends to 2020 they will represent 56% in the period 1990 - 2020. The "historical responsibility" of Annex I countries is therefore decreasing. If we take 1990 as the starting year in which the Climate Convention recognized clearly that greenhouse gases are interfering dangerously with the climate system, it becomes very difficult to attribute "blame" and "guilt" to Annex I for their historical contributions. It becomes also quite clear the need of non-Annex I countries to engage with Annex I countries in the effort to reduce emissions. The Copenhagen Accord has no mention of "historical responsibilities".


Author(s):  
Robyn Eckersley

This chapter critically explores the political and moral challenges involved in understanding the harms of climate change as the product of structural injustices with a specific focus on political responsibility. The chapter stages a critical encounter between Iris Marion Young’s account of political responsibility, and the debate among climate justice theorists on how to assign responsibility for mitigation and adaptation to citizens and states. This encounter demonstrates the value of a hybrid approach that includes, and bridges, forward looking shared responsibility and backward looking liability models, but also reveals a major predicament. The more that structural injustices based on historical responsibility are backgrounded, the easier it becomes to reach agreements between the world’s most vulnerable and most privileged. Yet doing so accelerates the skewed distribution of climate vulnerability toward the least privileged, diminishing the common ground needed to achieve an equitable allocation of responsibility for climate change.


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